Essays on the Social Impacts of Climate by Hsiang, Solomon M.
Essays on the Social Impacts of Climate
Solomon M. Hsiang
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy







Essays on the Social Impacts of Climate
Solomon M. Hsiang
It has been hypothesized that local or global climatic conditions can affect societies in a variety of
ways. However, to date, it has been difficult to measure the social impact of climate, so the scale and
scope of its influence on populations remains mostly theoretical. This dissertation integrates data and
quantitative methods from climate science, economics and political science to develop new techniques
for empirically measuring the the social impacts of climate. These techniques are used to measure
large-scale dynamical relationships between climatological conditions and the response of the societies
that are exposed to them. In general, the response of societies to climatological forcing is found to
be larger than previously thought. The concluding chapter discusses how these findings may inform
policies that govern the global environment and economic development.
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Understanding how human and natural systems are coupled is a research priority that has rapidly risen
in prominence. The interactions between human and natural systems are central to environmental
policies, sustainability analysis and, in many cases, development policy. Yet, to date, a majority of
research on coupled human-natural systems has focused on the impact that humans have on their
environment; while little is known about the effect that environmental conditions have on humans.
There are a number of general historical accounts that attribute human outcomes to geographic or
environmental conditions, but very few careful analyses of specific causal links.
Our ability to characterize human impacts on the environment better than we can describe en-
vironmental impacts on ourselves generates important asymmetries in policy. For example, when an
environmental policy is designed to balance costs and benefits of an environmental variable p, we are
only able to balance the tradeoffs that we know exist. The canonical public finance problem boils












In this case, the estimated costs of a policy come from our knowledge of how we affect environmental
parameter p and the costs we associate with improving environmental conditions. In the example of
anthropogenic climate change, these costs would be those associated with reducing greenhouse gas
1
2 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
emissions. Because these costs are well studied, the term
∑
j costsj(p) is often well characterized.
However, our limited understanding of the ways in which environmental conditions affect us means
that the term
∑
i benefitsi(p) is generally incomplete, often completely omitting some benefiti terms.
In these scenarios, the potential for such omissions would suggest that environmental policies might
generally be undervalued because cost estimates are generally more complete than benefits estimates.
Traditional approaches in empirical economics have been important for overcoming this asymme-
try. Modern techniques for identifying counterfactual environments have allowed us to describe many
environmental impacts on society that are otherwise impossible to measure and quantify. For example,
traditional approaches have worked well at describing the health benefits of limiting local pollutants,
such as soot. The largest contributions of these traditional approaches lie with their ability to identify
causal effects, and they have worked well when environmental parameters of social importance are
readily observable and measurable (for example, concentrations of soot in urban air). Unfortunately,
the statistical tools and research designs used for causal inference have not, on their own, been suf-
ficient for understanding environmental impacts on human societies when important environmental
parameters are not readily accessible.
A central challenge to understanding the impact of climates on societies has been the measurement
of environmental variables that climatological phenomena impose on societies. Unlike anthropogenic
pollutants like soot, natural climatological variations exhibit complex spatial and temporal structures
that originate from natural forcing. Further, because these forcings drive many phenomena in our
environment, natural climatological variations exhibit important correlations over space and time.
Both the complexity and correlation of climatological structures makes it difficult to parametrize and
identify their components that are most relevant to society. It seems that the difficulty of measuring
climatological phenomena may have been one of the important constraints for quantitative analysis of
climatological influences on society.
1.2 Approach
This dissertation focuses on the measurement of climate impacts; and its contributions arise directly
from new methods for generating socially-relevant measures of climatological phenomena. My interdis-
ciplinary training in climate physics and economics allowed me to transform raw climatological data
into socially-meaningful measures, which I apply in econometric studies of the climate’s impact on
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society. In each paper I examine different components of the general model
outcomet = f(C¯t, C
′
t, θt) (1.2)
where social outcome at time t is some function of the expected climate state C¯, a random environ-
mental component C ′ and parameters θ which agents may control. Understanding the structure of this
equation is essential to solving the problem posed in Equation 1.1 as well as for efficiently designing
other social policies that affect θ, such as building irrigation systems in poor countries.
The structure of Equation 1.2 is complex and the four papers in this dissertation can only illuminate
small pieces of it. However, each chapter highlights features that each individually have substantive
social significance. Taken together, these chapters paint a picture of the world where social outcomes
can be tightly coupled to environmental parameters C¯ and C ′, however there are regions in the space
of θ where this coupling clearly breaks down. As I discuss in Chapter 6, a central challenge moving
forward will be to understand exactly how social parameters θ mitigate or exacerbate the impact of
environmental forcing, a challenge that is not trivial because θ is highly endogenous.
The papers in this dissertation intentionally span several dimensions: I have tried to “fill in” as much
as possible of what is unknown about Equation 1.2 without generating overlapping results. In terms of
outcomes, these papers examine both market (Chapters 2, 3 & 4) and non-market outcomes (Chapters
3 & 4) by examining economic production (Chapters 2, 3 & 4), capital depreciation (Chapters 2 &
4), social & political stability (Chapters 3), the loss of human life (Chapters 3 & 4) and changes in
risk structures (Chapters 3 & 4). They also focus on different arguments of f(.): Chapter 2 studies
unanticipated atmospheric changes (C ′), Chapters 3 and 5 study changes in the underlying climate (C¯),
and Chapter 4 examines the scope for human actions to mitigate environmental events (θ). Further,
the types of climatological variations examined vary across the papers from local temperature and
rainfall anomalies (Chapter 2), to tropical cyclone strikes (Chapter 2 & 4), to the El Nin˜o-Southern
Oscillation (Chapter 3) and finally anthropogenic climate change (Chapter 5). At a more conceptual
level, these papers also differ by both examining how environmental fluctuations directly interact with
agents themselves, for example by making them less productive (Chapter 2) or killing them (Chapter
4), and examining how environmental fluctuations affect how agents relate to one another, for example
by inducing them to fight (Chapter 3) or increasing inequality (Chapter 5). Nonetheless, despite
my efforts to explore the space of climate-social coupling with broad brush strokes, this work only
represents the beginning of what is a much larger research endeavor. A large number of climatological
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phenomena remain unexplored with a huge number of potential social impacts. Furthermore, each of
the studies that follow are extremely “reduced form;” thus more work is needed to understand these
patterns’ underlying mechanisms. At a minimum, my work should be viewed as an attempt to establish
a basic framework of facts and methods that will enable us to better design and organize future work
on coupled human-climate systems.
The econometric approaches used in this work are similar to many of the approaches of applied
micro-economics, however my analyses examine highly aggregated data and adopt a “big picture”
perspective: three of the four chapters are fully global in scale, in cases utilizing summary statistics to
describe the state of the entire planet. This big picture perspective is useful for making generalizations,
however it is also an econometric necessity. Because the atmosphere and ocean are fluid bodies that
dissipate energy gradients rapidly, natural climatological variations tend to be large in spatial extent.
Thus, in order to observe enough variance in climatological variables that we can extract a signal in
social data, it is generally necessary that we adopt a regional or global perspective. However, this
requirement generates a new challenge: even though climatological phenomena may not vary rapidly
over small spatial distances, social phenomena do. Social processes separated by a few kilometers, let
alone a few hundred or thousand kilometers, may be entirely unconnected or dissimilar. Therefore,
as we adopt a global perspective, we must constantly be aware of social inhomogeneities (basically
variations in θ) that challenge the identification and external validity of my results.
The large-scale nature of climatological variations may have been one reason why several of the
relationships I characterize were not previously described by observers “on the ground.” When large
scale environmental patterns change, all the individuals in a location will be exposed to them and
it becomes difficult to find unexposed individuals for comparisons. Thus, without carefully tracking
changes over time or observing societies far from one another, it becomes difficult for observers on the
ground to identify a “treatment effect” when all observable units are treated simultaneously.
As mentioned, the large-scale perspective of these studies requires that they are interpreted with
care, however their large-scale nature can also make their interpretation intellectually exciting. When
we examine how the universe of societies respond to exogenous forcing of fixed magnitude (Chapters 3
& 4), we find evidence that social responses are strikingly similar around the globe. This consistency
suggests that there may exist “laws” to human-environment interactions, an appealing idea that will
require rigorous testing in the future.
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1.3 Chapter summaries
Chapter 2: Temperature strongly affects economic output probably through worker pro-
ductivity. In Chapter 2, I examine why temperature variations are so strongly associated with eco-
nomic output. Following up on the observation that high temperatures are correlated with lower than
average growth rates [Dell et al., 2009a], I isolate the impact of temperature from two economically
important correlates (rainfall and tropical cyclones) in a region with many small, relatively isolated and
economically similar countries. Following a panel of countries, I show that inter-temporal fluctuations
in temperature appear to have nonlinear impacts and are focused in labor intensive industries. These
results, when compared to laboratory results from ergonomics research, suggest these large macroeco-
nomic fluctuations probably originate in the response of workers to thermal stress. This mechanism
appears to have large economic impacts but has been omitted from both previous analyses of climate
change and development policies in currently poor and hot countries. In Chapter 5, I compute the
global economic cost of this mechanism under anthropogenic climate changes (with limited adaptation)
and find that it is similar in magnitude to the sum of all other previously estimated costs. However,
while these results do not conflict with cross-sectional correlations in temperature and economic out-
put [Nordhaus, 2006b], further work is required to understand whether or not this mechanism can
actually generate differences in incomes across countries.
Chapter 3: Evidence from ENSO that the global climate influences civil conflicts. In
Chapter 3, Kyle Meng, Mark Cane and I examine whether the global climate can induce civil conflicts
within societies. Building on historical accounts and drawing from extensive literatures in the climate
sciences and social sciences, we are able to map the timing of modern civil conflicts onto variations in
the El Nin˜o-Southern Oscillation (ENSO). By demonstrating that global patterns of conflict contain a
signal that originates from the global climate, our results overcome the previously unsolved challenge
of attributing violence to the global climate. Moreover, we find that variations in ENSO describe inter-
temporal variations in conflict risk more consistently, generally and robustly than any other commonly
used variables. These results may have important implications for how we interpret political history and
how we conceptualize the costs of future climate changes. They also may have practical implications for
the management of current conflicts, allowing us to reduce overall conflict incidence or at least limit
their humanitarian costs. Future work will focus on understanding the mechanisms through which
ENSO influences conflict, however it is unclear whether sufficient data exists so that these mechanisms
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can be disentangled in a satisfying way.
Chapter 4: Vulnerability to tropical cyclones declines rapidly but unevenly. In Chapter
4, Daiju Narita and I examine the rate at which societies become less vulnerable to tropical cyclones
(TCs). By improving and scaling-up the method I developed in Chapter 2 for reconstructing TC
incidence, we are able to compare how physically similar events lead to different social costs around
the world and over time. We are able to reject the hypotheses of previous studies that losses to TCs are
rising. Instead, we find that highly visible losses (deaths and economic damages) have been declining
rapidly for all but the most extreme TC events; and that this decline does not appear to be driven
by rising incomes. In contrast, we find that lost agricultural revenues, which are less visible, have not
declined in recent decades. Thus, unearned income now dominates global losses to TCs, a situation
very different from that observed mid-century when immediate damages dominated losses. These
findings demonstrate that societies can decouple their lives from climatological events at remarkable
rates when actions and technologies effectively mitigate risk; but at the same time these findings
identify ways in which societies may fail to decouple their lives from these events. By highlighting
where vulnerabilities may persist “naturally,” i.e. when events are exceptionally extreme or losses are
not visible, these results may help policy focus on social vulnerabilities that would not otherwise be
addressed. Future work will be needed to understand exactly what kind of social changes, such as
technological innovations or developments in political institutions, have lead to the effective reductions
in social vulnerability to TCs.
Chapter 5: Summarizing the global economic exposure to anthropogenic temperature
changes. In Chapter 5, I characterize the temperature changes that the global economy may be
exposed to if anthropogenic climate change proceeds unmitigated. This chapter differs from the others
because it is not concerned with causal inference but instead focuses on producing a useful tool to
streamline future research. Unlike smaller scale regional analyses, global evaluations of climate change
are notoriously complex and opaque. A particular weakness of these global studies, identified by the
modelers themselves, is our ability to describe the global costs of unmitigated climate changes. To aid
the process of constructing, augmenting and evaluating such global “damage functions,” I compute
temperature exposures for the global economy’s “primitive economic units”: people, croplands and
dollars of value added. By designing simple, useful and quantified measures of future exposure, I hope
that econometricians will more regularly project locally-derived response functions onto the global
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economy. In this way, the research community can begin to be more systematic and transparent
about whether global cost estimates are “reasonable.” In ancillary findings we also document that:
(1) the cost of thermal stress on productivity is potentially large, (2) summarizing global changes with
traditional global averages may introduce large errors to economic analysis, (3) temperature changes
are likely to be highly regressive, even before one considers the ability for wealthy populations to
protect themselves, and (4) the global economic impacts of warming seem unlikely to be positive.
Appendix
1.A Methodological lessons learned
The central methodological contributions of this dissertation lie in the techniques used for quantifying
social exposure to climatological fluctuations. In each paper, a new technique is developed to describe
physical exposure to a different phenomena. The methods for doing this vary, but in general they
follow these principles/rules-of-thumb, which have emerged through trial and error and which I collect
here for reference:
1. Physical processes should be described with physical measures. In the study of coupled
human-natural systems, there is frequently confusion between exposure to a physical process,
vulnerability to a physical process and the social cost of a physical process. Because exposure
is a physical event (sometimes called a “hazard” or “dosage”), it should be described in terms
of physical variables. For unclear reasons, many researchers try to describe physical processes
in terms of non-physical units, such as “the number of people affected by a cyclone.” It is not
obvious how such measures can be interpreted or reproduced.
2. Physical processes should be described by the parameters that are plausibly most
relevant to the social outcome of interest. Most environmental observations are recorded by
physical scientists whose interest is in developing a physical model of an environmental process;
and so the observations and measurements taken by these scientists are usually aimed at this goal.
Thus, there should be no a priori belief that raw environmental observations should map onto
social systems in any meaningful way. The analyst should be cognizant of how they expect “the
rubber to hit the road” when they study the interaction of climate and society and transform
their independent variables accordingly. Some researchers have used raw physical data which
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has no direct social significance, such as “the minimum central pressure of a cyclone.” Such
measures are difficult to interpret for non-scientists and will probably be out-performed by more
socially-relevant measures.
3. Physical processes should be measured in ways that are not manipulatable by so-
ciety. Modern econometrics emphasizes the importance of exogenous variation for independent
variables. Environmental fluctuations are often strictly exogenous, however if they are measured
by social systems they may be biased by the measurement procedure. When constructing mea-
sures of societies’ physical exposure to a process, the influence of agency should be minimized
as much as possible. For example, previous studies have used datasets where cyclone reporting
clearly increases with an expanding monitoring network, which itself is correlated with many
other social processes.
4. Physical understanding of a problem can augment weaknesses in data. Like all
datasets, many environmental datasets are unreliable or incomplete. However, understanding
the ways in which physical variables are related may allow a single process to be measured with
different datasets. For example, when rainfall data in the tropics is incomplete, it is possible
to use surface temperature data as a proxy because the two are coupled through the tropical
atmosphere’s static stability.
5. Scale-free intensive variables are probably the most generalizable. The social units in
a single dataset may differ in scale by orders of magnitude (eg. countries have different sizes
and populations). When comparing environmental impacts on social objects of different size,
both dependent and independent variables should be transformed into an intensive, rather than
extensive, form.
6. Construction of physical measures should be checked for robustness. Because there
are few or no standard techniques for projecting environmental variables onto social systems,
all procedures remains ad-hoc. However, the properties of a physical process should remain
qualitatively unchanged if the measurement process is pertubed slightly. This is important to
ensure that the measurement procedure does not itself generate artifacts in analyses.
7. If multiple events are to be aggregated, they probably should be measured in terms
of conserved values. In physical systems, it always makes sense to sum conserved values but
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often makes no sense to sum other summary statistics. This differs from many approaches in
social science where conservation is not always a central concept.
Chapter 2
Temperatures and Cyclones
Strongly Associated with Economic
Production in the Caribbean and
Central America
Solomon M. Hsiang 1




Understanding the economic impact of surface temperatures is an important question for both economic
development and climate change policy. This study shows that in 28 Caribbean-basin countries, the
response of economic output to increased temperatures is structurally similar to the response of labor
productivity to high temperatures, a mechanism omitted from economic models of future climate
change. This is demonstrated by isolating the direct influence of temperature from that of tropical
cyclones, an important correlate. Notably, output losses occurring in non-agricultural production
(−2.4%/ + 1◦C) substantially exceed losses occurring in agricultural production (−0.1%/ + 1◦C).
Thus, these results suggest that current models of future climate change that focus on agricultural
impacts but omit the response of workers to thermal stress may underestimate the global economic
costs of climate change.
2.1 Introduction
Understanding what drives and constrains economic growth is a classical problem in economics [Smith,
1776,Solow, 1956,Ramsey, 1928,Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2003]. While the relationship between envi-
ronmental conditions and economic performance is debated [Daly, 1996,Gallup et al., 1999,Acemoglu
et al., 2002,Easterly and Levine, 2003,Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2003,Arrow et al., 2004,Miguel et al.,
2004, Auffhammer et al., 2006, Dasgupta, 2008] it is central to cost-benefit analyses of environmen-
tal policies, such as the global regulation of greenhouse gases [Stern, 2006, Tol, 2009, Fankhauser,
1995, Nordhaus, 2008, Tol, 2002, Mendelsohn et al., 2006]. In this study, the economic histories of ge-
ographically and economically similar Caribbean-basin countries are analyzed to understand whether
year-to-year variations in surface temperature and tropical cyclones (hurricanes and tropical storms)
could be responsible for country-level economic fluctuations. The central finding is that short-term
increases in surface temperature are associated with large reductions in economic output across a set
of industries previously considered “not vulnerable” to climate changes. A temporary 1◦C increase in
surface temperature is associated with contemporaneous 2.5% reductions in economic output.
Recent work by Dell, Jones and Olken (2009) [Dell et al., 2009a] and Jones and Olken (2010) [Jones
and Olken, 2010] observe similar magnitude losses in, respectively, total production (-1.1%/+1◦C) and
exports (−2.0%/+1◦C to −5.7%/+1◦C) for a larger and more heterogenous sample of countries. They
hypothesize that this response may be driven by (1) a temperature-sensitive agricultural sector that
in turn has repercussions for the entire economy and/or (2) the response of human labor to thermal
stress. This second mechanism has largely been dismissed by modelers of future climate change in
favor of the first (for a review and discussion, see Tol (2009) [Tol, 2009]). However, this study suggests
that it is implausible for agricultural temperature responses to directly or indirectly drive the observed
economy-wide variations in these Caribbean-basin countries.
In the sample of countries examined here, total temperature-related losses in non-agricultural in-
dustries exceed the [statistically insignificant] losses of agricultural industries by a factor of 29. Three of
six non-agricultural industries suffer large and robust reductions in annual output that are dominated
by temperatures experienced during the hottest season and are non-linear in temperatures during that
season. The magnitude, structure and coherence of these responses support the hypothesis that the
underlying mechanism is a reduction in the productivity of human labor when workers are exposed to
thermal stress. The ergonomics and physiology of thermal stress in humans is well-studied [Ramsey
and Morrissey, 1978,Wyon, 2001,Pilcher et al., 2002,Hancock and Vasmatzidis, 2003,Seppa¨nen et al.,
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2003,Hancock et al., 2007], but has been absent from previous integrated assessments of global climate
change impacts [Stern, 2006,Tol, 2009,Fankhauser, 1995,Nordhaus, 2008,Tol, 2002,Mendelsohn et al.,
2006].
To isolate the direct economic impact of local thermal conditions, the impacts of correlated at-
mospheric processes must also be accounted for. Because temperatures in the tropical Atlantic and
local tropical cyclone activity have been correlated since 1950 [Emanuel, 1999, Mann and Emanuel,
2006,Elsner et al., 2008,Swanson, 2008], the economic impact of tropical cyclones must be estimated
and removed from the estimated effect of temperature. If correlations in temperature and output
were measured without accounting for the impact of cyclones, it would be difficult to know whether
local thermal conditions were directly responsible for reductions in output or if the correlation simply
measured the effect of cyclones on output by proxy. To measure the impact of cyclones so it may be
separated from the impact of temperature, wind-field histories for every storm passing through the
region is numerically reconstructed (Fig. 2.1A). Energy dissipation per square-meter is then computed
for each location in the region (Fig. 2.1B and 2.4) and spatially-averaged over each country for every
year (see Methods). When this measure of cyclone incidence is compared to raw economic data (for
example, Fig. 2.1C), it is clear that cyclones are a major factor in some economic processes and must
be accounted for. Annual rainfall is also controlled for in all of the statistical models, however the
results are not presented here.
Transient production losses associated with tropical cyclones exhibit an entirely different structure
from those associated with temperature; and are most strongly exhibited in agriculture and tourism,
the two sectors where adaptation via geographic relocation are plausibly the most costly. In contrast,
the construction industry expands production in response to cyclones, probably due to its role in
reconstruction. While the economic impacts of temperature changes only appear contemporaneously
with temperature fluctuations, the direct impacts of cyclones may persist for several years.
Annual longitudinal data from 28 countries in Central America and the Caribbean (1970-2006, see
Supplementary Section 2.A and Table 2.4) are analyzed with multiple regression analyses that simul-
taneously control for precipitation, average country-level differences in production for each industry,
country-industry time-trends in production and year-level shocks to regional-industry production (see
Methods and Section 2.B). Throughout this study the effects of temperature and cyclones are estimated
simultaneously, however they are presented in sequence for clarity.




































































Figure 2.1: Estimating tropical cyclone exposure and impacts. (A) An example idealized surface
wind speed function used to reconstruct the distribution of cyclone energy dissipated for each storm
(contours reflect the overlying surface). The direction of wind flow is irrelevant to energy dissipation,
so azimuthal flow is combined with the translational velocity of the storm (arrow) generating the
observed asymmetry in the wind speed field about the storm’s vector of motion. (B) The average
density of tropical cyclone wind energy annually dissipated throughout the Caribbean Basin over the
period 1851-2006. Countries included in this study are black, those excluded are blue. Inclusion is
based only on geographical extent and the availability of economic data. (c) An example of economic
impacts: banana crop yield (green) [source: FAOstat] and annual tropical cyclone energy dissipation
(orange) in Guadeloupe.
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Table 2.1: The effect of annual average surface temperature on production (1970-2006)
Industry %∆/+1◦C s.e.m. % output
Total production −2.5%** [1.0] -
Wholesale, retail, restaurants & hotels −6.1%*** [1.7] 20.4
Other services −2.2%** [1.1] 35.0
Transport & communications −2.2% [1.7] 10.7
Construction −0.6% [3.1] 7.4
Manufacturing +1.4% [2.6] 12.0
Agriculture, hunting & fishing −0.8% [2.5] 10.5
Mining & Utilities −4.2%* [2.4] 4.2
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
2.2 Temperature impacts
Annual average temperatures are associated with statistically significant reductions in total domestic
output and the outputs for three of six non-agricultural industries. These results are presented in Table
2.1 and they suggest that it is implausible for agricultural losses to drive these economy-wide responses
in the Caribbean and Central America. First, the statistically significant responses of wholesale, retail,
restaurants & hotels (-6.1%/+1◦C), mining & utilities (-4.2%/+1◦C) and other services (-2.2%/+1◦C)
are substantially larger than the estimated [statistically insignificant] response of agriculture, hunting
& fishing (-0.8%/+1◦C) when measured in percentage points. Second, these responses dwarf the losses
in agriculture further if they are measured in terms of their “economic size.” The last column of Table
2.1 lists the average contribution of each industry to total production. Wholesale, retail, restaurants
& hotels and other services together constitute 55.4% of value-added in the region’s average economy,
compared to the 10.5% represented by agriculture. Thus, production losses in the two former industries
account for approximately −2.0%/+1◦C in the economy-wide losses of −2.5%/+1◦C. This is twenty-
fold the losses in agriculture, hunting & fishing, estimated at −0.1%/+1◦C in economy-wide losses.
The sheer scale of the economic response to temperature suggests it cannot be driven by agricul-
ture alone, and the centrality of labor to production in wholesale, retail, restaurants & hotels and
other services is suggestive that ergonomic considerations may be important. However, additional ev-
idence substantially strengthens the case for ergonomic impacts. Meta-analyses of over 150 laboratory
and observational ergonomic studies agree that most forms of human performance deteriorate under
levels of thermal stress beyond a threshold [Ramsey and Morrissey, 1978, Wyon, 2001, Pilcher et al.,
2002,Hancock and Vasmatzidis, 2003,Seppa¨nen et al., 2003,Hancock et al., 2007]. Thus, performance
losses appear to be non-linear, with little or no performance loss from temperature increases in moder-
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Figure 2.2: The estimated impact of transient atmospheric changes in year t on total
domestic output. (A) Reductions in total output the year before (circle), the year of (square) and
the year following (triangle) a 1◦ increase in Sep-Oct-Nov temperature. (B) The same, but for a 1
standard deviation increase in cyclone energy dissipation. Whiskers are 90% confidence intervals, a
filled marker is statistically significant. Significance: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
ate temperature regimes and large performances losses associated with temperature increases in high
temperature regimes. If the economic responses to annual average temperature are driven by perfor-
mance losses, then they should be similarly non-linear and driven primarily by high temperatures.
Two techniques are used to detect the presence of this non-linearity. First, the effect of annual aver-
age temperature is decomposed into four seasonal contributions: December-January-February (DJF),
March-April-May (MAM), June-July-August (JJA) and September-October-November (SON). If the
economic response to temperature is non-linear and in agreement with ergonomic studies, temperature
changes during the hottest season (SON in this region) should have a larger economic impact than
temperature changes in other seasons. Second, spline regressions on degree-days are used to look for
non-linearities within this hottest season.
In all industries except mining & utilities and manufacturing, temperature increases during SON
(the hottest season) are associated with the largest reductions in production. Each column in Table
2.2 presents coefficients for seasonal average temperatures that are estimated simultaneously. Most of
the production losses associated with increased annual average temperatures are due to temperature
increases in SON. The effects of temperature changes during all other seasons are not statistically
different from zero (except one coefficient for mining & utilities). This is consistent with the hypothesis
2.2. TEMPERATURE IMPACTS 17
Table 2.2: The effect of seasonal average temperature on production (1970-2006)
Total Wholesale Other Transport Agr., hunt. Mining&
production ...hotels services & comm. Constr. Manuf. & fishing utilities
TDJFt -0.5% -1.4 0.1 -0.2 0.2 -2 -0.9 -3.5**
[0.6] [1.0] [0.7] [1.1] [2.4] [1.6] [2.0] [1.7]
TMAMt -0.3 0.4 -0.6 0.4 2.6 1.3 0 -1.2
[0.8] [1.0] [0.8] [1.0] [2.9] [1.4] [1.6] [1.5]
T JJAt 0.6 -0.8 0.6 1.2 0.7 1.5 2 0.3
[1.2] [1.8] [1.4] [1.5] [4.2] [2.3] [2.3] [2.8]
TSONt -2.9*** -4.6*** -2.6** -4.3*** -5 -1.8 -3.9 1.2
[1.0] [1.7] [1.0] [1.4] [3.1] [2.4] [2.4] [2.5]
Obs. 972 972 972 968 972 962 972 959
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, units: %∆/+1◦C
that production losses are nonlinear in temperature, with production dropping most strongly at the
highest temperatures. Furthermore, the coefficients for SON temperature are more precise than those
for annual temperature (Table 2.5). This suggests that annual average temperatures served as a noisy
measure of SON temperature for the results in Table 2.1, and that SON temperature is the measure
most strongly associated with economic output. Therefore, for statistical parsimony, SON temperature
is used as the sole predictor of output unless otherwise noted1. Using this model, both transport &
communications and construction exhibit significant production losses, compared to their statistically
insignificant responses to annual average temperatures.
Only current SON temperature is associated production losses, rather than future or past temper-
atures, further supporting the hypothesis that thermal stress during the production process is driving
losses. If temperature-induced losses in agriculture were driving the losses in other industries, one
might expect the losses in non-agricultural industries to lag behind temperature changes since it would
take time for the “temperature signal” to propagate through the entire economy. Fig. 2.2A plots the
response of total production to a 1◦C increase in future, current and past SON temperature. Only the
effect of current SON temperature is statistically different from zero. Fig. 2.3 plots similar results for
all seven industries. In the four industries significantly impacted by SON temperature, neither future
(Table 2.6) nor past temperatures have a significant impact on current production.
Estimating linear coefficients in Figs. 2.2-2.3 is a good approximation of the data. To show this, Fig.
2.4A plots non-parametric estimates of total production, wholesale, retail, restaurants & hotels, other
services and transport & communications, each against SON temperature (once the effects of other
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Figure 2.3: Industry-level production responses to temperature and tropical cyclones. Rows
are industries. The left column plots responses to average Sep-Oct-Nov temperature, the right column
plots responses to cyclone energy dissipation. Markings and units are the same as Fig. 2.2.
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Figure 2.4: Validating the appropriateness of a linear regression model. The responses to (A)
average SON surface temperature and (B) tropical cyclone energy. Measures are residuals following
regression on all remaining regressors. Histograms plot observational densities. The response functions
are most precisely estimated near zero residual values (abscissa), where observational density is high;
distortion near the tails is expected from sampling noise. These relationships are well approximated
by linear functions for residual values near zero. Panel (A) also shows that the estimated responses to
temperature are not driven by outliers.
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variables have been removed; see Fig. 2.7 for all sectors and confidence intervals). These estimated
responses are also broadly robust to the statistical model used. The estimated effects of current SON
temperature do not change substantially with the number of lags used, whether country-specific trends
are included, whether output is measured relative to the previous year’s output (rather than relative
to a trend) or if structural breaks following large cyclone events are allowed (Tables 2.7-2.8).
As a second test for the non-linear economic response to surface temperature, the response to daily
variations in temperature within the SON season are estimated. Even though economic data is only
available annually, daily production responses can be estimated using “degree days” (see Methods).
Fig. 2.5A plots the estimated response to daily average surface temperatures during SON for the
robustly temperature-sensitive industries (Table 2.9 provides coefficients and SE). Except for total
production, economic responses to temperature changes below 27◦C are not statistically different from
zero. For temperature changes between 27-29◦C, the responses become slightly steeper for all indus-
tries and statistically different from zero for wholesale, retail, restaurants & hotels and transport &
communications. Above 29◦C, the response steepens further for all industries and becomes significant
for other services (although it is no longer significant for wholesale, retail, restaurants & hotels). Taken
together, these results suggest that it is the years with a large number of very hot days during the
hottest season that exhibit the largest production losses.
Production’s transition from weak dependance on temperature to strong dependence on tempera-
ture occurs near a daily average temperature of 27-29◦C. For normal sea-level conditions, this roughly
corresponds to a “Wet Bulb Globe Temperature” (WBGT) at or above 25◦C, the level of thermal stress
near which human performance begins to deteriorate in laboratory experiments [Ramsey and Morrissey,
1978,Wyon, 2001,Pilcher et al., 2002,Hancock and Vasmatzidis, 2003,Seppa¨nen et al., 2003,Hancock
et al., 2007]. Fig. 2.5b shows “average” performance losses from three meta-analyses [Ramsey and
Morrissey, 1978, Pilcher et al., 2002, Seppa¨nen et al., 2003], a literature that informed the “Recom-
mended Exposure Limits” of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health of the United
States (1986) [NIOSH, 1986] (red line, Fig. 2.5b). Because humidity, radiation and air flow affect the
intensity of thermal stress experienced by workers, ergonomics research utilizes measures that cap-
ture their impact. WBGT, expressed in ◦C and plotted along the abscissa in Fig. 2.5b, is one such
measure. Insufficient data is available to calculate daily WBGT for this analysis, however the WBGT
equivalents of 27 and 29◦C at 80% relative humidity and 1000hPa (“normal” sea level conditions) are
orange crosses in Fig. 2.5 for reference. Daily average temperatures in the region regularly exceed
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these threshold temperatures (black curve, bottom of Fig. 2.5A) and are associated with years in which
labor-intensive industries experience the largest economic losses. This is consistent with the hypothe-
sis that country-level production losses associated with high-temperature years reflect individual-level
responses to thermal stress.
2.3 Addressing cyclones as confounding phenomena
To ensure the estimated impact of surface temperature on production captures direct thermal effects,
not the influence of cyclones, the influence of cyclones must be modeled simultaneously. This is impor-
tant because tropical Atlantic sea surface temperatures have been correlated with basin cyclone activity
during the last half century [Emanuel, 1999, Mann and Emanuel, 2006, Elsner et al., 2008, Swanson,
2008]. If the responses to cyclones and surface temperature are not modeled simultaneously, the effects
of the omitted variable might contaminate the estimates of the modeled response. Using a parametric
“storm kernal” (Fig. 2.1A) the historical exposure of countries to cyclones was reconstructed for every
year and every country (see Methods). For this analysis, “exposure” is measured as dissipated wind
energy per unit area and normalized to the observed standard deviation (mean = 0.32, min = 0,
max = 13.1).
Regression of total production on cyclone energy (Fig. 2.2B) suggests that the overall effect of
cyclones on output is not distinguishable from zero, but this is misleading. Decomposition of this
response by industry (Fig. 2.3) reveals that there are both large negative and positive output responses
to cyclone events. Also, contrasting with the impact of temperature changes, significant cyclone
impacts may persist beyond the year of the initial event. Agriculture, hunting & fishing (−1.8%/+1
s.d. and −0.6%/+1 s.d. the year following), wholesale, retail, restaurants & hotels (−0.9%/+1 s.d.)
and mining & utilities (−0.9%/+1 s.d.) all reduce output in response to cyclones, while construction
(+1.4%/+1 s.d. and +1.4%/+1 s.d. the year following) expands, presumably because of its role in
reconstruction. Fig. 2.4B demonstrates that a linear model of income is a good approximation for
the production response to cyclones for all but the most extreme observations (see Fig. 2.8 for all
industries and confidence intervals). These impacts are broadly robust to the statistical model used
(Tables 2.7-2.8).
The impact of cyclones on tourism-related income is disproportionately large. Data on total income
attributed to tourists, across all industries, is available for a shorter period (1995-2006) and reveals
substantial losses that persist multiple years. Table 2.3 displays reductions in tourism income relative
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Table 2.3: The effect of cyclones on tourism (1995-2006)
Deviations from a trend Change from prior year
Dependent var: receipts visitors $ per visit receipts visitors $ per visit
Cyclonest -1.6% -0.9 -0.6 -1.0* -1.5** 0.3
[1.0] [0.6] [1.1] [0.5] [0.5] [0.4]
Cyclonest−1 -3.5*** -2.8** -0.7 -1.8** -2.0** 0.1
[1.2] [1.1] [1.0] [0.8] [0.8] [0.4]
Cyclonest−2 -2.5** -0.9 -1.4 1.1 1.4 -0.3
[1.0] [1.2] [0.9] [0.7] [1.4] [0.8]
Cyclonest−3 -3.0** -2.0* -1.0* - - -
[1.4] [1.2] [0.6]
Cyclonest−4 -1.8* -1.2 -0.7 - - -
[1.0] [0.9] [0.7]
Cyclonest−5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 - - -
[0.7] [0.7] [0.7]
Cyclonest−6 0.0 -0.9 0.6 - - -
[0.6] [0.7] [0.6]
Obs. 275 273 273 252 250 250
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, units: %∆/+1 s.d. cyclone energy dissipation m−2
to a trend and relative to the previous year. The response in both models is large and driven primarily
by reductions in tourist visits, rather than by reductions of income per visit.
2.4 Discussion
Economies recover from shocks slowly, so the short-term impact of temperature changes have larger
long-term consequences. The estimated 2.5% reduction in output associated with a 1◦C temperature
increase in year t is the direct effect of temperature on output in year t. However, it is well known that
output in one year will affect output in the following year [Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2003]. Thus, a
temperature change in one year (t) will indirectly affect output in the following year (t+ 1) by altering
output in the first year (t). This is true even though it was shown in Fig. 2.2 that temperature in
the first year (t) did not directly influence output the following year (t + 1). In this sample, total
production in any year is observed to be approximately 0.9 times output the year before. Therefore, a
one-time reduction in output of 2.5% at time t leads to additional indirect reductions over all future
years that sum to 22.5% of output2 (as measured at time t).
This work analyzes only transient and unexpected variations in the atmosphere around the expected
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climatological state. When individuals adapt to changes in climatological conditions, the response may
differ [Smith et al., 2006,Deschenes and Greenstone, 2007]. Agriculture and tourism, industries where
geographic location plays a central role in production, suffer most from tropical cyclones. This suggests
that other industries, where relocation is a less costly adaptive strategy, may have adapted successfully
to cyclones. Adaptation to thermal stress may take many forms and some strategies will be available to
individuals even over short time horizons. For example, individuals may work less if high temperatures
make their efforts more exhausting [Graff Zivin and Neidell, 2010], although the costs of these strategies
may themselves be considerable. For this reason, it is possible that as countries become wealthier, they
are better able to cope with environmental changes [Dell et al., 2009a,Stern, 2006]. Within this sample
of countries, when the response to temperature changes and cyclones are allowed to be functions of
income (Section 2.C and Table 2.10-2.11) there is suggestive evidence that this intuition is generally
true.
While these results are specific to the Caribbean and Central America, the mechanisms are plausibly
quite general. Nonetheless, future work should evaluate the extent to which similar patterns hold in
other regions, taking into account those regions’ meteorological patterns and correlates of temperature.
Projected impacts from global climatic change have included capital losses from cyclones [Nord-
haus, 2006a, Narita et al., 2009] and the impact of temperature on agriculture and health [Stern,
2006, Tol, 2009, Fankhauser, 1995, Nordhaus, 2008, Tol, 2002, Mendelsohn et al., 2006]. None of these
integrated assessments have accounted explicitly for the impacts of thermal stress on human labor.
While agriculture’s vulnerability to high temperature is a focus of most estimates, this may be only a
small fraction of our economic vulnerability to changes in local temperature. It is estimated here that
output in the studied region would drop 2.5% in response to a temporary increase of 1◦C, but only
0.1% of this is attributable to reductions in agricultural output. The remaining 2.4% occurs in indus-
tries that have been omitted from existing cost estimates of global climatic change [Stern, 2006, Tol,
2009,Fankhauser, 1995,Nordhaus, 2008,Tol, 2002,Mendelsohn et al., 2006].
2.5 Methods
Annual economic data is available for 28 of 31 countries in the region (see blue boundaries in Fig. 2.1B).
Their combined population in 2007 was 81 million people. Details on the data are in Supplementary
Section 2.A, Table 2.4 contains summary statistics.
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Atmospheric data The local energy dissipated at the surface per square meter by tropical cyclone
winds are estimated and denoted C. Flooding, landslides and storm surges are not modeled explicitly.
Storm locations and intensities are taken from the Best Track record [Neumann et al., 1999]. Storms
are parametrically modeled as translating Rankine vortices [Kossin et al., 2007] out to a radius of 250
km on a 10 km grid (see Fig. 2.1a). Surface temperature T and rainfall R estimates are spatially
averaged over each country. Surface temperatures are from NCEP-NCAR Climate Data Assimilation
System 1 reanalysis [Kalnay et al., 1996]. Rainfall estimates are from the CPC Merged Analysis of
Precipitation [Xie and Arkin, 1996] (CMAP), with missing observations replaced with NOAA’s Climate
Anomaly Monitoring System (CAMS) [Ropelewski et al., 1985] estimates.
Economic data The production of goods and services is measured by per capita value-added and
its logarithm taken (denoted V ) so percentage changes can be estimated linearly. National accounts
are collected and maintained by the United Nations [UN, 2007] (UN) . Production in each country
is aggregated into industries according to the International Standard Industrial Classification of All
Economic Activities (ISIC): agriculture, hunting & fishing (ISIC code: A + B); mining & utilities (C
+ E); manufacturing (D); construction (F), wholesale, retail, hotels & restaurants (G + H), transport
& communication (I), and other services (J-P). Tourism data is collected by the UN World Tourism
Organization [UN, 2008].
Regressions The dependence of production on exogenous fluctuations in atmospheric states is esti-
mated by multivariate panel regressions using ordinary least squares (Section 2.B). Such connections
are identified by comparing only year to year variations in local conditions that do not follow the
secular time trend of the country and are distinct from regional shocks. This methodology differs
from cross-sectional analyses that compare levels of production between economies exposed to differ-
ent average environments [Tol, 2009, Nordhaus, 2006b, Dell et al., 2009b]. If the relation of interest
is approximately linear, short-run impacts can be identified by comparing idiosyncratic, year-to-year
variations. To account for simultaneous variations in temperature, rainfall and cyclone exposure, all
responses are estimated simultaneously using a distristributed-lag, auto-regressive (2) regression
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for industry j. ρ1−2 represent auto-regressive coefficients, γ and δ are country-specific trends for each
industry, η is a region-industry by year constant, µ is an industry by country constant and  is a
disturbance term. The variables of interest are the coefficients β, the derivatives of production with
respect to fluctuations in surface temperature T , tropical cyclone energy C and rainfall R. These
coefficients are assumed to be the same for all 28 countries, motivating the restriction of analysis to a
small group of countries with limited heterogeneity. Positive “lags” L are used to track and measure
the impact of events from previous years, up to some maximum lag τ ≤ 5.  characterizes variations
in output not explained by temporary atmospheric changes. Equation 2.1 is adjusted when estimating
seasonal impacts by replacing T with TSON and/or a vector of seasonal temperatures (in the case of
Table 2.2). A second regression model that omits the lagged values of the dependent variable and the




it − V ji,t−1 is also estimated (Table 2.7-2.8)
and provides similar estimates to Equation 2.1. Because this second model provides a more consistent
description of cyclone responses (across lag specifications) it is the model displayed in cyclone panels
of Figs. 2.2-2.3.
Figure 2.4 The non-parametric curve in Fig. 2.4 is a Nadaraya-Watson moving average with an
Epanechnikov kernel [Nadaraya, 1964,Watson, 1964]. The bandwidth in Panel A (B) is 0.1◦C (1 s.d.).
Bootstrapped standard errors for these curves are in Figs. 2.7-2.8. Both variables are residuals from
regressions on all remaining regressors in Equation 2.1 [Frisch and Waugh, 1933].
Daily production Daily production data is unavailable, however analysis of “accumulated degree-
days” can recover the response to daily average conditions if the response to temperature is constant
throughout the year [Schlenker and Roberts, 2009]. In Equation 2.1, the temperature term is replaced
by four terms representing the accumulated degree-days in four temperature bins: <27, 27-29 and
>29◦C. Temperature variations within each bin are treated as separate variables, with the OLS coef-
ficient for a bin representing the response of production to daily temperature variations only within
that bin. A full derivation of this model is in the Supplementary Information Appendix.
Uncertainty Uncertainty in the estimated values of β are calculated using generalized method of
moments estimates for variance of β. Non-parametric estimation of the variance-covariance matrix
for  allows for contemporaneous spatial correlations between countries whose centroids lie within 300
km of one another [Conley, 1999]. Following Conley (2008) [Conley, 2008], weights in this matrix
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are uniform up to that cutoff distance. In addition, non-parametric estimates of country-specific
serial-correlation are estimated using linear weights that decays to zero after a lag length of five
years [Newey and West, 1987]. This technique ensures that uncertainty in β is adjusted to account
for heteroscedasticity, country-specific serial correlation and cross-sectional spatial correlation. Due
to computational difficulties, uncertainty for tourism-related regressions is computed with a variance-
covariance matrix that allows for uniformly-weighted clustering by country [Bertrand et al., 2004,Newey




Table 2.4 contains summary statistics for the primary variables used in the analysis.
Countries Included in this study are Anguilla, Aruba, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, the British
Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Antigua and
Barbuda, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, the Netherlands Antilles,
St. Lucia, Montserrat, Nicaragua, Panama, Puerto Rico, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the
Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago and the Turks and Caicos Islands. Note that not all countries are
independent states for all or any of the years in the sample.
Temperature Observations are extracted from gridded reanalysis estimates from the NOAA NCEP-
NCAR Climate Data Assimilation System I [Kalnay et al., 1996]. Temperature is spatially averaged
over each country.
Rainfall Climate Prediction Center (CPC) Merged Analysis of Precipitation (CMAP) estimates of
rainfall are preferred because they merge available gauge readings with satellite data. When CMAP
observations are unavailable, they are replace by CPC’s Climate Anomaly Monitoring System (CAMS)
observations that interpolate gauge readings only. When combined, rainfall estimates are available for
the period 1950-2007. Like temperature, spatial averages are used.
Cyclones Storms trajectories and intensities are taken from the HURDAT Best Track database
[Neumann et al., 1999], with the wind field of each storm numerically reconstructed to estimate the
“storm experience” of individuals on the ground. This novel technique is implemented with the Limited
Information Cyclone Reconstruction and Integration for Climate and Economics (LICRICE) model,
which uses statistical relationships about key parameters to rebuild storm structures using information
collected prior to the satellite era.
The radius of maximum wind is predicted using a linear function of latitude and maximum wind
speed [Kossin et al., 2007], even when satellite data is available for statistical consistency. The field of
absolute surface wind speed is estimated by combining azimuthal winds and the translational velocity
of the storm. An example wind-speed function is pictured in Fig. 2.1A.
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Holding constant surface wind speed and drag (and thus the working rate), cyclone energy dissipa-
tion at a fixed location will increase when a storm remains over that location longer. For this reason,
power dissipation must be multiplied by the length of time a storm spends at a location, which is
inversely proportional to the storm’s translational speed. The translational speed of a storm’s center
is calculated for each six-hour interval of the Best Track record and then smoothed once with a 1-2-1
filter to prevent large jumps in storm velocity. Fig. S2.6 plots an example field of total estimated
energy dissipation for all points in the region during 2004.
All else equal, larger countries have more total energy dissipated over them, so energy dissipation
is normalized by a country’s area. Thus, the measure of energy dissipation is an energy dissipation
density that describes the expected quantity of energy dissipated over a square kilometer conditional
only on the year and the country containing that square.
The cyclone energy density C is an annual estimate, so it is summed over all storms affecting











where V storms is the translational velocity of the center of a storm indexed by s, V
wind
s (z) is the velocity
of wind at grid cell z, Ai is the area of country i, and κ is a constant capturing drag and the density of
air. This measure is analogous to a density of accumulated cyclone energy (ACE), a commonly used
alternative measure [?].
Economic output National statistical agencies, government ministries, central banks and other
international institutions provide national accounts data to the United Nations where it is standardized
into estimates of annually averaged production for twenty-eight countries from 1970-2007 [UN, 2007].
Details on the methodology for data estimation can be found at data.un.org.
Tourism Tourism receipts are the income earned by destination countries from visitors’ consumption
across multiple industries (lodging, transport, food, etc.) [UN, 2008]. It excludes income related to
international transport contracted by residents of other countries. The data is maintained by the
Secretariat of the United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO), details are at unwto.org.
Tourism data are available for twenty-five countries for the shorter period 1995-2006.
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2.B Method Supplement
The objective of this study is to empirically determine if the production of value in individual industries
has any statistical dependance on interannual variations in the state of the local atmosphere. Previous
work used a cross-sectional approach where patterns in production are correlated with the average
state of the local atmosphere [Nordhaus, 2006b, Dell et al., 2009b, Tol, 2009]. A critique of this
approach is that the average state of the atmosphere (a fixed parameter) may be correlated with other
fixed parameters (for example, altitude) which may themselves directly affect patterns of production
[Tol, 2009]. This is the omitted-variables problem: without describing all fixed variables affecting an
outcome, statistical inference on any single fixed variable may be biased [Greene, 2003]. Since it is
impossible to characterize this full set of fixed variables, this study removes all fixed differences between
countries and only examines trends related to dynamic variations. The average atmospheric states of
any two countries are never compared here. Instead, the influence of the atmosphere on production is
identified by looking at the response of production to perturbations in the atmospheric state around
its mean value. This should only compare a country to itself at different points in time when it is
experiencing a different atmospheric state. While each country may respond slightly differently to
atmospheric variations, a collection of countries is analyzed as if they responded identically to increase
statistical power, producing a single estimate (β) for the “average effect” of atmospheric conditions
on production within that collection. If the effects differ dramatically between countries, this average
effect will not describe the true structure of the relation well. For this reason, analysis is restricted to
a small region where atmospheric variations and productive processes share reasonable commonalities.
For industry j, let production of value be some function
V jit = f
j(Vji,t−1, t,Xi,Cit,Rit,Tit) + 
j
it (2.2)
where Vji,t−1 is a vector of historical production, Xi is some vector of fixed country-specific traits
and Cit, Rit and Tit are vectors of historical incidence of cyclones, rainfall and surface temperature
respectively. Atmospheric variations that impact production at time t may include events from the
recent past. Time t enters f j(...) directly for three reasons: (1) there may be trends in productive
output due to technological innovations that occur gradually over time, (2) production in a given
industry may be expanding over time due to economic growth or (3) specific years may be “abnormal”
for reasons unrelated to atmospheric processes, such as large variations in world commodity prices. jit
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describes variations in output not explained by the data.
Equation 2.2 can be approximated by a Taylor-series expansion in which non-linear terms are
dropped (except a t2 term, which is kept). The following linear approximation for f j is estimated:








by applying ordinary least squares to the data. The variables of interest are the parameters denoted
by β, the derivatives of production with respect to atmospheric fluctuations. The terms lagged by
L measure the impact of events from previous years, up to some maximum lag τ . If τ is larger
than the actual number of historical years that affect production at t, the estimates for β will be
consistent [Greene, 2003] (τ = 5 for all industries in all estimates unless otherwise noted). Each
industry in each country is assumed to have a mean output that varies smoothly in time. This
variation is thought to be different for each country, as different economies will expand in different
industries at different rates: γi and δi describe these changes over time. If a certain year has unusual
properties that affect all the countries in the sample (for example, world oil prices are high), then this
variation will be captured in the estimate of ηt. This term is an additive constant that is common
to all countries in the data, but only added for a single year. µi is a constant term that is unique to
each country. This term is critical because countries will have different baseline levels of production in
different industries for reasons unrelated to variations in atmospheric processes. This term captures
all static differences between production levels in countries described earlier as dependent on Xi.
The autocorrelation coefficients ρ1−2 describe the extent to which output in year t (relative to the
trends described by γi and δi) is correlated with the previous year’s output, holding all environmental
variables fixed. Because the sum ρ1 + ρ2 is large (but always less than unity), controlling for these
lagged dependent variables is essential to avoiding spuriously large estimates of β. However, because
ρ1−2 may be underestimated by Equation 2.3, a model in “first-differences” that constrains ρ1 = 1 (it
assumes V has a unit-root) is also estimated as a robustness check (see below).
The model in Equation S2.3 is equivalent to writing the model in terms of de-trended “anomalies”
of economic and weather variables (as is often done in the climate sciences). The two models produce
identical estimates for the β’s [Frisch and Waugh, 1933].
The omitted variables problem also applies to dynamic variables, such as temperature anomalies.
If the dynamic variation of two variables are correlated and both affect production, the exclusion
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of one from Equation S2.3 will produce biased estimates of β for the other [Greene, 2003]. Previous
literature has established correlations between cyclogenisis, cyclone intensity, surface temperatures and
rainfall [Mann and Emanuel, 2006, Camargo et al., 2007, Rosenzweig and Hillel, 2008]. Of particular
concern is the contamination of the estimated impact of surface temperature by tropical cyclones.
“Potential intensity theory” [Bister and Emanuel, 1998, Emanuel, 1991] predicts that the maximum
attainable intensity of cyclones will be determined by local sea surface temperatures (holding other
atmospheric variables fixed). Empirically, variations in the number and intensity of extremely intense
hurricanes are well predicted by local sea surface temperatures [Emanuel, 1999,Elsner et al., 2008]. If
intense hurricanes dominate the magnitude of economic responses, as suggested by Nordhaus (2006)
for capital damages in the United States [Nordhaus, 2006a], then a small number of cyclones may
seriously contaminate the estimated response of industries to surface temperatures. This may occur
even if the correlation between surface temperatures and cyclones is weak, should the response to
cyclones be nonlinear and the response to surface temperatures be small.
Table 2.12 displays the correlation coefficients (ρ) between C ′, T ′ and P ′. When integrated over
countries, cyclone energy dissipation is only weakly positively correlated with surface temperature
(ρ = 0.08) and weakly negatively correlated with rainfall (ρ = −0.04). Temperature and rainfall are
weakly negatively correlated (ρ = −0.14). Table 2.13 demonstrates that when the effect of temper-
ature or cyclones are estimated alone, they do not differ substantially from their values when they
are estimated simultaneously. Thus, it appears that in the region studied, regressions on temperature
without controlling for rainfall and cyclones would have revealed similar estimates. However, such a
study would have left the interpretation of these coefficients ambiguous. It would be unclear whether
the the included variable was directly affecting production or appeared to affect production because
an excluded variable actually affected production. Using the approach of this study, it is possible
to attribute the estimated impact of surface temperatures to direct impacts of local thermal energy
(enthalpy) and not to the primary secondary process associated with surface heating: intense trop-
ical cyclones. In the Caribbean Basin, cyclones are likely the most economically significant form of
correlated environmental variation. However, different regions around the world exhibit a variety of
environmental variations that are correlated with surface heating and which have plausible economic
significance. The environmental variables included in this study are limited to measures of major
processes in the local atmosphere and may not be comprehensive insofar as environmental variation
in the region is concerned (eg. earthquakes).
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Table 2.12 also displays correlations between variables in year t and the previous year t−1. Following
quadratic de-trending, C ′ (ρ = 0.10), T ′ (ρ = 0.55) and R′ (ρ = 0.49) still all exhibit serial correlation.
As production is also auto-correlated, there is potential for spurious correlations between weather
variations and economic output. Thus, an important check on the main results is to estimate the
effect of weather changes on changes in output, rather than output itself. If output is an integrated
process of order one, differencing output between periods will produce a stationary time series that
should not lead to spurious correlations. As mentioned in the main text, results from the model




βjLC × Ci,t−L + βjLR ×Ri,t−L + βjLT × Ti,t−L
]
+ jit (2.4)
are estimated and listed in Tables 2.7-2.8 in the columns marked “∆t−1.” The values for β estimated
by this model remain highly significant for the relationships highlighted in the main text. In fact, the
coefficients estimated for Equation 2.4 are actually larger than those estimated for Equation 2.3 for
total production, wholesale, retail, restaurants & hotels and other services.
Equations S2.3 and S2.4 relate annually-averaged temperature to production. In the main text,
Equation 2.3 is modified to decompose the seasonal contributions (L = 0 only) to this annual average:
V jit = β
j,DJF
T ×TDJFit +βj,MAMT ×TMAMit +βj,JJAT ×T JJAit +βj,SONT ×TSONit +g(Vji,t−1, t,Cit,Rit,Tit)
(2.5)
where g(...) contains all of the terms (τ = 1) of Equation S2.3 except the L = 0 term for temperature.
The superscripts indicate the average surface temperature over three months: December-January-
February (DJF ), March-April-May (MAM), June-July-August (JJA) and September-October-November
(SON). Table 2.2 in the main text presents these seasonal coefficients for all industries.
To test whether average or extreme temperatures are driving reductions in productivity, the relative
impact of extremely warm days is compared to the impact of “normal” days. If high temperatures
affect productivity more than average temperatures, then incremental changes in temperature will
affect production more at higher temperatures than the same incremental changes in temperature
at average temperatures. This will produce non-linearities in the response of productivity to surface
temperature, with the response function becoming steeper at high temperatures if they have larger
impacts on production. To detect such non-linearity, it may be insufficient to examine only the impact
of annually or seasonally averaged surface temperatures. To estimate the structure of non-linear
production responses to temperature, the response to daily average temperature is estimated.
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To construct such an estimate, let P˜ (Td) be a continuous function describing production as a
function of temperature T on day d:






that is approximated by a piece-wise linear function P¯ :









where 1[...] is equal to one if the statement in the brackets is true and zero otherwise. Here, xk is the
lower-valued limit of the kth segment and x¯k is the higher-valued limit of that segment.
If P˜ is assumed to be a function that is independent of the day of the year, than P¯ can be still
be recovered if daily temperature observations and only annual production observations are available.
(Schlenker and Roberts (2008) test this assumption and the assumption of piece-wise linearity, they
find them both to be reasonable for primary crops in the United States [Schlenker and Roberts, 2009]).






















by substitution of Equation S2.6 and interchanging the order of summation. The bracketed term[∑
d∈tDk(Tt)
]
is constructed for each year using daily temperature observations for each of the N
segments. This term is in units of “degree-days,” as it is referred to in the literature [Schlenker and
Roberts, 2009].
Fig. 2.5A in the main text is constructed by estimating such an equation for N = 3 segments with
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boundaries at 27 and 29◦C. The following equation is estimated with ordinary least squares:


















where g(...) is the same as in Equation S2.5. Here, the subscript d denotes daily observations and t
yearly observations. The estimated coefficients βj1 − βj3 are the slopes of the segments in Fig. 2.5A
(main text) and are tabulated with their standard errors in Table 2.9.
2.C Weather impact reductions with higher income
In the discussion of the main article, it was noted that as countries become wealthier, they may
become better able to cope with environmental changes [Parry et al., 2007, Stern, 2006, Dell et al.,
2009a]. Within this sample of countries, the response to temperature changes and cyclones can be
modeled as linear functions of income. This is done by “interacting” income and temperature or
income and cyclone exposure in the statistical model. This means that a new variable is constructed
by multiplying temperature by income, so that the effect of temperature becomes a linear function of
income (β˜+ ζ˜× income). However, because income in any year is also affected by temperature in that
year, income levels observed three years earlier is used in constructing the “interaction variable”. The
new model for temperature impacts becomes
V jit = β˜
j,SON




+ω× incomei,t−3 + g(Vji,t−1, t,Cit,Rit,Tit).
(2.7)
If increases in income make countries more susceptible to temperature impacts, than the estimated
values for ζ˜ should be negative; and if increases in income make countries more resilient to temper-
ature changes, then ζ˜ should be positive. Table 2.10 presents the estimated values of β˜ and ζ˜ for
SON temperature using models analogous to Equation S2.3 and Equation S2.4. Th structure across
these estimates is not entirely consistent. However, for temperature-sensitive industries other than
transport & communications it appears that increases in income generally increases resilience to high
temperatures. The disagreement in coefficients and significance levels for the two statistical models
suggests the need for additional analysis to determine what models are appropriate for modeling adap-
tation. Table 2.11 presents analogous results for tropical cyclones. Again, these results are suggestive
that higher income countries experience smaller losses to cyclones (in % of current income), however
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they are not entirely compelling. One concern is that those sectors with significant, positive-valued
interaction terms are not those sectors identified in the main text as most vulnerable to cyclones. A
related concern is that several industries that are vulnerable to cyclones do not exhibit significant
interaction terms. Thus, it is only with strong caution that these results can be taken as suggestive
evidence that increases in income generally reduce productive vulnerability to weather shocks. Future
work will focus on understanding this relationship better.
2.D Supplementary Tables and Figures
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Table 2.5: Comparing the effects of annual-average and SON-average temperatures
Panel (a)
Total production Wholesale, retail, Other services Transport &
restaurants & hotels communications
SON AVG SON AVG SON AVG SON AVG
Tempt -2.65%*** -2.50** -5.41*** -6.13*** -2.21** -2.16** -3.24** -2.16
[0.87] [1.01] [1.47] [1.68] [0.90] [1.07] [1.39] [1.70]
Tempt−1 -0.19 0.17 -1.11 0.69 0.79 0.82 -1.57 -0.72
[0.70] [1.00] [1.10] [1.54] [0.69] [1.00] [1.16] [1.41]
Obs. 968 968 968 968 968 968 964 964
Panel (b)
Construction Manufacturing Agriculture, hunting Mining
& fishing & Utilities
SON AVG SON AVG SON AVG SON AVG
Tempt -5.51* -0.55 0.70 1.41 -0.97 -0.76 0.67 -4.24*
[3.07] [3.12] [2.08] [2.61] [2.33] [2.48] [2.09] [2.44]
Tempt−1 -3.13 1.41 -0.57 -1.86 -1.21 -1.83 -1.70 -1.74
[2.34] [3.87] [1.62] [2.29] [1.89] [2.27] [1.96] [2.86]
Obs. 968 968 958 958 968 968 955 955
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors (in brackets) account for spatial correlation (uniformly
weighted up to 300 km) and country-specific serial correlations using a Bartlett window of five years. Units: %
output per 1◦C.
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Table 2.6: Falsification test: the effect of future weather on current production
Panel (a)
Total Wholesale Other Transport
production ...hotels services & comm.
TempSONt+1 -0.7% -0.2 -1.0 -1.2
[0.8] [1.3] [0.8] [1.3]
Cyclonest+1 0.1 -0.1 0.1 -0.1
[0.2] [0.2] [0.1] [0.2]
Panel (b)
Agr., hunt. Mining&
Constr. Manuf. & fishing utilities
TempSONt+1 -3.9 -0.8 -5.4** -0.6
[2.5] [2.0] [2.3] [2.1]
Cyclonest+1 0.1 -0.2 0.1 -0.2
[0.5] [0.3] [0.4] [0.3]
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors (in brackets) account for
spatial correlation (uniformly weighted up to 300 km) and country-specific serial
correlations using a Bartlett window of five years. Model includes regressors from
the “true” model in Equation 1. Each coefficient is a separate regression. Units
for temperature coefficients: % output per 1◦C, cyclone coefficients: output per
1 standard deviation in cyclone energy dissipated.
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Table 2.7: Robustness of main results
Panel (a)
Total production Wholesale, retail, restaurants & hotels
∆ from trend ∆t−1 ∆trend ∆ from trend ∆t−1 ∆trend
TempSONt -2.5%*** -2.7*** -2.2*** -2.9*** -2.8*** -4.3*** -5.4*** -4.6*** -5.0*** -5.5***
[0.8] [0.9] [0.8] [0.8] [0.9] [1.4] [1.5] [1.3] [1.2] [1.9]
TempSONt−1 0.3 -0.2 0.6 -0.8 -0.6 -1 -1.1 0.2 -1.2 -1.8
[0.7] [0.7] [0.8] [0.7] [0.7] [1] [1.1] [1.1] [1] [1.2]
Cyclonest -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.7* -0.8** -0.7** -0.9** -0.4
[0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.4] [0.3] [0.3] [0.3] [0.4] [0.6]
Cyclonest−1 0.3* 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.2 -0.1 -0.3 0 -0.3 -0.1
[0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.3] [0.3] [0.4] [0.4] [0.4]
Cyclonest−2 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 0 -0.3 -0.1
[0.2] [0.3] [0.2] [0.3] [0.3] [0.3] [0.3] [0.3]
Lags 1 5 5 5 5 1 5 5 5 5
FE & YE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
country trends Y Y N N Y Y Y N N Y
trend breaks N N N N Y N N N N Y
Obs. 972 968 968 996 968 972 968 968 996 968
Other services Transport & communications
∆ from trend ∆t−1 ∆trend ∆ from trend ∆t−1 ∆trend
-2.2*** -2.2** -1.9** -3.2*** -2.5* -3.5*** -3.2** -2.9** -2.8** -3*
TempSONt [0.8] [0.9] [0.8] [0.8] [1.3] [1.3] [1.4] [1.3] [1.2] [1.7]
1 0.8 1.4 0.4 0.4 -0.3 -1.6 -0.8 -1.9 -2
TempSONt−1 [0.6] [0.7] [0.7] [0.7] [1] [1.1] [1.2] [1.2] [1.2] [1.2]
Cyclonest -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5* -0.4
[0.1] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.3] [0.3] [0.3] [0.3] [0.3] [0.7]
Cyclonest−1 0.3** 0.3 0.4** 0.3 0.3 0.4* 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3
[0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.3] [0.3] [0.3] [0.4]
Cyclonest−2 0 0 0.1 0.1 -0.6** -0.6** -0.7** -0.5
[0.1] [0.1] [0.1] [0.3] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.6]
Lags 1 5 5 5 5 1 5 5 5 5
FE & YE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
country trends Y Y N N Y Y Y N N Y
trend breaks N N N N Y N N N N Y
Obs. 972 968 968 996 968 968 964 964 992 964
Models denoted “∆ from trend” or “∆trend” are regressions of ln(output) which control for two lagged values of ln(output) and
quadratic country-specific time trends. Models denoted “∆t−1” use a dependant variable that is ln(output)t − ln(output)t−1 and do
not control for deterministic trends. In all models, for each industry, country specific constants and year specific constants (so-called
“Fixed effects” and “Year effects”) are estimated (“FE &YE”). In the model with “trend breaks,” only linear country-specific trends are
included but two country-specific trend-breaks are estimated for the largest cyclone events experienced by each country. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors (in brackets) account for spatial correlation (uniformly weighted up to 300 km) and country-specific
serial correlations using a Bartlett window of five years. Units for temperature coefficients: % output per 1◦C, cyclone coefficients: %
output per 1 standard deviation in cyclone energy dissipated.
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Table 2.8: Robustness of main results (Continued)
Panel (b)
Construction Manufacturing
∆ from trend ∆t−1 ∆trend ∆ from trend ∆t−1 ∆trend
TempSONt -3.6% -5.5* 0.4 -2.8 -7.9* 0.1 0.7 0.7 -0.3 0.7
[2.9] [3.1] [3] [2.7] [4.3] [2] [2.1] [2.1] [2] [2.9]
TempSONt−1 -1 -3.1 2.5 0.5 -5 -0.5 -0.6 -1.1 -1.6 -0.3
[2.4] [2.3] [2.5] [2.5] [3] [1.6] [1.6] [1.6] [1.6] [2.4]
Cyclonest 1.2* 0.9 1.6** 1.4** 1 0 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -1.2
[0.7] [0.7] [0.6] [0.6] [1.4] [0.5] [0.5] [0.5] [0.5] [1.2]
Cyclonest−1 1.4** 1.3* 1.5** 1.4** 1.2 0.1 0 0.2 0.1 -0.8
[0.7] [0.7] [0.7] [0.7] [1.1] [0.4] [0.3] [0.4] [0.4] [1.0]
Cyclonest−2 -0.9 -0.9 -1.3 -0.6 -1.2** -0.9 -0.9* -2.1
[0.8] [0.9] [1] [0.9] [0.6] [0.5] [0.5] [1.5]
Lags 1 5 5 5 5 1 5 5 5 5
FE & YE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
country trends Y Y N N Y Y Y N N Y
trend breaks N N N N Y N N N N Y
Obs. 972 968 968 996 968 962 958 958 987 958
Agriculture, hunting & fishing Mining & Utilities
∆ from trend ∆t−1 ∆trend ∆ from trend ∆t−1 ∆trend
TempSONt -1.7 -1 -3.3 -2 -0.3 0.5 0.7 2.2 0.5 2.3
[1.9] [2.3] [2.2] [2.1] [2.2] [2] [2.1] [1.8] [2] [3.7]
TempSONt−1 -0.8 -1.2 -2.7 -2.2 -1.9 -2 -1.7 -0.9 -1.2 -0.1
[2] [1.9] [1.8] [1.9] [2.7] [1.8] [2] [1.8] [1.9] [3.1]
Cyclonest -1.1*** -1.3*** -1.6*** -1.8*** -1.4*** -0.8** -0.9** -0.6 -0.9** -0.5
[0.3] [0.3] [0.3] [0.4] [0.8] [0.3] [0.4] [0.4] [0.4] [0.8]
Cyclonest−1 -0.8** -0.8** -0.7** -0.6* -1.2* -0.1 -0.3 0.1 0.1 -0.2
[0.3] [0.4] [0.3] [0.4] [0.7] [0.3] [0.3] [0.3] [0.4] [0.6]
Cyclonest−2 -0.7 -0.2 -0.2 -1.3 -0.1 0.4 0.3 0.2
[0.6] [0.6] [0.6] [1.2] [0.4] [0.4] [0.4] [0.6]
Lags 1 5 5 5 5 1 5 5 5 5
FE & YE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
country trends Y Y N N Y Y Y N N Y
trend breaks N N N N Y N N N N Y
Obs. 972 968 968 996 968 959 955 955 985 955
Models denoted “∆ from trend” or “∆trend” are regressions of ln(output) which control for two lagged values of
ln(output) and quadratic country-specific time trends. Models denoted “∆t−1” use a dependant variable that is
ln(output)t − ln(output)t−1 and do not control for deterministic trends. In all models, for each industry, country spe-
cific constants and year specific constants (so-called “Fixed effects” and “Year effects”) are estimated (“FE &YE”). In
the model with “trend breaks,” only linear country-specific trends are included but two country-specific trend-breaks are
estimated for the largest cyclone events experienced by each country. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors (in
brackets) account for spatial correlation (uniformly weighted up to 300 km) and country-specific serial correlations using a
Bartlett window of five years. Units for temperature coefficients: % output per 1◦C, cyclone coefficients: % output per 1
standard deviation in cyclone energy dissipated.
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Table 2.9: Non-linear response to daily mean surface temperature [%∆/+ 1◦C in bin]
Total Wholesale Other Transport
production ...hotels services & comm.
TempSONt < 27
◦C -2.9** -2.7 -1.4 -3.1
[1.4] [2.4] [1.3] [2.1]
27◦C< TempSONt < 29
◦C -2.1* -3.9** -2.0 -3.7**
[1.1] [1.8] [1.2] [1.7]
29◦C< TempSONt -4.4* -4.5 -4.1* -9.6**
[2.5] [4.4] [2.4] [4.2]
Obs. 973 973 973 969
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors (in brackets) account for spatial
correlation (uniformly weighted up to 300 km) and country-specific serial correlations
using a Bartlett window of five years. Units: % output per 1◦C.
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Cyclones (C ′t) 1
C ′t−1 0.1015 1
Temperature (T ′t ) 0.0753 0.0454 1
T ′t−1 0.1127 0.0892 0.5517 1
Rainfall (R′t) -0.0376 -0.1055 -0.1428 -0.1575 1


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2.6: An example of the computed energy dissipated by tropical cyclones for a single year (2004).
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Global Climate Influences Civil
Conflicts: Evidence from El Nin˜o




It has been hypothesized that global climatic changes have been responsible for episodes of widespread
violence and even the collapse of civilizations. Yet previous studies have not shown that violence can
be attributed to the global climate, only that random weather events might be correlated with conflict
in some cases. Here, we directly connect planetary-scale climate changes to global patterns of civil
conflict by examining the dominant interannual mode of the modern climate, the El Nin˜o-Southern
Oscillation (ENSO). Historians have argued that ENSO may have driven global patterns of civil conflict
in the distant past, a hypothesis that we extend to the modern era and test quantitatively. Using data
from 1950 to 2004, we show that the probability of new civil conflicts arising throughout the tropics
doubles during El Nin˜o years relative to La Nin˜a years. This result, which indicates that ENSO has
played a role in 21% of all civil conflicts since 1950, is the first demonstration that the global climate
has a strong impact on the stability of societies in the modern world.
3.1 Introduction
The idea that the global climate might influence the peacefulness of societies [Homer-Dixon, 1991,Dia-
mond, 2005,Grove, 2007,Davis, 2002,Fagan, 2009] has motivated a growing body of research [?]. How-
ever, much of the support for this idea is anecdotal and the two methodologies dominating quantitative
work on this problem have yielded inconclusive results [Salehyan, 2008]. The first of these approaches
correlates multi-century trends in regional climate with trends in wars [Zhang et al., 2007, Tol and
Wagner, 2009], but such correlations are weak [Tol and Wagner, 2009] and gradual social changes
over multiple centuries confound results. The second approach avoids confounding trends by corre-
lating random changes in local annual temperature or rainfall with local civil conflicts [Miguel et al.,
2004, Levy et al., 2005, Burke et al., 2009, Jensen and Gleditsch, 2009, Buhaug, 2010], but different
statistical assumptions have yielded different results and the notion that random local temperature or
rainfall shocks are analogs for global climate changes have been criticized on three grounds: (1) The
global climate may affect a large number of interacting environmental variables that influence conflict
but are not adequately summarized by local temperature and rainfall; (2) Systematic environmental
changes that occur on a planetary scale may influence markets, geopolitics or other social systems
differently than location-specific weather shocks that are uncorrelated with weather in other locations;
(3) Predictable changes in climate and unpredictable weather shocks may generate very different social
responses, even if they are otherwise identical. We circumvent these issues by examining ENSO varia-
tions, which shift the planet’s climate through a spectrum of states much faster than confounding social
changes occur (Fig. 3.1a). An ENSO index summarizes global and multi-dimensional climatological
changes that occur simultaneously at locations throughout the tropics and subtropics [Ropelewski and
Halpert, 1987, Chiang and Sobel, 2002, Sarachik and Cane, 2010]. Furthermore, early-season ENSO
processes inform populations about late-season events, allowing individuals to respond to foreseeable
climate conditions. Our approach is to use a parsimonious statistical model to demonstrate a robust
connection between a global climate variation, ENSO, and the onset of civil conflicts. This technique
is methodologically clear, but is unable to provide direct insight into the mechanisms linking conflict
to ENSO. We return to this issue below.
3.2. APPROACH 53
3.2 Approach
ENSO may plausibly influence multiple varieties of conflict, such as riots or genocides, however we
restrict this analysis to organized political violence. We examine the Onset and Duration of Intrastate
Conflict Dataset [Gleditsch et al., 2002,Strand, 2006] that codes a country as experiencing conflict onset
if more than 25 battle-related deaths occur in a new civil dispute between a government and another
organized party over a stated political incompatibility (see Supplementary Information Section 3.A and
Supplementary Table 3.2 for data details). Following Strand [Strand, 2006] (2006), a dispute is “new”
if it has been at least two years since that dispute was last active; however, individual countries may
experience conflict onset in sequential years if the government has sequential disputes with different
opposition groups. (Sensitivity to this criteria is explored in the Supplementary Information.) Using
this statistic, we define annual conflict risk (ACR) in a collection of countries to be the probability
that a randomly selected country in the set experiences conflict onset in a given year. Importantly,
this ACR measure removes trends in conflict counts due to the growing number of countries [Gleditsch
et al., 2002,Blattman and Miguel, 2010] (Fig. 3.1b and Supplementary Fig. 3.4).
In an impossible but ideal experiment, we would observe two identical Earths, change the global
climate of one and observe whether ACR in the two Earths diverged. In practice, we can approximate
this experiment if the one Earth that we do observe randomly shifts back and forth between two
different climate states. Such a quasi-experiment is ongoing and is characterized by rapid shifts in the
global climate between El Nin˜o and La Nin˜a, the phases of the El Nin˜o-Southern Oscillation (ENSO).
In order to identify an effect of the global climate on conflict, we compare societies to themselves
when they are exposed to different states of the global climate. Heuristically, a society observed during
a La Nin˜a is the “control” for that same society observed during an El Nin˜o “treatment.” We further
sharpen this comparison by separating the world into two groups of countries, those whose climate is
strongly coupled to ENSO and those weakly affected by ENSO. If climate influences ACR, we expect
to observe the larger ENSO signal in ACR of the former group.
ENSO related changes in the tropical Pacific profoundly impact the global tropics primarily by
radiating waves through the atmosphere, linking climates around the globe through so-called “tele-
connections” [Ropelewski and Halpert, 1987,Chiang and Sobel, 2002]. Virtually the entire tropics are
influenced by ENSO, with most land areas becoming warmer and dryer, while ENSO effects in mid-
latitudes are generally smaller and less consistent [Chiang and Sobel, 2002,Sarachik and Cane, 2010].
We partition the globe into two groups based on how coupled their climates are to ENSO, separating
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Figure 3.1: Construction of global ENSO vulnerability partition. (a) Monthly sea surface
temperature anomaly over the NINO3 region (5◦S-5◦N, 150◦W-90◦W). (b) ACR for the whole world.
(c) Red (blue) indicates an ENSO teleconnected (weakly-affected) grid cell; NINO3 region hatched.
(d) Countries are coded as weakly-affected (W.A.) or teleconnected (T.) based on the fraction of their
population that inhabited teleconnected cells in 2000. (e) The distribution of countries changes little
if teleconnected area is used instead of populations. (d) The distribution of countries changes little
if temperatures in teleconnected cells are required to correlate with NINO3 for five months instead
of three. (g) Correlation of monthly NINO3 with NINO3 in December. The natural “tropical year”
begins in May and ends the following April at the “spring barrier.” To isolate the ENSO signal, an
annual measure of ENSO was constructed by averaging May-December NINO3.
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countries into “teleconnected” and “weakly-affected” groups. Guided by the analysis of Chiang and
Sobel [Chiang and Sobel, 2002] (2002), we identify locations as “teleconnected” if local surface tem-
peratures are positively correlated with sea surface temperatures in the equatorial Pacific (Fig. 3.1c-f,
also see Methods Summary, Fig. 3.5-3.8 and Supplementary Information Section 3.B; Fig. 3.8 shows
that only three Pacific island countries exhibit negative correlations that are spatially coherent and
persistent). We identify teleconnected locations using surface temperature, rather than rainfall [Ro-
pelewski and Halpert, 1987] or cloud cover [Klein et al., 1999], because the temperature signal is more
reliable and the temperature data has more complete spatial coverage. In generating our partition
we avoid using socioeconomic variables since these might themselves influence ACR, confounding our
analysis. We validate our partition by confirming that it preserves the well-documented impact of
ENSO on countries’ average surface temperature [Chiang and Sobel, 2002], precipitation [Ropelewski
and Halpert, 1987], and agricultural yields and revenues [Rosenzweig and Hillel, 2008] (Supplementary
Fig. 3.9). In all cases the usual relationships hold in the teleconnected group and we find no significant
correlations in the weakly affected group (see Table 3.3 and Supplementary Information Section 3.B.4).
In the analysis of ACR which follows, all inference is based strictly on correlations over time between
ENSO and ACR in the teleconnected group. Locations in the weakly affected group are not a perfect
“control” for teleconnected locations because they differ in other ways. Nonetheless, analysis of ACR
in the weakly affected group is a valid way to check that there are no unobserved confounding global
variables that are correlated with ENSO.
Our preferred summary statistic for the global ENSO state is the NINO3 index (Fig. 3.1a), the
average sea surface temperature anomaly in the equatorial Pacific region shown in Fig. 3.1c. Our
results are insensitive to which index of ENSO is chosen (Fig. 3.10), but detecting ENSO impacts
requires that we account for the “spring barrier” [Sarachik and Cane, 2010] by averaging NINO3 from
May to December only rather than over the entire calendar year (see Fig. 3.1g, Table 3.4-3.5 and
Supplementary Information Section 3.C).
3.3 Results
We regress the conflict measure ACR on NINO3 for both groups and detect a large and significant
increase in ACR associated with warmer NINO3 values only in the teleconnected group (see Table
3.1, Fig. 3.2a and Supplementary Materials Section 3.D). We build a multiple regression model by
including linear time trends and an additive constant to all years after 1989 (inclusive), a common
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(1) group aggregate 0.76* 0.16
[0.39] [0.31]
n = 54 n = 54
(2) group aggregate 0.85** 0.06
linear trend [0.40] [0.30]
n = 54 n = 54
(3) group aggregate 0.81** 0.04
linear trend [0.32] [0.31]
post-1989 constant n = 54 n = 54
(4) same as (3) 0.95** 0.33
1975-2004 only† [0.34] [0.45]
n = 29 n = 29
(5) country-level panel 0.89** 0.04
country-specific trends [0.38] [0.29]
country-specific constants n = 3978 n = 3400
(6) same as (5) 0.84** -0.01
non-African countries only [0.41] [0.29]
n = 2084 n = 3203
Standard errors in brackets ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients are proba-
bility responses in units of %/1◦C, 1.0 means the probability of conflict in
a given year (ACR) rises 0.01 for each 1◦C in NINO3. Heteroscedasticity
robust SE for rows 1-4. SE in rows 5-6 are robust to heteroscedasticity,
serial correlation and spatial correlation. 1989 dropped in all models (3-
σ outlier). †After 1974, the set of countries in the teleconnected group
stabilized at 87-91 countries.
technique [Buhaug, 2010] to account for mean shifts in ACR following the end of the Cold War
(rows 1-3). The dashed lines in Fig. 3.2b depict the estimated relationship when a linear response
is assumed. Relaxing this assumption, we use a weighted moving-average that permits arbitrary
non-linear responses to NINO3 (solid curves in Fig. 3.2b). The red curve indicates that ACR in the
teleconnected group is most responsive to strong ENSO events and is less affected by smaller deviations
from the neutral state.
In the teleconnected group, ACR is 3% in the La Nin˜a state and rises to 6% in the El Nin˜o state;
this contrasts with the weakly-affected group where ACR remains at 2% for all ENSO states (Fig.
3.2b). This suggests that ENSO affected one-fifth (21%) of all civil conflicts during this period (see
Methods Summary).
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teleconnected ACR Cold war ends
Figure 3.2: Conflict risk response to ENSO. (a) Time series of ACR for the teleconnected group
and NINO3. (b) Dashed lines are linear fits of ACR on NINO3 for the two regions. Solid curves
are weighted moving-averages of ACR (90% CI shaded) against NINO3. Conditional means control
for linear trends and a post-Cold War constant. (c) Solid (hatched) bars show total monthly conflict
onsets in teleconnected countries during 18 most El Nin˜o-like (La Nin˜a-like) years. Monthly data are
available for only half of the conflicts.
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shown in Fig 1g, we should expect conflicts triggered by ENSO to occur in the later part of the
calendar year. Fig. 3.2c, based on the subset of conflict data available at monthly resolution, shows
the within-year distributions of conflict onsets for the teleconnected group in El Nin˜o and La Nin˜a years
(defined here as the highest and lowest terciles of NINO3 values). The distributions of conflicts are
similar early in the year with substantial differences appearing only after El Nin˜o events are underway.
The correlation we observe between ACR and NINO3 is robust to the battery of statistical models
advanced by previous studies [Miguel et al., 2004,Burke et al., 2009,Jensen and Gleditsch, 2009,Buhaug,
2010] (see Supplementary Materials Section 3.E). To ensure the entrance of new countries into the
sample do not drive our result, we restrict our sample to the post-colonial period [Burke et al., 2009]
(Table 3.1, row 4) and also estimate a country-level linear probability model [Burke et al., 2009,Buhaug,
2010] (row 5). Further, we find that non-linear probability models (Fig. 3.11), count models (Fig.
3.12) and survival models (Table 3.6) produce indistinguishable results. We limit the sample to exclude
African countries (Table 3.1, row 6) and find that the correlation is not driven exclusively by Africa
[Miguel et al., 2004,Burke et al., 2009,Buhaug, 2010]. We find the relationship persists when alternative
ENSO indices are used (Table 3.7). We estimate dynamic-panel and first-difference models (Table 3.8)
and find no evidence that patterns of serial correlation in either variable drives our results. We expand
our sample to include several influential outlying observations (1946, 1948 and 1989, see Fig. 3.13)
and find the correlation persists (Table 3.9). We remove country-specific constants and trends from
our longitudinal model [Buhaug, 2010] and find our estimates unchanged (Table 3.10). When we
include controls for contemporaneous temperature and precipitation (Table 3.11) or for lagged income,
political institutions and population (Table 3.12; and see Fig. 3.14) we continue to find a large and
significant influence of ENSO on ACR. We then estimate a model with all of the above controls, as well
as controls for gender balance, urbanization, age-structure, income growth, agricultural reliance and
cyclone disasters (Table 3.13; and see Fig. 3.15) and find that our results persist across African and
non-African countries. Using standard definitions [Strand, 2006], we find that neither large (> 1000
battle deaths) nor small (25 < # battle deaths < 1000) conflicts dominate our result (Table 3.14).
However, we find that increasing the required peaceful period between conflicts [Strand, 2006] reduces
the correlation between ENSO and large conflicts, indicating that many of the large conflicts associated
with ENSO are reoccurring conflicts (Table 3.14). Finally, we note that all of these techniques are
robust to spatial correlation in disturbances [Jensen and Gleditsch, 2009] (see Methods Summary).
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Figure 3.3: Conflict risk and income. (a) Red (blue) is a weighted moving-average (90% CI shaded)
of ENSO sensitivity β of ACR on log income per capita (2007) for countries in the teleconnected
(weakly-affected) region. (b) Same, for baseline ACR α.
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By examining years following ENSO events, we find suggestive but statistically insignificant evidence
that approximately 40% of the conflicts associated with ENSO are displaced in time (Table 3.15).
We evaluate the relative sensitivities of different countries by estimating a separate regression for
each country, decomposing ACR for each country into a baseline component (α) independent of ENSO
and a component (β) that varies linearly with NINO3 (see Supplementary Materials Section 3.D). Fig.
3.3a shows that in the teleconnected group (red curve) low income countries are the most responsive
to ENSO (i.e. β is larger), while similarly low income countries in the weakly-affected group (blue
curve) do not respond significantly to ENSO. It is noteworthy that the dependence of baseline ACR
α on income is statistically indistinguishable between the two groups (Fig. 3.3b).
While we observe that those countries whose ACR responds most strongly to ENSO are low income,
we cannot determine if (1) they respond strongly because they are low-income, (2) they are low
income because they are sensitive to ENSO, or (3) they are sensitive to ENSO and low income for
some third unobservable reason. Relationship (1) is frequently hypothesized based on the argument
that low income countries lack the resources to mitigate the effects of environmental changes [Homer-
Dixon, 1991, Hsiang, 2010, Jones and Olken, 2010]. However, relationship (2) is consistent with the
observations that ENSO existed well before the invention of agriculture [Sarachik and Cane, 2010] and
conflict induces economic underperformance [Miguel et al., 2004,Blattman and Miguel, 2010].
3.4 Discussion
Our results do not provide an estimate of the full social value of a global climate state, but a comparison
of the influence of income and of ENSO on ACR is instructive. In a teleconnected country where average
income per capita is $1000, a 1◦C increase of NINO3 increases ACR by 1% (Fig. 3.3a), so the 3◦C
shift associated with a change from La Nin˜a to El Nin˜o increases ACR by 3%. A similarly sized 3%
decrease in its baseline ACR α would be associated with an order of magnitude increase in average
income (Fig. 3.3b).
Since the strong ENSO events that have the greatest influence on ACR may be predictable up to
two years in advance [Chen et al., 2004] use of our findings may improve global preparedness for some
conflicts and their associated humanitarian crises.
While we find that the changes in the global climate associated with ENSO influence global patterns
of conflict, our results might not generalize to gradual trends in average temperature or particular char-
acteristics of anthropogenic climate change. Generalizing our results to global climate changes other
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than ENSO will require an understanding of the mechanisms that link conflict to climate. ENSO
has a proximate influence on a variety of climatological variables, each of which may plausibly in-
fluence how conflict-prone a society is. Precipitation, temperature, sunlight, humidity and ecological
extremes can adversely influence both agrarian [Rosenzweig and Hillel, 2008, Schlenker and Roberts,
2009] and non-agrarian economies [Hsiang, 2010, Jones and Olken, 2010]. In addition, ENSO varia-
tions affect natural disasters, such as tropical cyclones [Carmargo and Sobel, 2005], and trigger disease
outbreaks [Kovats et al., 2003]. All of these have adverse economic effects, such as loss of income or
increasing food prices, and it is thought economic shocks can generate civil conflict through a variety of
pathways [Homer-Dixon, 1991,Miguel et al., 2004,Blattman and Miguel, 2010]. Furthermore, altered
environmental conditions stress the human psyche, sometimes leading to aggressive behavior [Anderson
et al., 2000]. We hypothesize that El Nin˜o can simultaneously lead to any of these adverse economic
and psychological effects, increasing the likelihood of conflict. Further, the influence of ENSO may ex-
ceed the sum influence of these individual pathways because it is a global-scale process that generates
simultaneous and correlated conditions around the world. This is possible if non-local processes, such
as increasing global commodity prices [Brunner, 2002] or conflict contagion [Blattman and Miguel,
2010,Jensen and Gleditsch, 2009], strongly influence local conflict risk. Future work will examine the
relative importance of these various mechanisms.
3.5 Methods summary
Pixels with surfaces temperatures significantly and positively correlated with NINO3 for ≥ 3 months
out of the year (Fig. 3.5-3.6) are coded “teleconnected” (red, Fig. 3.1c). Remaining pixels are coded
“weakly affected” (blue, Fig. 3.1c). Countries are coded “teleconnected” (“weakly affected”) if > 50%
of the population in 2000 inhabited teleconnected (weakly affected) pixels (Fig. 3.7). Group-level
time-series regressions use a continuous variable for ACR with linear trends and post-1989 constants;
we drop 1989 because it is a 3-σ outlier, presumably because of the collapse of the Soviet Union (Fig.
3.13). Group-level standard errors are robust to unknown forms of heteroscedasticity. Country-level
longitudinal regressions are linear probability models for ACR with country constants and country-
time trends. Country-level standard errors are robust to unknown forms of spatial correlation over
distances ≤ 5000 km, serial correlation over periods ≤ 5 years and heteroscedasticity. We estimate
the number of conflicts affected by ENSO by assuming all conflicts in the weakly-affected group were
unaffected and a baseline ACR of 3% for the teleconnected group would have remained unchanged in
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the absence of ENSO variations. We then project the observed sequence of NINO3 realizations onto
our linear conflict model (∂ACR/∂NINO3 = 0.0081) and find 48.2 conflicts (21%) were influenced by
ENSO.
Appendix
3.A Data sources and definitions
Table 3.2 contains summary statistics for the main variables in this study.
Climate data To determine the relative teleconnectedness of local climates to ENSO, we use the
National Centers for Environmental Prediction (NCEP) Climate Data Assimilation System 1 (CDAS1)
reanalysis of monthly surface temperatures during 1949-2009 [Kalnay et al., 1996]. ENSO variations
can be detected using different indices, with the most commonly used being equatorial Pacific sea
surface temperature (SST) anomalies. We utilize monthly means of three such indices: NINO12 (10◦S-
Eq, 90◦W-80◦W), NINO3 (5◦S-5◦N, 150◦W-90◦W), and NINO4 (5◦S-5◦N, 160◦E-150◦W) [Kaplan
et al., 1998]. These indices measure SST in different locations in the Pacific Ocean, with NINO12
measured furthest east and NINO4 measured furthest west (see Fig. 3.10). These three indices
differ both in the magnitude and timing of their variations, but are correlated with one another. For
example, the standard deviation of our NINO12 measure (1.02◦C) is substantially larger than that of
our NINO4 measure (0.58◦C). Our main text presents results for NINO3 because it is less influenced by
coastal perturbations (compared to NINO12) and captures “medium-scale” events reliably (compared
to NINO4), although we find that the choice of NINO index is inconsequential.
Conflict data We use the Onset and Duration of Intrastate Conflict dataset compiled by the Up-
psala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) at Uppsala University and the International Peace Research
Institute in Oslo (PRIO) [Gleditsch et al., 2002, Strand, 2006]. This dataset contains information on
the magnitudes and recurrence periods of conflicts. A conflict is defined as “a contested incompatibil-
ity that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of
which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related death” [Gleditsch
et al., 2002,Strand, 2006]. A conflict onset is the date on which a certain fatality threshold has been
crossed in specific conflict between a unique government-opposition dyad (note that a country can
experience conflict onset in sequential years if its government fights with different opposition groups
in sequential years). The dataset uses fatality thresholds of 25 and 1000 battle-related deaths to dis-
tinguish events of different intensities. Should a conflict that has subsided be reinitiated, it is counted
as a new conflict only if the last time it surpassed the 25 battle-deaths cutoff was more than X years
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ago, where 2 ≤ X ≤ 9. For example, “Onset2” records a new conflict onset only if that conflict is new
or if that specific conflict has been quiescent for at least two years. Our main results utilize this 25
fatality, 2-year definition of conflict onset. We check the robustness of this choice in a later section.
A subsample of this data set (approximately half of the full data set) has monthly dates associated
with the timing of conflict onset [Gleditsch et al., 2002, Strand, 2006]. This subsample is used to
construct Fig. 3.2c in the main text.
Agricultural data To validate our partition of the world into ENSO teleconnected and weakly-
affected groups, we estimate the differential impact of ENSO on agricultural yields and agricultural
revenue in each. Cereal yields are obtained from the Food and Agricultural Organization’s (FAO)
FAOStat database [Food and Agriculture Organization, 2009] and are available for 1961-2007. Agri-
culture revenue is acquired from the United Nations National Accounts database [UN, 2007] and is
available for 1970-2008. The total annual agricultural revenue for each group is simply the sum of
agricultural revenue across all countries in the given year (see Fig. 3.9).
Income data Income data is obtained from the United Nations National Accounts database [UN,
2007]. Incomes are available for 1970-2008 and are converted to 2007 US dollars per capita.
Demographic data Population data is obtained from United Nations World Development Indica-
tors [World Bank, 2008] and are available for 1950-2008.
Political institutions data Polity IV data describes the level of democratization embodied by the
political institutions of a country and is obtained from the Polity IV Project sponsored by the Political
Instability Task Force [Marshall et al., 2009] and are available for 1950-2008. Polity IV scores take
integer values ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy).
Rainfall data Data merged from gauges, satellite observations and numerical simulations is obtained
from the Climate Predicition Center (CPC) Merged Analysis of Precipitation [Xie and Arkin, 1996]
(CMAP) and are available for 1979-2008.
Tropical Cyclone data Hurricane, typhoon, cyclone and tropical storm data are obtained from the
Limited Information Cyclone Reconstruction and Integration for Climate and Economics (LICRICE)
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model [Hsiang, 2010] and are available for 1950-2008. The data describe the annual maximum wind-
speed spatially averaged over each country.
3.B The ENSO-teleconnection partition
3.B.1 ENSO teleconnections
A central contribution of this work is to develop a simple and robust partition of the continents based
on their teleconnectedness to ENSO. Previous analyses have identified different types of ENSO tele-
connections using a number of statistical techniques on different data sets [Ropelewski and Halpert,
1987,Ropelewski and Halpert, 1989,Nicholls, 1989,Nicholson and Kim, 1997,Klein et al., 1999,Chiang
and Sobel, 2002,Giannini et al., 2003,Rosenzweig and Hillel, 2008,Sarachik and Cane, 2010]. Because
of the heterogeneity in these approaches, there are variations in the patterns of teleconnections that
they characterize. Nonetheless, there are many common patterns and we attempt to summarize this
agreement with a simple approach that partitions the world into locations that are either strongly
teleconnected or weakly affected. While this a crude simplification of the high dimensional and contin-
uous structure of ENSO teleconnections, it provides a surprising amount of power to global analyses
of ENSO impacts, despite its simplistic nature.
El Nin˜o events are associated with abnormally warm sea surface temperatures in the central and
eastern equatorial Pacific, releasing large fluxes of thermal energy into the atmosphere. This warming
of the tropical Pacific free troposphere induces warming throughout the tropical free troposphere,
generally stabilizing the air column to vertical motions, inhibiting rainfall and warming the surface.
For a fully developed discussion of these dynamics, see Sarachik and Cane [Sarachik and Cane, 2010]
(2010). While there are many other local impacts of ENSO variations with complex structure in
space and time, the simplest and most general fingerprint throughout impacted regions is near-surface
warming induced by the increased static stability [Chiang and Sobel, 2002]. Furthermore, using surface
temperatures to identify teleconnections benefits from the fact that temperature data is the most
reliably collected atmospheric statistic and is well modeled in reanalyses [Kalnay et al., 1996].
3.B.2 Construction method
To construct our global partition of ENSO teleconnections, we examine whether reanalysis grid cells
exhibit surface temperatures that are positively correlated with NINO3 on a monthly basis (with a two
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month lag) for at least three months out of the year. The details of this construction are as follows:
Let NINO(m, y) = the value of the ENSO index in calendar month m ∈ {1, ..., 12} and year
y ∈ Y ≡ {1950, ..., 2004}. Similarly, let T (x,m, y) be the surface temperature at location x, month m
and year y. Let ρ(x,m,L) be the correlation coefficient (over all years y ∈ Y ) of NINO(m, y) and
T (x,m+L, y) (ρ is plotted for each month in Fig. 3.5). Note that T lags NINO3 by L > 0 months to
account for the fact that signals from the tropical Pacific where NINO3 is measured need some time
to propagate and influence the rest of the world [Chiang and Sobel, 2002]. In the main analysis L = 2.






is the number of months that grid point x exhibits interannual surface temperature variations that are
significantly correlated at a level ≤ 0.1 with NINO3 L months earlier.
Even with no mechanistic connection between surface temperatures at x and NINO3, most values
of MxL should be ≥ 1 since 1 in 10 random draws will be correlated at the α = 0.1 level. If the monthly
draws of temperature were all completely independent, MxL ≥ 3 would occur randomly 11 percent of
the time1 (MxL ≥ 5 would occur 0.4% of the time). Independence is not a valid assumption in this
case, but it is a useful benchmark. For a cutoff value R, a point x is denoted ENSO “teleconnected”
if MxL ≥ R. We define a binary measure of “teleconnectedness” Vx(L,R) = 1 if MxL ≥ R and = 0
otherwise. In the main analysis, R = 3. Fig. 3.6A displays Vx (for L = 2 and R = 3, the values used
in the main analysis); points with Vx = 1 are marked in red.
To estimate country-level teleconnection index V¯i for country i, we take a weighted average of Vx









Values for V¯i will range from 0 in the least teleconnected countries to 1 for the most teleconnected
countries. The histogram in Fig. 3.1d (main text) displays the distribution of V¯i for the values used
in the main analysis (L = 2, R = 3 and wx = the population of pixel x in the year 2000). Because
it is so strongly bimodal, a partition into just two groups appears to be an excellent approximation.
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group and those with V¯i ≤ 0.5 to the weakly-affected group (see Fig. 3.7).
3.B.3 Robustness of the ENSO-teleconnection partition
In this subsection, we examine the sensitivity of our partition under different choices for w, L, and R.
We find that the gross features of the global partition are unchanged for a range of reasonable parameter
choices and we document that it agrees well with previous analyses of regional ENSO teleconnections.
Pixel Assignment Fig. 3.6 illustrates changes to the partition that occur when L and R are
modified. Panel a depicts teleconnected pixels (Vx(L,R) = 1) as red for L = 2 and R = 3, the values
used in the main analysis. Panel b is the same, except L = 0. Almost no features change, suggesting
that the selection of L is inessential. Panel c displays the changes that occur when L is held fixed at 2
and R is changed. As described before, setting R < 3 would admit too many chance assignments, but
perhaps R = 3 is also too low. When R = 5 is used, those pixels that are teleconnected are marked
as green. Pixels that are teleconnected when a cutoff R = 3 is used but are no longer teleconnected
when R = 5 are yellow. Pixels that are weakly-affected when either R = 3 or R = 5 are blue. Note
that the red region in Panel a is the union of the green and yellow regions in Panel c. When R is
increased from 3 to 5, only the group assignment of the yellow region changes. This region is small
and represents the boundary of the moist tropics and the arid subtropics; it is the region where the
annual monsoonal rains stop in their meridional translation and reverse direction. The primary effect
of increasing R from 3 to 5 is to simply omit relatively dry pixels that do not have five rainy months
in a normal year.
Country Assignment Figures 1d-f in the main text illustrate the redistribution of country-level
assignments when the weighting values wx are changed from area to population weights and when R
is changed from 3 to 5 months. (Fig. 3.7 displays countries assigned to the teleconnected group in red
and the weakly-affected group in blue, using the values from the main analysis, L = 2, R = 3.) The
histogram in Fig. 3.1d (main text) displays the distribution of the country-level ENSO teleconnection
index V¯i when pixels are aggregated using weights wx that reflect the population of each pixel. The
histogram in Panel e displays how this distribution changes if the weights are changed to reflect the area
of each pixel; the overall distribution is virtually unchanged. The histogram in Panel f displays how
the distribution changes if population weights are used but R = 5 instead of 3. Again, the structure
hardly changes.
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Negative temperature correlations When designating pixels and countries as teleconnected, we
only examined whether surface temperatures were positively correlated with NINO3 or not. One might
be concerned that we ignore significant negative correlations with NINO3 because such correlations are
well known [Sarachik and Cane, 2010], however most locations with negatively correlated temperatures
are oceanic and not continental [Chiang and Sobel, 2002]. If large continental regions were negatively
correlated with NINO3, we might expect that ACR in those countries would have a response to ENSO
that was opposite the response in the teleconnected group. To check that such a pattern does not
influence our results, we document that only three countries in our sample (< 2%) have most of their
population in locations where surface temperatures that are negatively correlated with NINO3 (see Fig.
3.8). Northern Mexico, the western United States, eastern Russia and eastern Indonesia also contain
locations where surfaces temperatures anticorrelate with NINO3, however these locations contain only
a small fraction of these countries’ total populations. Fiji, the Solomon Island and New Zealand are
the three countries that could plausibly be coded as “negatively teleconnected,” yet none experience
any civil conflict during the period of observation.
Agreement with previous analyses Several previous studies have illustrated different types of
ENSO teleconnections using different environmental variables and statistical techniques [Ropelewski
and Halpert, 1987,Ropelewski and Halpert, 1989,Nicholls, 1989,Nicholson and Kim, 1997,Chiang and
Sobel, 2002, Giannini et al., 2003, Rosenzweig and Hillel, 2008]. The pixels we designate as telecon-
nected to ENSO (Fig. 3.1c in main text) is approximately the union of regions previously found to
be teleconnected to ENSO. The seminal work by Ropelowski and Halpert [Ropelewski and Halpert,
1987, Ropelewski and Halpert, 1989] demonstrated that several regions in the tropics and subtropics
exhibited rainfall anomalies (of both signs) in association with ENSO (see Fig. 21 p. 1625 in [11]).
Nicholls [Nicholls, 1989] showed the dependence of rainfall throughout eastern Australia (see Fig. 4b
p. 969 in [13]). Nicholson and Kim [Nicholson and Kim, 1997] illustrated impacts throughout sub-
Saharan Africa by utilizing more complete data sets than earlier work could access (see Fig. 7 p. 125
in [14]). Chiang and Sobel [Chiang and Sobel, 2002] explained the propagation of teleconnections with
Kelvin wave dynamics and demonstrated their results using 1000-200mb temperature anomalies, which
were correlated with ENSO throughout the tropics and some of the subtropics (see Fig. 2 p. 2618 in
[15]). Giannini, Saravanan and Chang [Giannini et al., 2003] demonstrated the dependance on ENSO
of rainfall and surface temperatures in the Sahel (see Fig. 4E-F p. 1029 in [16]). A large number of
other studies have illustrated flooding or ecological responses in more limited regions, many of which
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are summarized in Rosenzweig and Hillel [Rosenzweig and Hillel, 2008].
Our binary teleconnection partition is a dramatic simplification of the rich relationships studied
in earlier work. For many purposes it would be an oversimplification, but it serves our purposes
here by providing a structurally simple inclusive description of worldwide ENSO impacts. The binary
assignment is justified a posteriori by the sharpness of the division. However, this strong generalization
does not allow us to identify the specific mechanisms that are driving our main findings.
3.B.4 Partition validation using weather and agricultural outcomes
As a validation exercise of our global partition of ENSO teleconnection, we explore the effect of ENSO
on surface temperatures, rainfall and agricultural output (Table 3.3) because these relationships are
well established [Ropelewski and Halpert, 1987,Chiang and Sobel, 2002,Cane et al., 1994,Rosenzweig
and Hillel, 2008,Sarachik and Cane, 2010].
Temperature and rainfall First we check that temperature and rainfall at the country-level are
correlated with interannual variations in ENSO in the teleconnected group and not in the weakly
affected group. The partitioning technique was designed to isolate those countries that are strongly
influenced by ENSO, however it is possible that countries that have temperatures positively correlated
with NINO3 for three months also exhibit negative correlations in other months or do not exhibit
annually averaged signals for some other reason. Moreover, it is important to verify that rainfall
patterns are negatively correlated with NINO3 in the teleconnected countries because rainfall was not
explicitly used in the construction of the partition. (Rainfall was not used in the partition construction
because rainfall signals are more variable and rainfall data is both less complete and noisier.)
To verify our partition with weather data, we estimate
Wi(t) = βNINO3(t) + γi + θi1t+ θi2t
2 + i(t) (3.1)
whereWi(t) is either temperature or rainfall for country i in year t, NINO3 is averaged May-December,
γi is a country-specific constant (fixed effect) and θi1 and θi2 are country-specific linear and quadratic
time trends. This equation is estimated once for each country group and the results are in rows 1 and
2 of Table 3.3. In the teleconnected group, annual average temperature (precipitation) is significantly
and positively (negatively) correlated with the dominant NINO3 signal in each year. In the weakly
affected group, the estimated values of β are near zero and statistically insignificant.
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Cereal yields Next we compare inter-temporal variations in cereal yields for individual countries in
the two groups with inter-temporal variations in ENSO. Using a longitudinal dataset of all countries
between 1961-2007 we estimate the following dynamic model:
log(Yi(t)) = β1NINO3(t) + β2 log(Yi(t− 1)) + γi + θi1t+ θi2t2 + i(t) (3.2)
where Yi(t) is the Cereal Y ield for country i in year t. The trend terms are intended to account
for technological innovation such as the “green revolution”. Equation 3.2 is estimated separately for
the teleconnected and weakly-affected groups. Standard errors are clustered by country [Liang and
Zeger, 1986, Arellano, 1987, Bertrand et al., 2004] to account for unknown patterns of within-country
autocorrelation. Row 3 of Table 3.3 presents the NINO regression coefficient and associated standard
errors for the two groups. For the teleconnected group, the coefficient is significantly negative while for
the weakly-affected group the coefficients are positive but insignificant, a result that is consistent with
observed increases in rainfall for some locations in the mid-latitudes [Rosenzweig and Hillel, 2008].
Agricultural revenue Finally, we check our teleconnection partition against agricultural outcomes
by using agricultural revenue data from another source [UN, 2007]. In row 4 of Table 3.3, we estimate
equation 3.2 using country-level agricultural revenue and find that relative to the impact of ENSO
on the teleconnected group, the drop in agricultural revenue for weakly affected countries is smaller
and not significant. We also aggregate a single time-series of total agricultural revenue A per capita
for the entire teleconnected and weakly-affected groups for 1970-2007. For each group, this number
represents the total value of all agricultural output for roughly half of the world population (see Fig
3.9). Specifically, for each group, we estimate the following auto-regressive model
A(t) = β0 + β1NINO3(t) + β2A(t− 1) + θ1t+ θ2t2 + (t). (3.3)
Row 5 of Table 3.3 shows the regression coefficient β1. Consistent with the other panels in Table 3.3,
we find that in the teleconnected group, an increase in NINO3 leads to large and significant negative
impacts in agricultural revenue while the coefficient for the weakly-affected group is smaller and not
statistically significant. (We have verified that these different agricultural responses are also robust
across NINO12 and NINO4 indices, results that are available on request.)
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These results, which are consistent with previous regional and local-scale analyses [Ropelewski and
Halpert, 1987, Chiang and Sobel, 2002, Cane et al., 1994, Rosenzweig and Hillel, 2008, Sarachik and
Cane, 2010], broadly validate our global partition of ENSO teleconnections.
3.C ENSO timing and measurement error
Annual conflict onset data is organized by years that begin in January and end in December [Gleditsch
et al., 2002, Strand, 2006]. NINO indices are collected for individual months and therefore must be
aggregated into years in order to match the conflict data. The simplest approach would be to average
NINO indices over years that begin in January and end in December, producing measures of ENSO
that are exactly contemporaneous with the conflict onset observations. However, ENSO “events” do
not begin in January nor end in December. ENSO events generally begin in May/June and persist
until they break down in March/April of the following year. For this reason, the period April-May
is often termed the “spring barrier” and separates “tropical years” from one another. Fig. 3.1g in
the main text illustrates the spring barrier by plotting monthly correlations between NINO3 values in
December and other months. Importantly, the values of the NINO3 index in January-April of Calendar
Year t are unrelated to the dominant event observed in Tropical Year t.
To demonstrate that ENSO events are organized this way, Table 3.4 tabulates the correlation
coefficients for monthly NINO3 values over the period 1950-2008. Entries describe the correlation
between the NINO3 values that are observed in two months of the same calendar year. The first
three columns, marked early season, have values near one for the first three rows, indicating that
months prior to the spring barrier have NINO3 values that are highly correlated with one another.
The bottom seven rows have values close to zero, indicating that NINO3 values before and after the
spring barrier are not correlated. In any given year, the annual average NINO value is dominated by
measurements following the spring barrier. Thus, if an El Nin˜o or La Nin˜a “event” occurs, the calendar
year in which it begins (referred to as “Year 0” in the climate literature) is the calendar year that
exhibits the largest annually averaged signal. These events are generally coherent across the months
June-December, as indicated by the high values in the last seven columns of Table 3.4. The correlation
coefficients associated with spring barrier months (April and May) have intermediate values as this is
the transition period between “tropical years”.
Because El Nin˜o or La Nin˜a events are dominated by signals following the spring barrier, includ-
ing early season measurements that are uncorrelated with these late season signals is equivalent to
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introducing noise into estimates of a given year’s dominant climatology. Therefore, we omit early
season months and estimate the ENSO state of the global climate by averaging NINO index values
over May-December only. The NINO index values for January-April of the following year are omitted,
despite their occurrence in the same “tropical year,” because they follow all conflicts that are recorded
in the matching calendar year.
Table 3.7 demonstrates the result when the spring barrier is ignored in the “naive” approach
described above. Panel f displays the coefficients and standard errors when ACR for the teleconnected
group is regressed on annual average NINO indices using all months, ignoring the existence of the
spring barrier. Contrast this with Panel c displaying the results when index values for January-April
are omitted from the annual averages of NINO. Including January-April NINO values reduces the
magnitude of the coefficients by about 11-16% and increases the size of the standard errors by 13-
49%. Thus, a “naive” estimate ignoring the timing of ENSO events would suggest that there is no
statistically significant relation between ENSO and conflict onset. Tables 3.4, 3.5 and 3.7 suggest
that the inclusion of January-April NINO values lead to “attenuation bias,” a well known statistical
problem associated with classical (additive) measure error in a regressor variable [Greene, 2003,Angrist
and Pischke, 2008].
In addition, recall that Fig. 3.2c of the main text displays the within-year distribution of additional
conflicts associated with El Nin˜o-like conditions. It demonstrates that conflict onsets preceding the
spring barrier are not driving our main result.
3.D Main statistical models
Table 3.1 in the main text presents the main results of this study: a shift in the global climate from
a strong La Nin˜a to a strong El Nin˜o increases the probability of conflict onset in the teleconnected
group from 3% to 6% whereas the probability of conflict onset in the weakly-affected group remains
unchanged at 2%. Estimating the magnitude of these changes requires the use of statistical models,
which are detailed here.
Time series model of conflict risk : In our primary results, presented in Table 3.1 row 3, we





. We use a time series model with the following
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specification:
annual conflict risk(t) = α+ βNINO(t) + θt+ post cold war(t) + (t) (3.4)
where α is a constant, θ is a linear trend and post cold war(t) is a constant term for all years following
1989 (inclusive) and zero otherwise. The coefficient of interest is β, which describes how many more
conflict onsets per country are associated with a 1◦C increase in NINO. This model is estimated once
for the teleconnected group and once for the weakly-affected group. In each case, the observational
unit is a “group-year” and the comparison is between the time series of NINO and the time series
of a group’s annual conflict risk, each of which has 54 observations. The linear trend captures slow
increases in overall conflict risk and NINO. It also ensures that the estimated coefficients only represent
high-frequency variations in ENSO and not correlated trends. The introduction of a cold war constant
is a common practice in statistical analyses of conflict [Buhaug, 2010] because overall conflict levels
changed qualitatively following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The standard errors presented for
these time-series models are White standard errors and are robust to heteroskedasticity of arbitrary
form [White, 1980].
One drawback of Equation 3.4 is that country-level trends in conflict cannot be accounted for (eg.
some countries may have become more conflict-prone over the observation period). The stationarity
of NINO indices suggest that this is not a major threat to unbiased estimation of β. However, the
entry of new countries into our sample (see Fig. 3.4) may bias our estimates if new countries are
systematically different from older countries (eg. they may be more violent) and they enter the sample
differentially during different ENSO states (eg. during more El Nin˜o-like conditions). It is for these
reasons that we check our estimates with the following second estimation procedure.
Longitudinal linear probability model of conflict risk : Rows 5 and 6 of Table 3.1 in the main
text presents the coefficients from a country-level panel data linear probability model. These results
come from the following specification:
Ci(t) = βNINO(t) + µi + θit+ i(t) (3.5)
where Ci(t) is unity if country i begins a conflict in year t and zero otherwise, µi is a country-specific
constant and θi is a country-specific trend. Unlike the time-series model in Equation 3.4, the unit of
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observation for this model is a “country-year”. For each country and year combination, there is one
observation for a total of 3978 observations in the teleconnected group and 3400 observations in the
weakly-affected group. The advantage of this technique is that it allows us to remove country-level
trends in violence with the term θi because each country is observed multiple times. It also allows us
to control for new countries that enter the sample during different ENSO states: the country-specific
term µi removes any time-invariant characteristics of a country that might make it more or less conflict
prone.
One disadvantage of the longitudinal data approach is that it is more difficult to calculate appropri-
ate standard errors for our estimates of β. First, there may be serial correlation in conflict onset that
are observed for an individual country. For example, countries may go through violent periods when
they experience several conflict onsets over a short period. Second, all countries in a region are exposed
to the same NINO index in a given year. If there are other factors that give rise to spatial correlation
in conflict onsets, then our observations will not be independent and we will underestimate the size
of our standard errors [Bertrand et al., 2004, Angrist and Pischke, 2008]. We address these concerns
by computing standard errors using the generalized method of moments proposed by Conley [Conley,
1999] (1999) to account for unknown forms of spatial correlation. Because ENSO is regional to global
in scale, we allow for spatial correlations in errors over distances up to 5000 km. In addition, we allow
for serial correlation over periods less than six years and heteroskedasticity of unknown form.
A second issue associated with this longitudinal data model is that the variable Ci(t) can only take
on the values of zero or one (i.e. it is a “binary response” model) [Greene, 2003]. Several methods have
been developed to estimate probabilities when only a binary outcome is observable. The linear model
in Equation 3.5 represents the simplest of these models and is the easiest to interpret. However, when
using this type of model, two issues must be examined to ensure that a linear model is appropriate.
First, the predicted probabilities of an event should not be lower than zero nor higher than one. Figure
3.11 plots the predicted ACR for both regions (labeled “OLS”) over the values of NINO3 that are
observed. All predicted ACR values are well within the unit interval. Second, the probability response
function should be well approximated by a linear function. Probit and logit models are two commonly
used models that have been developed to deal with the type of non-linearity commonly observed in
probability response functions [Greene, 2003]. Fig. 3.11 also plots the predicted ACR using these two
other methods (labeled “Logit” and “Probit”). These response functions are indistinguishable from
the linear model, suggesting that linearity is a good approximation.
3.D. MAIN STATISTICAL MODELS 75
The similarity of the results between rows 3 and 5 of Table 3.1 in the main text provides strong
support for our main results. Two estimation procedures with different strengths and weaknesses
provide almost identical results.
Note on 1989 In the regressions presented in the main text, observations from 1989 are dropped.
Fig. 3.13a illustrates why we have done this. It plots the residuals for a regression in row 2 of Table 3.1
from the main text. The number of conflicts in 1989 for the teleconnected group was three standard
deviations from the conditionally expected value. It seems likely that the large number of conflicts
in that year were related to events associated with the end of the Cold War. Yet, we note that once
a constant for the post-Cold War period is included in Equation 3.5 (a common technique in the
literature [Buhaug, 2010]) our main result appears robust to the reintroduction of 1989 to the sample
(see Table 3.7). Fig. 3.13b plots the estimated residuals using this second model.
Non-parametric estimates of conflict risk: Fig. 3.2b in the main text provides local non-
parametric estimates of our time-series model. Non-parametric techniques are employed to (1) validate
that linearity between NINO3 and conflict risk is a reasonable assumption, and (2) obtain a better
sense of local behavior around different parts of the NINO3 distribution. For Fig. 3.2b, a Nadaraya-
Watson estimator [Nadaraya, 1964,Watson, 1964] was fit to the data using a Epanechnikov kernel with
a 1◦C bandwidth. The 90% confidence intervals are bootstrapped.
Hierarchical regression model of ENSO teleconnection and income: Fig. 3.3 in the main text
uses a hierarchical regression model to decompose conflict risk for each country into ENSO unaffected
(αi) and ENSO-affected (βi) components. Specifically, for each country i, we run the regression:
Ci(t) = αi + βiNINO3(t) + i(t) (3.6)
where the variables are defined as they were in Eq 3.5. We next conduct a local non-parametric
estimate for the relationship between income per capita and the two estimated terms αi and βi. Fig.
3.3a in the main text plots βi against log income per capita in 2000 using a Epanechnikov kernel with
a 0.6 log income per capita bandwidth. The 90% confidence intervals are bootstrapped. Fig. 3.3b uses
the same method for αi.
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3.E Robustness of the main result
Earlier, we showed that the bimodal distribution of the country-level teleconnection index is largely
insensitive to parameters in the construction of the global teleconnection partition. Here we further test
the robustness of our results by altering the independent variables of the statistical model, explicitly
modeling potential serial correlations, altering the sample of years used in the model, including a large
number of potentially confounding control variables, estimating a distributed lag model, altering the
definition of ACR and examining whether our results hold outside of Africa. Our main findings survive
all of these checks.
NINO index Table 3.7 provides results when NINO12, NINO3 and NINO4 are used to check that
our results are robust to different measures of the global ENSO state. While the coefficients in thise
table may look as if they change substantially as the NINO index changes, this is partly driven by
differences in the scale of variation observed for each index. These coefficients are in units of % year
−1
1◦C ,
however the range of degrees Celsius over which each index varies is not fixed. Table 3.2 presents the
standard deviations for the three NINO indices. When the coefficients from our preferred specification
(panel d in Table 3.7) are converted to units of % year
−1
1 standard deviation , they look similar, ranging from
0.51-0.47.
Serial correlation In our time series analysis of ACR and NINO3, one might be concerned that
patterns of serial correlation in one or both variables could be affecting our central findings, however
we do not find that this is the case. Table 3.8 presents our baseline results in models 1 and 6. The
Durbin-Watson d-statistic for the teleconnected group rejects the null hypothesis of serial correlation in
errors, however the same test for the weakly affected group fails to reject the null. When the residuals
from the baseline model are regressed on their lagged values (models 2 and 7) we again find no serial
correlation in the teleconnected group but some serial correlation in the weakly affected group. When
we explicitly add lagged values of ACR to the baseline model (models 3 and 8) we find no substantive
change in our coefficient of interest. We also model changes in ACR as a response to changes in NINO3
(models 4 and 9) and find that our results are not statistically different from the baseline model. Finally
we re-estimate our standard errors for our baseline model using a Newey-West estimator [Newey and
West, 1987] that is robust to both serial correlation and heteroscedasticity (rather than the White
estimator [White, 1980] that we used previously and is only robust to heteroscedasticity). Regardless
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of whether we use a lag cutoff of three, five or ten years2, our estimated standard errors and significance
levels do not change in a meaningful way.
Sample selection In our main analysis, we focus on the period 1950-2004 and omit the observation
in 1989. We begin our analysis in 1950 because the post-war years were extraordinary, containing two
extreme outliers (1946 and 1948). In addition, no other data sets except NINO reconstructions are
available prior to 1950. We omit 1989 because it is also an influential outlier, probably related to the
end of the Cold War. Retaining these obvious outliers in our analysis would likely bias our estimates,
however we examine whether their inclusion in our analysis substantially changes our finding. In model
1 of Table 3.9 we present our baseline sample. In model 2 we add 1989 only and in model 3 we add the
years 1946-1949 only. In model 4 we exclude only 1948 and 1989 (the largest outliers) and in model 5
we restrict the sample to years following 1975 (inclusive), when the sample of teleconnected countries
stabilized. In model 6 we include all years in the Conflict Onset and Duration Dataset. In all of these
samples, we find that the coefficient on NINO3 is statistically significant and statistically indistin-
guishable from our baseline model. However, these outliers exert a large and probably unreasonable
influence on our model, so they remain omitted in our primary analysis.
Semi-parametric control variables In a recent paper, Buhaug [Buhaug, 2010] (2010) suggested
that the compelling longitudinal-based results in studies such as this should not depend critically on
using country-specific constants (fixed-effects) or country-specific trends. Burke et al. [Burke et al.,
2010] (2010) respond that such controls are essential to reliable statistical inference. It is our view
that such controls are generally appropriate, however we check that our results are robust to their
omission. Table 3.10 presents results from our longitudinal linear-probability model (Equation 3.5)
with and without country fixed-effects (µi) and country-specific trends (θi). None of these alterations
affects our estimated coefficient of interest, however the omission of country fixed-effects increases our
estimated standard errors slightly.
Other control variables Because previous studies have identified many parameters that are corre-
lated with conflict, it may be worth it to try and include these variables in our longitudinal analyses.
We do this to check the robustness of our results in light of previous work, but do not present heavily-
controlled regression results as our main findings because we feel that such control is not methodolog-
2Greene [Greene, 2003] (2003) recommends using a cutoff length that is at least as large as the fourth-root of the
number of observations, which in this case is 2.7 years.
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ically sound [Greene, 2003, Angrist and Pischke, 2008], especially when our independent variable of
interest (ENSO) is unquestionably exogenous. Moreover, our preferred model generates results that
appear weaker than the following heavily-controlled models, suggesting that our preferred approach is
the more conservative one.
We begin by introducing idiosyncratic country-level temperature and precipitation shocks that oth-
ers [Levy et al., 2005,Miguel et al., 2004,Burke et al., 2009, Bruckner, 2010] have suggested influence
civil conflicts. ENSO may influence conflict through temperature and precipitation, however it may
also affect conflict through a variety of other mechanisms including (but not limited to) the timing of
rainfall, altered wind patterns, humidity, cloud cover, disasters, ecological events, or other environmen-
tal changes. It may also be the case that ENSO induced changes in temperature and precipitation have
a fundamentally different impact on conflict than idiosyncratic weather shocks because ENSO induced
changes are experienced by a large number of countries. Thus, it is not surprising that when monthly
temperature or rainfall are included in our longitudinal model, the coefficient on NINO3 remains large
and statistically significant (Table 3.11). When rainfall is introduced to the model our coefficient of
interest becomes larger, however this is partially an artifact of the subsample of years (post 1979) for
which reliable global rainfall data is available. We do not believe that this is a well-specified model
because ENSO is known to affect temperature and rainfall [Angrist and Pischke, 2008], however we
present it here for completeness.
We now turn to three of the most commonly suggested correlates of civil conflict: income [Collier
and Hoeﬄer, 2004,Miguel et al., 2004,Blattman and Miguel, 2010], population [Urdal, 2008,Bruckner,
2010] and political institutions [Buhaug, 2010]. When all of our data is pooled together (Fig. 3.14) it
appears that ACR increases with population, decreases with income and is greatest for countries that
are “anocracies” (Polity IV scores near zero). We include lagged values for these controls one by one
and jointly into our fixed-effects model and present the results in Table 3.12. In all of these models, the
effect of ENSO on ACR is large and statistically significant. This contrasts with the weakly affected
region, where correlations between ACR and NINO3 continue to be absent even in the presence of
these controls. Further, when we stratify the teleconnected sample according to whether countries are
in Africa or not (models 9-10), both regions exhibit similar results. This contrasts with the effects of
income, population and Polity IV, all of which change in magnitude and/or sign between the African
and non-African subsamples. Polity IV is the only control that exhibits a reasonably consistent and
significant correlation with ACR, however the amount of variation it explains is small (Fig. 3.14) and
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it is known to be extremely endogenous [Miguel et al., 2004, Angrist and Pischke, 2008, Burke et al.,
2010].
Finally, we estimate a “kitchen sink” model that contains the following controls. The paper that
motivates each variable’s inclusion is listed in as a citation.
1. country fixed-effects [Fearon and Laitin, 2003]
2. country-specific time trends [Burke et al., 2010]
3. log income per capita [Collier and Hoeﬄer, 2004] (lagged)
4. income growth [Miguel et al., 2004] (lagged)
5. Polity IV score [Buhaug, 2010] [linear & quadratic] (lagged)
6. agriculture industry share (%) [Burke et al., 2009] (lagged)
7. percent urbanized [Fearon and Laitin, 2003] (lagged)
8. log population [Bruckner, 2010] (lagged)
9. percent female [Urdal, 2008] (lagged)
10. percent below 15 yrs old [Urdal, 2008] (lagged)
11. percent above 65 yrs old [Urdal, 2008] (lagged)
12. cyclone maximum windspeed [Barron et al., 2004] (area average)
13. monthly temperature [Burke et al., 2009] (12 variables)
14. monthly rainfall [Miguel et al., 2004,Levy et al., 2005] (12 variables)
Results from this heavily controlled model are presented in Table 3.13. The full-sample estimates
with or without the weather controls (rows 1 and 4) exhibit large and statistically significant corre-
lations between ACR and NINO3 in the teleconnected group only. We check that a linear model for
the ACR response to NINO3 is a good approximation for the data in this “kitchen-sink” model (Fig.
3.15) and observe that these results are not driven by outliers. When the sample is split into African
and non-African countries, we again see large coefficients for all groups. Only one teleconnected coef-
ficient (model 3) is not significant despite being larger in magnitude that the analogous coefficient in
our baseline model (Table 3.1 in the main text, row 3). This is hardly surprising and occurs because
our standard errors grow substantially with such dramatic “over-fitting” in our statistical specifica-
tion [Greene, 2003]. Again, it is our view that including so many endogenously determined and/or
irrelevant control variables is not the correct approach to causal inference since ENSO is known to
vary over time exogenously. We only present these results as a robustness exercise.
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Lag and lead NINO terms As discussed in the main text, we conduct tests to determine whether
or not (1) the conflicts induced by ENSO in the teleconnected group would have occurred in its absence
and (2) our main results might be spurious.
To check if ENSO simply advances inevitable conflicts, we add a one-year lagged NINO term into
Eq. 3.4. Model 1 of Table 3.15 replicates our main result for the teleconnected group. Model 2 includes
a lagged NINO3 term while model 3 also includes an interaction term between current NINO3 and
lagged NINO3 because sequential ENSO events may have compounding impacts. Model 4 includes two
lagged NINO3 terms. Observe that the only significant coefficients in the four models are for current
NINO3. Columns 2 and 4 show that when lagged NINO3 terms are included, the coefficient on the
lagged terms are of lesser magnitude than the current NINO3 coefficient. The point estimate suggests
that about 40% of the observed conflicts might be displaced, however we cannot reject the null that
no displacement occurs.
As an additional check against potentially spurious results, model 5 of Table 3.15 includes a future
NINO3 term which, as expected, is not a statistically significant predictor of current ACR.
Columns 6-10 replicate the analysis for the weakly-affected group and do not yield any statistically
significant coefficients.
Conflict size Next, we check whether our main result is driven by large or small conflicts and find
that neither is dominating our result. The UCDP/PRIO Onset and Duration of Intrastate Conflict
database separates conflict onsets into three categories: large conflicts that exhibit more than one-
thousand battle-related deaths in a single year, small conflicts that exhibit more than twenty-five
battle-related deaths in the year of onset but never exceed one-thousand cumulative deaths throughout
the conflict, and intermediate conflicts that exhibit more than one-thousand cumulative battle related-
deaths throughout the conflict, but never exceed one-thousand deaths in a given year. Because there are
a very small number of intermediate conflicts, they are dropped from the following analysis (although
they are included in the main analysis). Also note that the scale of conflicts is determined by the
absolute number of battle related-deaths, not by the fraction of individuals in a country that are
killed. Thus, a large conflict in a large country may not be of the same “intensity” as a large conflict in
a small country. Nonetheless, we follow the existing literature and use these cutoffs [Strand, 2006,Burke
et al., 2009,Buhaug, 2010] despite their imperfections.
To check that our main results are not driven by only small or large conflicts, we re-estimate
Equation 3.5 for small conflicts only and then again for large conflicts only (Table 3.14 column 1,
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titled “Onset2”). The sum of the coefficients for small and large conflicts should be approximately
equal to the coefficient of NINO3 in row 5 of Table 3.1 in the main text. If the coefficient for small
conflicts were much larger (smaller) than the corresponding coefficient for large conflicts, than that
would indicate that small (large) conflicts were driving our main result in Table 3.1. We find no
evidence this is the case. The increase in conflict onset risk associated with a 1◦C increase is identical
for large (0.45%) and small (0.45%) conflicts.
Intermittency threshold Previous statistical analyses of conflict have demonstrated that altering
the definition of “conflict onset” may substantially influence their results [Gleditsch et al., 2002,Strand,
2006, Hegre and Sambanis, 2006]. One parameter that has been shown to affect results is the “inter-
mittency threshold” for conflicts [Hegre and Sambanis, 2006]. Throughout our main analysis, if a
specific conflict has been quiescent for at least two years and then becomes active again, it is coded
as a new conflict onset. Borrowing the terminology of the UCDP/PRIO database, we call the binary
variable that results from this coding rule Onset2 [Gleditsch et al., 2002,Strand, 2006]. We allow the
number of quiescent years X to change when estimating Equation 3.5. Thus, OnsetX denotes a new
conflict onset that occurs only after X years of inactivity. Note that by construction all conflict onsets
recorded in OnsetX will also be recorded in Onset(X − 1), but the reverse is not true.
Table 3.14 shows how the results for large and small conflicts change when the intermittency
threshold is increased3. As the intermittency threshold is increased, there is almost no effect on the
coefficients for small conflicts. However, increasing the intermittency threshold for large conflicts causes
3One might be concerned that the existence of any intermittancy threshold may generate cyclical behavior in the
ACR which could generate artificially large responses to the quasi-cyclical timing of ENSO events. To see why this type
of bias is incapable of dramatically affecting our results, let
Ct = true ACR at time t
Nt = number of countries at time t
Assume conflict risk and the sample are stationary until the following year:
Ct = Ct+1, Nt = Nt+1
We observe CtNt conflicts in the data at time t. However, we only observe Ct+1(Nt+1 − CtNt) conflicts the following
year because the CtNt countries that had conflicts the preceding year were artificially excluded from observation (this
is not true, as explained in the text, but suppose it were).








however in the following year we would estimate
Cˆt+1 =





= Ct − C2t .
Therefore, the potential bias that would be introduced is of the magnitude C2. Given that we estimate an average ACR
of 4% in the teleconnected region, the introduced bias would be 0.16%. This bias is only 1
25
th of the signal’s magnitude
and is well below the estimated uncertainty of our preferred models (±0.84%).
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the NINO coefficients to fall in magnitude. The coefficients are about half as large when Onset4 is
used and one-fourth as large when Onset9 is used, compared to Onset2. These results suggest that
all types of small conflicts are affected by the global ENSO state, while there may be two types of
large conflicts: one of which occurs infrequently and is associated with ENSO and one of which is more
frequent and exhibits cycles of “flaring up” and “cooling down” in association with the global ENSO
state.
Non-African countries Most previous studies examining the relationship between weather and
conflict have focused on Africa [Miguel et al., 2004,Hendrix and Glaser, 2007,Meier et al., 2007,Burke
et al., 2009, Buhaug, 2010]. We find that while the effect of ENSO on conflict is strong in Africa, it
appears similarly strong and statistically significant on other continents as well. Row 6 of Table 3.1
in the main text displays the baseline longitudinal regression model using non-African teleconnected
countries only and the estimated coefficient is almost identical to the average value (row 5). Models
9-10 in Table 3.12 display results for African and non-African countries in the longitudinal model with
commonly used control variables and the coefficients for NINO3 in both subsamples are similar to the
average value (model 8). Contrast this with the coefficients for log(GDP/capita) which are opposite
in sign and significant for the two subsamples. Finally, Table 3.13 displays the “kitchen sink” models
for both subsamples and finds that the coefficients on both subsamples remain larger than the baseline
model (Table 3.1 row 4 in the main text). In one of the specifications (row 3) the coefficient for non-
African countries is not statistically significant, but this appears to be due to an inflation in standard
errors. This is probably a result of over-fitting the model with too many irrelevant variables [Greene,
2003].
Conflict as a Poisson point process An alternative approach to modeling conflict onsets is to
assume that conflict onsets can be represented by a non-homogenous Poisson point-processes. Two
techniques can be applied in this setting: count analysis and survival analysis. We implement both
and verify that our central findings remain unchanged.
In our count analysis, we model the number of conflicts observed in the teleconnected group as if
these values were Poisson distributed, with a mean (variance) parameter that changed in response to
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via maximum likelihood (notation is the same as in Equation 3.5). Here, we assume that the structure
of disturbances is such that
∑
i Ci(t) can be represented by a Poisson distribution. Figure 3.12 shows∑
i Ci(t) in the teleconnected group against NINO3(t) for the period 1975-2005 when the sample of
countries is roughly constant. The regression line is an ordinary-least-squares fit to the data while the
circles display predicted values using the Poisson regression described in Equation 3.7. Observe that
movements in the predicted mean are the same, regardless of which statistical model is used.
In our survival analysis, we model how long peaceful periods “survive” before a “failure,” i.e. a
conflict, occurs. Assuming that conflict onsets can be represented by a non-homogeneous Poisson
point-process, we allow the hazard rate h (instantaneous ACR) to change over time in response to
ENSO. We estimate the model:
h(t) = e(βNINO3(t)+µi+θit) (3.8)
again by maximum likelihood (notation is the same as in Equation 3.5). Table 3.6 presents our
estimates for both the teleconnected and weakly affected groups. In row 1 we present our estimates
of the hazard rate increase associated with a 1◦C increase in NINO3. We find that the hazard rate
response in the teleconnected group is significant and matches our main result: a 1◦C increase in
NINO3 increases the risk of transition from a peaceful state into conflict by 25%. If one uses the full
temperature swing from La Nina to El Nino (roughly a 4◦C increase), the total risk of conflict doubles.
This magnitude matches our main results that we estimated with ordinary least squares (recall Fig
3.2 in the main text).
Finally, for a sense of scale, in row 2 of Table 3.6 we estimate how NINO3 influences the length
of uninterrupted peaceful periods. This is an alternative but equivalent interpretation of Equation
3.8. We estimate that a 1◦C increase in NINO3 reduces the length of an average peaceful period in
the teleconnected group by 0.22 years. Thus, a shift from an La Nin˜a to El Nin˜o reduces the average
peaceful period by 0.88 years. Summed over all eighty countries in the teleconnected group, this
same shift in NINO3 reduces the global number of peaceful country-years by 70 (0.22 years1◦C × 4◦C ×
80 countries = 70.4 country-years).
3.F Supplementary Tables and Figures
Table 3.2: Summary statistics of primary variables
variable mean SD min max years
ENSO index [◦C] May-Dec average
NINO12 0.088 1.02 -1.49 3.53 1950-2008
NINO3 0.117 0.829 -1.38 2.75 1950-2008
NINO4 0.117 0.583 -1.36 1.11 1950-2008
Annual probability of conflict onset [%/yr]
Whole world 3.08 2.51 0 11.2 1950-2004
Teleconnected region only 4.14 2.43 0 11.2 1950-2004
Weakly-affected region only 1.90 2.02 0 9.09 1950-2004
Agricultural output in teleconnected group
Cereal yields [kg/ha] country-level obs. 1500 924 0 8900 1961-2007
Value-added per capita [2000 US$] country-level obs 168 105 12.4 771 1970-2007
Value-added per capita [2000 US$] group 142 12.8 128 181 1970-2007
Agricultural output in weakly-affected group
Cereal yields [kg/ha] country-level obs. 2880 1720 0 9190 1961-2007
Value-added per capita [2000 US$] country-level obs 425 355 40.1 2500 1970-2007
Value-added per capita [2000 US$] group 254 45.2 202 352 1970-2007
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Table 3.3: Validating the global partition with temperature, precipitation and agriculture responses
to NINO3 (1950-2004)
Independent Variable: NINO3 averaged May-Dec. (◦C)
Dependant variable Model Teleconnected Weakly-Affected
(1) Temperature country-level panel 0.048*** -0.017
(◦C) country-specific trends [0.009] [0.011]
country-specific constants n = 4067 n = 3461
(2) Precipitation country-level panel -0.12*** -0.00
(mm/day) country-specific trends [0.02] [0.01]
country-specific constants n = 2323 n = 1835
(3) Cereal yields country-level panel -1.05*** 0.71
(%) country-specific trends [0.40] [0.43]
country-specific constants n = 3934 n=2690
(4) Agricultural Income country-level panel -0.57*** -0.33
(%) country-specific trends [0.16] [0.22]
country-specific constants n = 3187 n = 2399
(5) Agricultural Income group total -1.06*** -0.22
(%) trends [0.37] [0.37]
n = 37 n = 32
Standard error in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All trends have linear and quadratic
terms. SE in rows 1-4 are clustered by country. SE in row 5 are robust to heteroscedasticity. In
rows 3-5, coefficients are in units of %/1◦C, 1.0 means yields (or income) decline 1% for each 1◦C
in NINO3. Models 3-5 include one lag dependent variable (see SI). Temperature and precipitation
are spatially averaged. 1990-94 dropped in W.A. row 5 due to unreliability.
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Table 3.4: Monthly correlation coefficients for NINO3 (1950-2008)
early season “spring barrier” late season (“Year” 0)




M 0.85 0.92 1
(transition)
A 0.62 0.73 0.85 1
M 0.39 0.50 0.66 0.86 1
(little/no correlation) (transition) (high coherence)
J 0.15 0.25 0.41 0.64 0.88 1
J -0.00 0.09 0.25 0.47 0.71 0.90 1
A -0.08 0.01 0.20 0.44 0.68 0.85 0.96 1
S -0.05 0.03 0.20 0.44 0.68 0.80 0.88 0.94 1
O -0.10 -0.03 0.12 0.35 0.63 0.79 0.86 0.90 0.96 1
N -0.10 -0.03 0.10 0.31 0.59 0.77 0.825 0.86 0.92 0.98 1
D -0.11 -0.06 0.07 0.29 0.59 0.77 0.81 0.84 0.90 0.96 0.98 1
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Table 3.5: The importance of accounting for ENSO dynamics for signal detection
Dependent Variable: Conflict Risk (%/yr)
Independant variable
(1) Jan-Dec. NINO3 0.51
all countries [0.40]
n = 54
(2) Jan.-Dec. NINO3 0.76
teleconnected only [0.59]
n = 54
(3) May-Dec. NINO3 0.46*
all countries [0.24]
n = 54
(4) May-Dec. NINO3 0.85**
teleconnected only [0.40]
n = 54
Heteroscedasticity robust S.E., ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.; 1989 dropped.
Models all contain a linear trend.
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Table 3.6: Survival analysis for peaceful periods between civil conflicts (1950-2004)
Independent Variable: NINO3 May-Dec
teleconnected weakly affected
(1) ∆ proportional hazard per 1◦C 25%** 6%
[11%] [12%]
(2) ∆ average survival time per 1◦C -0.22 yr** -0.06 yr
[0.09 yr] [0.12 yr]
Observations 4929 4346
The peaceful periods between civil conflicts are modeled with survival analysis.
The hazard function is assumed to have an exponential form (i.e. conflicts are
a Poisson point-process) that varies in response to ENSO. Row (1) describes
the proportional change in the hazard rate associated with a 1◦C increase
in NINO3. A value of “1%” implies that the probability a peaceful period
ends is 1.01× the baseline hazard rate. Row (2) describes the same model,
but interpreted in terms of survival time. A value of “-0.1 yr” implies that the
average peaceful period (across all countries in a sample) decreases by 0.1 years
for a 1◦C increase in NINO3. All models include country-specific constants and
country-specific trends. 1989 is dropped. Standard errors clustered by country
in brackets: ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3.7: Changes in annual conflict risk in response to ENSO (1950-2004)
Independent variable: NINO12 NINO3 NINO4 NINO12 NINO3 NINO4
(a) Global time series
Dependent Variable: conflict onsets / countries
Jan-Dec NINO coeff.: 0.33 0.57 0.87* - - -
[0.24] [0.39] [0.49] - - -
Observations: 54 54 54 - - -
R2: 0.03 0.04 0.069 - - -
teleconnected group weakly-affected group
(b) Regional time-series
Dep. Var.: conflict onsets in region / countries in region
May-Dec NINO Coeff 0.59* 0.762* 0.842 -0.022 0.160 0.623
[0.304] [0.390] [0.535] [0.215] [0.307] [0.495]
Observations: 54 54 54 54 54 54
R2 0.073 0.080 0.048 0.000 0.004 0.032
(c) Same as (b) plus linear trend
May-Dec NINO Coeff 0.625** 0.852** 1.07* -0.071 0.059 0.430
[0.310] [0.396] [0.555] [0.202] [0.300] [0.470]
Observations: 54 54 54 54 54 54
R2 0.095 0.112 0.086 0.053 0.053 0.066
(d) Same as (c) plus post-1989 dummy
May-Dec NINO Coeff 0.634** 0.813** 0.879* -0.065 0.036 0.319
[0.252] [0.318] [0.482] [0.208] [0.305] [0.446]
Observations: 54 54 54 54 54 54
R2 0.273 0.277 0.237 0.124 0.123 0.130
(e) Same as (d) plus 1989 obs
May-Dec NINO Coeff 0.589** 0.737** 0.679 -0.054 0.054 0.360
[0.249] [0.320] [0.507] [0.208] [0.305] [0.450]
Observations: 55 55 55 55 55 55
R2 0.279 0.279 0.242 0.114 0.114 0.123
(f) Ignoring the “spring barrier” obscures signal
Jan-Dec NINO coeff.: 0.542 0.762 0.901 - - -
[0.374] [0.586] [0.622] - - -
(g) Country-level longitudinal-data linear probability model
Dep. Var.: conflict onset in a country (binary)
May-Dec NINO coeff.: 0.674% 0.893 1.0 -0.108 0.038 0.414
[0.38]* [0.415]** [0.522]* [0.154] [0.266] [0.471]
Observations: 3978 3978 3978 3400 3400 3400
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients
are probability responses in units of %/1◦C, 1.0 means the probability of conflict in a given year rises
0.01 for each 1◦C increase in NINO averaged May-Dec. All panels except (e) drop 1989. Panel (f)
includes a linear trend. Panel (g) includes county-specific constants (fixed-effects) and linear trends
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Table 3.10: Fixed effects or country-specific trends do not drive the result
Dependent Variable: Conflict Risk (% / yr)
Independent Variable: May-Dec NINO3 (◦C)
Panel model Teleconnected Weakly-Affected
(%/yr◦C) (%/yr◦C)
(1) No controls 0.85* 0.20
[0.44] [0.33]
(2) Country fixed effects 0.89** 0.13
[0.40] [0.33]
(3) Country-trends 0.90** 0.09
[0.39] [0.32]
(4) Country fixed effects 0.89** 0.04
Country-trends [0.39] [0.32]
Observations 3978 3400
Conley [Conley, 1999] SE in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
1989 dropped.
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Table 3.11: ENSO influences ACR holding local temperature and rainfall constant
Dependent Variable: Conflict Risk (% / yr)
Independent Variable: May-Dec NINO3 (◦C)
Panel model Teleconnected Weakly-Affected
(%/yr◦C) (%/yr◦C)
(1) No weather 0.89** 0.04
[0.39] [0.32]
n=3978 n=3400
(2) Include temperature 1.02*** 0.13
(monthly, 12 vars) [0.39] [0.30]
n=3978 n=3400
(3) Include temp & rain 1.66*** 0.36
(monthly, 24 vars) [0.48] [0.33]
n=2234 n=1774
Conley [Conley, 1999] SE in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. 1989 dropped. All models include country specific con-
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Table 3.13: The “kitchen sink” model
Dependent Variable: Conflict Risk (% / yr)




(1) All Countries 1.35*** 0.03
[0.47] [0.31]
n = 2464 n=1827
(2) Africa Only 1.63** 0.27
[0.76] [0.53]
n=1349 n=96




(4) All Countries 1.83*** 0.46
[0.53] [0.33]
n=1973 n=1467
(5) Africa Only 1.95* 0.54
[1.01] [1.79]
n=1083 n=75
(6) Not Africa 1.49** 0.50
[0.66] [0.34]
n=890 n=1392
Conley [Conley, 1999] SE in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. 1989 dropped in all models. Controls include country
fixed-effects, country-specific linear trends, lagged log income
per capita, lagged per capita income growth, lagged Polity IV
score (with quadratic term), lagged agriculture industry share
(%), lagged percent urbanized, lagged population, lagged per-
cent female, lagged percent below 15 years old, lagged percent
above 65 years old. Models 4-6 include 12 monthly tempera-
ture variables, 12 monthly precipitation variables and annual
average maximum tropical cyclone windspeed.
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Table 3.14: Robustness analysis under different definitions of conflict risk (1950-2004)
Dependent Variable: Binary conflict indicator for teleconnected group countries
Onset2 Onset3 Onset4 Onset5 Onset6 Onset7 Onset8 Onset9
“Small” Conflicts 0.454 0.372 0.342 0.379 0.411 0.411 0.449 0.449
“Large” Conflicts 0.453 0.291 0.210 0.121 0.093 0.064 0.102 0.102
“Small” conflicts had between 25 and 1000 battle related deaths. “Large” conflicts had more than 1000 battle
related deaths. Each coefficient is a separate regression. Coefficients are percent probability responses in units
of %/1◦C, 1 means the probability of conflict in a given year rises 0.01 for each 1◦C increase in NINO3 sea
surface temperature. OnsetN indicates that a conflict must be dormant for N years before renewed violence
marks the “onset” of a new conflict. NINO3 SSTs are measured using May-December means. Models contain
country constants (fixed effect) and country-specific time trends. 1989 dropped in all models.




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































98 CHAPTER 3. GLOBAL CLIMATE INFLUENCES CIVIL CONFLICTS















Figure 3.4: The number of countries in the dataset is growing over time, more than doubling over
the period of observation. Because conflict onset is coded as a binary variable for each country-year
observation, it is necessary to normalize the total number of observed conflict onsets by the number
of distinct countries being observed. To check that this trend is not driving any of our results, we
re-estimate the model while restricting the sample to the period following 1975 (inclusive) when the
sample of teleconnected countries was stable; we also estimate a model with the raw panel data using
country-specific constants in the regression (country fixed-effects).
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Figure 3.6: (A) Global ENSO teleconnection partition used in main analysis. Red: pixels coded as
teleconnected when surface temperatures are positively correlated with NINO3 two months earlier
(L = 2) for at least three months (R = 3). Blue: weakly-affected pixels failing this criteria. (B) Same,
but L = 0. (C) Green: teleconnected pixels when R = 5 and R = 3 (and L = 2). Yellow: teleconnected
pixels when R = 3 but not when R = 5. Blue: weakly-affected pixels when R = 3 and R = 5.
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Teleconnected countries (red) and weakly affected countries (blue)
Figure 3.7: Countries assigned to be teleconnected when pixels are weighted by population (wx =
populationx,t=2000) are red, weakly-affected countries are dark blue. Grey countries have no conflict
data.
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Figure 3.9: Total agricultural revenue for the weakly affected group (top) and teleconnected group
(bottom), both with a quadratic fit. During 1990-1994 values for the weakly affected group are
unreliable and are omitted from the analysis.
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Figure 3.10: The NINO12, NINO3 and NINO4 regions in the equatorial Pacific Ocean. NINO index
values are defined as the average sea surface temperature over a NINO region minus the long-term
mean sea surface temperature in that region.


























Figure 3.11: The linear probability model used for our country-level analysis (see main text Table
3.1 row 5) is virtually indistinguishable from non-linear probability models. For both regions, logit
and probit models produce almost identical results to the linear probability model used in the main
analysis. We prefer (and present) the linear probability model because it is simpler.
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Figure 3.12: The linear probability model used for our country-level analysis (see main text Table
3.1 row 4) could instead be modeled with standard statistical techniques for “count data” such as a
Poisson regression. Unfortunately, such an approach is difficult to interpret when the sample size of
countries is changing over time (See Fig. 3.4). Nonetheless, we can use a Poisson regression to model
the number of conflicts for the period 1975-2004, when the sample of countries is almost constant.
However, we find there is no obvious gain in prediction over ordinary least squares.
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Figure 3.13: (A) Residuals (it) estimated with a linear trend (see main text Table 3.1 row 2 and
Equation 3.4). 1989 is a 3 standard deviation outlier and therefore has been dropped from all models,
for both the teleconnected and weakly-affected groups. (B) When a post-1989 (inclusive) constant
term is added to the regression (see Table 3.1 panel d and Equation 3.4), 1989 is less of an outlier.
However, for consistency in models, it is still dropped from the estimation. We re-introduce the 1989
observation in Table 3.1 Panel e using this specification and find our results are largely unchanged.
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Figure 3.14: Bivariate non-linear fits of ACR against three standard correlates and NINO3. While
population and income are correlated with conflict risk across countries, when country means (fixed-
effects) are included, the correlation is not significantly different than zero (Table 3.12). Only Polity
IV (a measure of democratic institutions) remains statistically significant, however it explains very
little variation in conflict risk over time when compared to NINO3.
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Figure 3.15: Linearity of ACR regression on NINO3 when both are partialled-out on 35 time-varying
controls, country fixed-effects and country-specific time trends. Dashed line is the OLS fit (with
95% confidence interval), and solid line is a non-linear fit. The density of observations following this
transformation is the histogram at the bottom.
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An extreme environmental event may generate different losses for different societies. If the physical
exposure to an event is held fixed, then the magnitude of a society’s loss defines its vulnerability
to that event. Competing hypotheses suggest that social and economic developments could make
vulnerability rise or fall over time, but previous studies have been unable to reject either hypothesis
because they lacked accurate data on societies’ physical exposure to extreme events. We address this
problem for a specific type of event by reconstructing the exposure of 233 countries to every tropical
cyclone (TC) on the planet between 1950 and 2008. By filling a critical data gap, this reconstruction
enables us to compare how revenue losses, damages, and deaths from physically similar events change
over time. On a global scale, we find that populations rapidly mitigate certain TC risks, reducing their
reported damages from a TC of fixed intensity by a remarkable 10% yr−1 and death rates by 5% yr−1.
However, these rapid reductions in vulnerability are not evident for the highest intensity TCs and lost
agricultural revenues, which are more difficult to observe than deaths or damages, exhibit non-declining
vulnerability for events of all intensities. Because the vulnerability of agriculture has remained high
while vulnerability to damages has declined rapidly, our results indicate that lost agricultural revenues
have dominated TC losses ever since ∼1990.
4.1 Introduction
A general trend common throughout human history is a declining dependance of societies on their
environment [Diamond, 1997, McNeil, 2000, Richards, 2005], however the universality of this trend is
contested. In particular, it has been argued that the vulnerability of societies to extreme environmental
events is not declining and may even be increasing [ISDR, 2009, Bank and the United Nations, 2010]
because societies plan for extreme events in emotional, political and financially inefficient ways [Taleb,
2007, Smil, 2008, Weitzman, 2009, Kunreuther et al., 2009]. To date, this idea has remained largely
anecdotal and theoretical because it has been difficult to test with data – primarily because objective
data on societies’ exposure to extreme events is difficult to obtain. By developing a new global dataset,
we are able to examine this question for a specific type of extreme event: tropical cyclones (TCs), the
family of phenomena that includes hurricanes, typhoons, tropical storms and cyclones. We document
that on a global scale, over the last half century, vulnerability to TCs has not only declined but it has
fallen rapidly.
The “vulnerability” of a population is a measure of how effectively environmental hazards are
translated into social losses [Mutter, 2005], where the magnitude of a hazard (eg. TC) is measured by
strictly physical processes. In some cases, vulnerability may decline as an unintentional but beneficial
side effect of technological and social changes or economic investments that would still occur in the
absence of TCs. For example, sturdier houses may be built because they are more comfortable and
they happen to be more robust to high winds. In other cases, individuals intentionally invest in
infrastructure or alter their behavior in ways that protect them from a hazard [ISDR, 2009, Bank
and the United Nations, 2010,Pielke Jr. and Sr., 1997,Smith et al., 2006, IPCC, 2007,Deschenes and
Greenstone, 2007, Patt et al., 2010]. This active response of agents, referred to as “adaptation,” is
known to occur in response to numerous environmental hazards and has been observed in different
contexts around the world [ISDR, 2009,Bank and the United Nations, 2010, IPCC, 2007]. In general,
both unintentional and intentional actions that influence vulnerability are implemented at the level
of individuals, households, communities, firms or governments and involve a large number of small
investments or behavioral changes. This makes it difficult to observe and understand how these large
number of actions interact and aggregate, gradually altering the ways in which a large society interacts
with its environment.
A fundamental question in the study of coupled human-natural systems is how quickly and ef-
fectively societies can limit their vulnerability to environmental fluctuations [Patt et al., 2010, Dell
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et al., 2009b]. For different environmental stressors it is possible that the vulnerability of societies falls
slowly, quickly or not at all. Understanding the rates of these changes is important, for example, in the
evaluation of future climate changes [IPCC, 2007,Patt et al., 2010,Schlenker et al., 2005,Narita et al.,
2009] where it is expected that populations will adjust to environmental changes but it is unknown if
these adjustments will take days or centuries. Furthermore, vulnerability may vary by society or by
environmental stressor. For example, poor populations may be less able to adapt to certain stressors or
there may be certain types of extreme hazards that no society can adapt to with existing technologies.
4.2 Approach
In this study, we use a physical model [Hsiang, 2010] to reconstruct every tropical cyclone (TC) between
1950-2008. We then systematically evaluate how the effects of TCs on societies have changed over time.
If the social impact of TCs diminishes with time, we interpret this as evidence that a population has
become less vulnerable to their current TC-climatology.
By objectively measuring TC events as populations on the ground would have experienced them,
we are able to compare social responses to physically similar events that occur at different points in
time. This allows us to disentangle changes in vulnerability from changes in TC exposure and changes
in TC reporting. Our approach contrasts with a large literature, summarized in recent assessments
by the United Nations and the World Bank [ISDR, 2009, Bank and the United Nations, 2010], that
relies on rapidly evolving systems of disaster reporting [OFDA/CRED, 2009]. We demonstrate that
institutional changes in how events are reported seriously confound any effort to measure rates of
change in vulnerability without reconstructing objective measures of events’ physical properties.
Previous global-scale studies have relied almost exclusively on the Emergency Events Database
(EM-DAT) [OFDA/CRED, 2009] to measure the physical properties of TCs [ISDR, 2009, Bank and
the United Nations, 2010, Narita et al., 2009, Kahn, 2005, Toya and Skidmore, 2007, Kellenberg and
Mobarak, 2008,Loayza et al., 2009,Cavallo and Noy, 2009,Noy, 2009,Mendelsohn et al., 2010]. However,
TCs are not recorded in EM-DAT unless the TC’s social impact is sufficiently large or unless a social
institution (eg. a national government, international organization or reinsurance company) reports
the event [OFDA/CRED, 2009]. This means that parameters reported in EM-DAT are unreliable
measures of physical processes because they are strongly influenced by changes in social systems that
may also affect the vulnerability of societies. Yet, summarizing patterns reported in EM-DAT without
accounting for the physical incidence of TCs at all [ISDR, 2009, Bank and the United Nations, 2010]
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cannot accurately describe trends in vulnerability because the physical properties of TC may themselves
be changing over time [Knutson et al., 2010a,Knutson et al., 2010b]. Thus, in order to estimate trends
in vulnerability with EM-DAT, the data must be combined with physical measures of TC incidence
from unbiased (and therefor non-EM-DAT) sources.
We generate objective measures of TC incidence by reconstructing every TC in the International
Best Track Archive for Climate Stewardship (IBTrACS) database [Knapp, 2009] as a translating
vortex [Mallen et al., 2005,Kossin et al., 2007] using the Limited Information Cyclone Reconstruction
and Integration for Climate and Economics (LICRICE) model [Hsiang, 2010] (see Methods). LICRICE
reconstructs the wind field for all 6712 storms (interpolating among 191822 6-hr observations) over
every 0.1◦ × 0.1◦ cell between 48◦N-48◦S latitude (See Fig. 4.5 and 4.6). We measure storm exposure
using both (1) the energy dissipated by a storm at a location over its lifetime [Hsiang, 2010] and (2)
the maximum wind speed achieved at a given location during a storm’s lifetime. Fig. 4.1A shows the
maximum wind speed achieved at each location in an average year (see Fig. 4.7 for more summary
statistics) and Fig. 4.1B shows the estimated distribution of the highest wind speeds experienced by
the global population [CIESIN, 2009]. One-third of the world population would have experienced TC
winds of at least tropical-storm intensity over 1950-2008.
To match TC exposure with socio-economic outcomes, cyclone measures are aggregated and spa-
tially averaged so there is a single observation for each of 233 countries in every year (n = 13688,
see Fig. 4.8). We focus here on the wind speed measure (mean = 3.4 ms−1, s.d. = 7.7, min. = 0,
max = 78.3) for succinctness, however wind speed and energy are highly correlated (Fig. 4.9) and
generally produce similar results (estimates using energy are presented in the Appendix). Fig. 4.1C
shows the distribution of country-year wind speeds for each continent (country-level distributions are
shown in Figs. 4.10-4.14). Figs. 4.1D plots LICRICE output when events are and are not recorded
in EM-DAT, revealing that over time smaller scale TC events have been reported with increasing
frequency in EM-DAT (also see Fig. 4.15). This has lead to a dramatic increase in the number of
TCs reported in EM-DAT, a trend that does not reflect the physical incidence of TC’s on society (Fig.
4.1E). This reporting bias in EM-DAT is driven by an increase in the number of countries reporting
TCs and the number of TC’s reported per country (Fig. 4.16), probably reflecting improvements in
disaster monitoring.
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Figure 4.1: Global TC exposure. (A) Annual average maximum wind speed achieved by TCs at
each location (1950-2008). Contours are 5 ms−1. (B) The number of individuals who experience
TC wind speeds above a given value (inverse cumulative distribution function) for the maximum TC
wind speed experienced (1950-2008) at an individuals’ locations. The spatial distribution of the global
population is held fixed (2000 estimate [CIESIN, 2009]). Vertical lines are cutoff wind speeds for the
Saffir-Simpson (S.S.) scale. (C) Distributions of country-by-year TC observations after TC exposure
is spatially averaged. Boxes are the interquartile range and vertical lines are medians. (D) Country-
by-year TC exposure when a TC is reported in EM-DAT (black) and when no TC is reported in
EM-DAT (red). (E) The total number of TCs reported annually in EM-DAT (black) and the total
energy dissipated by TCs [spatial average] over countries in the sample (red).
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4.3 Results
To minimize the impact of EM-DAT’s reporting bias on our estimates, we estimate TC losses condi-
tional on the intensity of physical exposure estimated by LICRICE for the 91 countries in EM-DAT
(see Fig. 4.17 for a graphical explanation of why this corrects the bias). Normalizing the number of
individuals killed in a country by its population and the economic damages in a country by its gross
domestic product [Pielke Jr. et al., 2008], we find that that the former increases by 7.7% (±0.7%)
and the latter increases by 10.2% (±1.2%) for every additional 1 ms−1 in TC wind speed (see Figs.
4.2A-B, also Fig. 4.18). These average relationships hold for a large number of alternative statistical
models (Table 4.2) with only moderate variation across continents (Table 4.3). Furthermore, for the
pooled sample (Fig. 4.19) and for individual countries (Figs. 4.20-4.23) we verify that this relationship
is well approximated by our exponential model (see Methods), which seems to be a more reasonable
approximation than the power function used in previous analyses [Mendelsohn et al., 2010,Nordhaus,
2006a] (see Fig. 4.19).
The economic damages reported by EM-DAT are an estimate of economic losses, which may include
lost consumption goods (eg. vacation homes), lost productive capital (eg. factories) or costs of business
interruption, depending on the protocols of the reporting institution [OFDA/CRED, 2009]. In general,
these estimates are probably dominated by physical damages, as many researchers have assumed
[Cavallo and Noy, 2009, Noy, 2009], and some of the value reflected in capital losses may reflect lost
future revenues [Bank and the United Nations, 2010,Mendelsohn et al., 2010]. However, it seems likely
that many income streams lost to a TC are not reported because income that is never earned is difficult
to observe, report and verify. Thus, we examine how economic growth scales with TC incidence in
200 countries reporting national income statistics [UN, 2009]; although we note that some of these lost
income streams may overlap with the damages reported by EM-DAT.
Globally, we find robust and consistent evidence that the growth rate in agriculture, hunting &
fishing (mean = 3.07 percentage points, n = 6912) falls by 1.4 ± 0.3 percentage points for every
additional 10 ms−1 in TC wind speed, with growth rates in following years recovering (Fig. 4.2C).
This average response is robust across statistical models (Table 4.4), is evident when annual changes
in rainfall and temperature are controlled for (Table 4.4 and Fig. 4.24), is broadly consistent across
continents (Table 4.5) and leads to persistent reductions in income over many years (Table 4.4).
Analysis of yield data reveals that TCs impact a variety of crops, with fiber crops exhibiting the largest
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in the global dataset (Fig. 4.25 and Tables 4.6-4.7); results that differ from a similar analysis restricted
to the Caribbean and Central America [Hsiang, 2010] because some non-agricultural industries do not
respond to TCs in a consistent way inside and outside of North America (Tables 4.6-4.7).
Focusing on deaths, damages, and agricultural growth, we examine how TC losses change over
time to estimate the rate at which societies become less vulnerable to their TC climatology. To ensure
that we only compare the impacts of equivelently-sized TC events, we use ordinary least squares to
estimate the linear equation
Zit = αZ(T ) + βZ(T )× wind speedit + it (4.1)
where Z is one of the outcomes from Fig. 4.2A-C and  is a disturbance. For each outcome we estimate
the intercept α and the slope β for a moving window of fifteen years centered on year T . We find that
none of the slopes β have neared zero over time (Figs. 4.3A-C) however we observe that the intercept
terms α have been declining rapidly for both deaths and damages (Figs. 4.3D-E). Holding windspeed
fixed, per capita deaths from TCs have been steadily declining by ∼ 5% yr−1 and normalized damages
fell ∼ 10% yr−1. However, it is important to note that βdamages has risen gradually (Fig. 4.3C),
indicating that vulnerability to large TC events has remained stationary or declined more slowly than
the falling vulnerability to small and moderate TC events (we estimate that zero change occurs at
∼ 37 ms−1).
Declining vulnerability to TCs may be driven by improvements in risk-mitigating technology, such
as TC forecasting [Heming and Goerss, 2010], by rising incomes that enable populations to invest
in existing technologies [Kahn, 2005, Noy, 2009], or by institutional developments that help societies
prepare for disasters better, such as improvements in a government’s capacity to enforce building
codes [Kahn, 2005,Toya and Skidmore, 2007] – although, the gradualness of the trends in Fig. 4.3D-E
suggest these changes are not determined by the discrete effect of a single technology or global event.
We find suggestive evidence that rising incomes may influence this trend when we compute βdamage for
individual countries (Figs. 4.22-4.23) and plot their values against the incomes of those countries in
1970 (Fig. 4.3F). It is clear that countries with higher initial incomes suffer smaller normalized damages
when exposed to similar TCs. (Note that in Fig. 4.3F the United States is a clear outlier, so it is
omitted from the following analysis. This also suggests that the American experience with TCs should
not be extrapolated to other countries [Mendelsohn et al., 2010].) However, when we simultaneously
estimate the effect of income on TC losses and global trends in TC losses, we find evidence that rising
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Table 4.1: Rapid reduction of Tropical Cyclone vulnerability (1971-2007)
dependent variable: damaget/GDPt−1 killedt/pop.t−1
model contains country constants: no yes no yes
slope variables
wind speedt (ms
−1) 13.0*** 10.2*** 10.6*** 6.4***
[1.2] [1.7] [0.9] [1.0]
yeart × wind speedt 0.4*** 0.3*** 0.1 0.1
[0.1] [0.1] [0.1] [0.1]
GDPt−1 × wind speedt -0.022** -0.025 -0.028*** -0.015**
[0.010] [0.015] [0.006] [0.007]
intercept variables
yeart -11.2*** -11.0*** -4.6*** -5.7***
[2.2] [2.7] [1.7] [1.4]
GDPt−1 -0.39** 0.36 -0.03 0.07
[0.18] [0.62] [0.10] [0.32]
yeart ×GDPt−1 0.020** 0.012 -0.002 -0.005
[0.009] [0.009] [0.005] [0.004]
Observations 420 420 545 545
R2 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.7
Each column is a separate multiple regression and the United States is omitted
from all four models. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors [White, 1980] in
brackets: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients are percentage changes.
1 unit of wind speed is 1 ms−1 and 1 unit of GDP is a 1% change. A coefficient
of 10 for wind speed means losses increase 10% for every 1 ms−1 increase in
wind speed. A coefficient of 0.1 for year × wind speed means that after one
year, losses rise an addition 0.1% for every 1 ms−1 increase in wind speed.
A coefficient of 0.01 for GDP × wind speed means that after a 1% rise in
GDP , losses rise an addition 0.01% for every 1 ms−1 increase in wind speed.
A coefficient of −1 for year implies that losses fall 1% every year at all values
of wind speed.
incomes reduce slopes βdamages and βkilled (consistent with Fig. 4.3F) but we fail to find evidence
that the dramatic declines in intercepts αdamages or αkilled are driven by rising incomes (Table 4.1).
Moreover, the effect of rising incomes on the slope terms is small compared to the secular trend in the
slopes: in order for income growth to offset the positive secular trends, countries would need to grow
an impressive 12% (6.7%) annually to keep the slope βdamages (βkilled) constant. Taken together, these
findings suggest that rising incomes may be dramatically less important for declining vulnerability than
other global processes, such as technological innovations or institutional developements. This result
contrasts with previous studies, based exclusively on EM-DAT, which find that income is a central
determinant of disaster vulnerability [Kahn, 2005,Toya and Skidmore, 2007,Noy, 2009].
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Globally, average deaths and damages from TCs have fallen rapidly over the last half-century. For
a country with a GDP growth rate of 5% yr−1, the death rate for a 10 ms−1 TC fell by half every
12.7 years and normalized damages for that event fell by half every 7.5 years. These rapid declines
contrast starkly with agricultural income growth, which persistently suffered declines of 1-1.4% for the
same 10 ms−1 event with no fall in vulnerability (Fig. 4.3C). As mentioned earlier, we cannot know
for certain whether these observed declines in vulnerability are due to intentional “adaptation” or are
simply unintentional but beneficial gains from investments and changes that would have occurred even
in the absence of TCs. Yet, we observe that countries experiencing frequent and intense TCs do not
suffer the same losses as countries experiencing TCs less frequently when both countries are exposed to
events of the same intensity (Fig. 4.26). This evidence suggests that populations may be intentionally
adapting to their TC climates [Deschenes and Greenstone, 2007], although it is hardly conclusive.
We use our statistical models to hindcast damages and agricultural income lost to TCs since
1970 (see Figure 4.4). We estimate that EM-DAT severely underreported damages in the 1970’s and
only approached the distribution of true damages in the 1990’s. Moreover, we estimate that total
damages from TCs declined dramatically and rapidly (in terms of total US dollars) between 1970 and
the present. However, because loses to agricultural incomes did not decline but grew gradually with
growth in agriculture, they began to generally exceed direct damages sometime in the 1980’s.
4.4 Discussion
These results contrast with previous global assessments that strictly rely on self-reported EM-DAT
data to understand trends in human vulnerability to TCs and other disasters [ISDR, 2009, Bank and
the United Nations, 2010]. Analyses that do not compare physical events of the same magnitude
over time but instead summarize the universe of all reported TC losses conclude that deaths and
damages from TCs are stationary or rising (orange line in Fig 4.4A) because expansions in reporting
networks have increased the total number of events that are accounted for. With the exception of a
few exceptionally costly outlying events, we find that both normalized and total deaths and damages
have declined continuously and rapidly over recent history, on a global scale. These results suggest
that modern societies have become decreasingly vulnerable to their TC climates, probably through
technological advances since rising incomes appear to have had only secondary impacts. However,
losses in agricultural income and damages from extreme TCs have not declined in recent history and
may even have grown gradually. This suggests that existing patterns of adaptation or investments
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have not successfully reduced all types of TC vulnerability. For example, it is possible that lost agri-
cultural income is difficult to observe (compared to damaged infrastructure, for example) so societies
underinvest in its protection; or it may not be cost-effective to protect agricultural production that
is widely dispersed over large areas. Further, it is possible that damages from extreme TCs persist
because their intensity overwhelms otherwise effective risk-mitigating systems. These results suggest
that future research, policies and investment in risk-mitigation may be most effective if they focus on
agriculture and high-intensity TCs.
Understanding how societies adapt to large-scale environmental conditions is a central issue in
the assessment of future climate changes [IPCC, 2007, Patt et al., 2010]. In particular, many studies
suggest that total TC counts might decline while the number of extreme TCs may rise (see [Knutson
et al., 2010a,Knutson et al., 2010b] for reviews), this is concerning if the observed failure to adapt to
extreme TCs persists. Insofar as adaptation to other climatic variables resembles historical adaptation
to TCs, we might expect adaptation to small and moderate-scale changes that are easily observable
to be relatively rapid. However, losses to extreme events or losses that are difficult to observe, such
as reductions in productivity [Dell et al., 2009b,Hsiang, 2010], might persist in the absence of explicit
measures to promote adaptation.
4.5 Methods
Data TC wind speed is measured as the maximum wind speed achieved at a location during the
lifetime of a storm. If a location experiences multiple storms, the annual maximum is used as the
wind speed measure for that year. Location-specific annual wind speed estimates are spatially averaged
over a country to aggregate exposure into country-by-year observations. TC energy is measured using
a “power dissipation density index” following Hsiang (2010) [Hsiang, 2010] (mean = 0.22, s.d. = 1,
min = 0, max = 19.4). Income data is from the United Nations National Accounts files [UN, 2009],
population data is from the World Development Indicator files [World Bank, 2008], yield data is from
the Food and Agriculture Administration files [Food and Agriculture Organization, 2009], temperature
data is from the National Center for Environmental Prediction reanalysis [Kalnay et al., 1996], and
rainfall data is from the Climate Prediction Center Merged Analysis of Precipitation [Xie and Arkin,
1996].
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Analysis Table 4.1 contains coefficients from the model
ln(Zit) =αi + α1 · yeart + α2 · lnGDPit−1 + α3 · yeart · lnGDPit−1
+ [β0 + β1 · yeart + β2 · lnGDPit−1] · wind speedit + it (4.2)
where Zit is normalized deaths or damages for country i in year t and αi is a country specific constant.












+ αi + αt + δi · yeart + it (4.3)
where Zit is industry value added per capita (inflation adjusted) αt are year specific constants and δi












+ αi + αt + ρ1 · ln(Zit−1) + ρ2 · ln(Zit−2) + it (4.4)
where Zit is average yields (kg/ha) and ρ1−2 are autoregressive coefficients. In Equations 4.3-4.4, the
disturbance term  is assumed to have arbitrary forms of spatial correlation up to distances of 500
km and serial correlation over five years [Hsiang, 2010, Conley, 1999]. All models are assumed to be
heteroscedastic.
Appendix
4.A Supplementary Tables and Figures
Table 4.2: Global tropical cyclone damages and deaths (1950-2008)
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Controls: - FE FE FE FE FE
- - YE YE YE YE
- - - WEA WEA WEA
- - - - Yi -
- - - - - PO
Panel (a)
Dependent Variable: log(damage/GDP)
Wind Speed (m/s) 0.1018*** 0.0989*** 0.0904*** 0.0931*** 0.1020*** 0.1357***
[0.0123] [0.0158] [0.0129] [0.0148] [0.0145] [0.0256]
Observations 447 447 447 385 385 207
Panel (b)
Dependent Variable: log(damage/GDP)
Energy (s.d.) 0.5447*** 0.4050*** 0.4125*** 0.4893*** 0.5977*** 0.7907***
[0.0742] [0.0884] [0.0725] [0.0817] [0.0877] [0.1123]
Observations 447 447 447 385 385 207
Panel (c)
Dependent Variable: log(killed/population)
Wind Speed (m/s) 0.0771*** 0.0706*** 0.0577*** 0.0553*** 0.0649*** 0.0855***
[0.0054] [0.0087] [0.0072] [0.0086] [0.0096] [0.0155]
Observations 701 701 701 495 495 310
Panel (d)
Dependent Variable: log(killed/population)
Energy (s.d.) 0.3378*** 0.2809*** 0.2448*** 0.2926*** 0.3506*** 0.5234***
[0.0317] [0.0400] [0.0365] [0.0506] [0.0559] [0.1236]
Observations 701 701 701 495 495 310
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Heteroscedasticity, serial correlation (5 years) and spatial
correlation (500 km) robust standard errors in brackets. Abbreviations for control variables:
FE - “fixed effects” (country-specific constants); YE - “year effects” (year-specific constants);
WEA - “weather controls” (annual temperature and precipitation); Yi - country-specific time
trends; PO - “previous observations” (the sample is restricted to countries reporting losses
one or two years prior).
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Table 4.3: Global tropical cyclone damages and deaths by continent (1950-2008)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Global Africa Asia N. America Oceania
Panel (a)
Dependent Variable: log(damage/GDP)
Wind Speed (m/s) 0.0904*** 0.1883** 0.1245*** 0.0829*** 0.1195***
[0.0129] [0.0598] [0.0327] [0.0205] [0.0204]
Observations 447 35 175 169 53
Panel (b)
Dependent Variable: log(damage/GDP)
Energy (s.d.) 0.4125*** 0.9252*** 0.4125*** 0.3950*** 1.1206***
[0.0725] [0.1417] [0.1545] [0.1217] [0.1078]
Observations 447 35 175 169 53
Panel (c)
Dependent Variable: log(killed/population)
Wind Speed (m/s) 0.0577*** -0.0275 0.0769*** 0.0545*** 0.0418**
[0.0072] [0.0234] [0.0163] [0.0111] [0.0176]
Observations 701 57 341 211 76
Panel (d)
Dependent Variable: log(killed/population)
Energy (s.d.) 0.2448*** -0.0448 0.1708*** 0.3536*** 0.1143
[0.0365] [0.0969] [0.0446] [0.0843] [0.0971]
Observations 701 57 341 211 76
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Heteroscedasticity, serial correlation (5 years) and
spatial correlation (500 km) robust standard errors in brackets. All models include
country-specific constants (fixed-effects) and year specific constants (year-effects).
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Table 4.4: Tropical cyclone impact on agricultural growth (1970-2007)
Direct effect Cumulative effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Independent variable: Wind Speed (m/s)
FE - FE FE FE FE FE FE FE
- YE YE YE YE YE YE YE YE
- - - Yi Yi Yi Yi - Yi
- - - - T TP TP - TP
t+ 1 -0.0005
[0.0004]
t -0.0010*** -0.0009*** -0.0011*** -0.0010*** -0.0010*** -0.0014*** -0.0013*** -0.0011*** -0.0014***
[0.0003] [0.0002] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003]
t− 1 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0012*** -0.0012***
[0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0004] [0.0005]
t− 2 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0012** -0.0015**
[0.0004] [0.0003] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0005] [0.0004] [0.0006] [0.0006]
t− 3 0.0006 0.0006* 0.0005 0.0006 0.0006* 0.0007 0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0009
[0.0004] [0.0003] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0006] [0.0008]
t− 4 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0010 -0.0011
[0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0008] [0.0009]
t− 5 -0.0000 0.0001 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0010 -0.0010
[0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0008] [0.0009]
Obs. 6,895 6,895 6,895 6,895 6,895 4,607 4,607 6,895 4,607
(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Independent variable: Energy (s.d.)
t− 1 -0.0018
[0.0024]
t -0.0077*** -0.0070*** -0.0081*** -0.0079*** -0.0078*** -0.0085*** -0.0085*** -0.0081*** -0.0085***
[0.0020] [0.0018] [0.0019] [0.0020] [0.0019] [0.0018] [0.0018] [0.0019] [0.0018]
t− 1 -0.0006 0.0007 -0.0003 -0.0000 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0084*** -0.0086***
[0.0021] [0.0021] [0.0022] [0.0022] [0.0022] [0.0022] [0.0022] [0.0030] [0.0029]
t− 2 -0.0023 -0.0006 -0.0017 -0.0013 -0.0012 -0.0047 -0.0048 -0.0101** -0.0133***
[0.0033] [0.0030] [0.0032] [0.0033] [0.0033] [0.0034] [0.0033] [0.0045] [0.0046]
t− 3 0.0036 0.0049* 0.0037 0.0042 0.0044 0.0043 0.0045 -0.0064 -0.0089
[0.0028] [0.0029] [0.0029] [0.0030] [0.0030] [0.0035] [0.0033] [0.0055] [0.0064]
t− 4 -0.0017 -0.0003 -0.0012 -0.0011 -0.0011 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0076 -0.0088
[0.0022] [0.0020] [0.0021] [0.0020] [0.0020] [0.0020] [0.0019] [0.0060] [0.0069]
t− 5 -0.0020 -0.0012 -0.0022 -0.0020 -0.0020 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0098* -0.0095
[0.0016] [0.0018] [0.0017] [0.0016] [0.0016] [0.0016] [0.0016] [0.0059] [0.0068]
Obs. 6,889 6,889 6,889 6,889 6,889 4,601 4,600 6,889 4,601
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Heteroscedasticity, serial correlation (5 years) and spatial correlation (500 km) robust
standard errors in brackets. Abbreviations for control variables: FE - “fixed effects” (country-specific constants); YE - “year
effects” (year-specific constants); Yi - country-specific time trends; T - temperature; TP - temperature and preciptiation.
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Table 4.5: Tropical cyclone impact on agricultural growth by continent (1970-2007)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Global Africa Asia N. America Oceania
Wind Speed (m/s) -0.0014*** -0.0023* -0.0005 -0.0014*** -0.0014*
[0.0003] [0.0012] [0.0006] [0.0004] [0.0008]
t− 1 0.0001 0.0021* -0.0005 -0.0002 0.0000
[0.0003] [0.0012] [0.0007] [0.0005] [0.0008]
t− 2 -0.0003 0.0001 0.0008 -0.0002 -0.0017*
[0.0005] [0.0011] [0.0005] [0.0007] [0.0010]
t− 3 0.0007 0.0006 -0.0002 0.0012** -0.0009
[0.0005] [0.0011] [0.0006] [0.0006] [0.0011]
t− 4 -0.0003 0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0012
[0.0004] [0.0010] [0.0005] [0.0006] [0.0007]
t− 5 0.0001 0.0000 0.0010* 0.0003 -0.0011
[0.0003] [0.0011] [0.0006] [0.0005] [0.0007]
Observations 4,607 1,234 1,038 792 403
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Global Africa Asia N. America Oceania
Energy (s.d.) -0.0085*** -0.0165*** -0.0023 -0.0090*** -0.0087
[0.0018] [0.0055] [0.0064] [0.0017] [0.0054]
t− 1 -0.0001 0.0096 -0.0005 -0.0032 -0.0028
[0.0022] [0.0062] [0.0061] [0.0024] [0.0044]
t− 2 -0.0047 0.0026 0.0085 -0.0037 -0.0099
[0.0034] [0.0077] [0.0066] [0.0033] [0.0067]
t− 3 0.0043 -0.0006 -0.0008 0.0078** -0.0104
[0.0035] [0.0048] [0.0062] [0.0033] [0.0098]
t− 4 0.0001 0.0021 -0.0063 0.0013 -0.0058
[0.0020] [0.0047] [0.0070] [0.0023] [0.0046]
t− 5 -0.0007 0.0000 0.0035 0.0013 -0.0046
[0.0016] [0.0045] [0.0073] [0.0017] [0.0046]
Observations 4,601 1,234 1,038 792 397
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Heteroscedasticity, serial correlation (5 years)
and spatial correlation (500 km) robust standard errors in brackets. All mod-
els include country fixed-effects, year dummies, country-specific trends, and
temperature and precipitation controls.
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Table 4.6: Tropical cyclone windspeed impact on industry growth (1970-2007)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Agriculture,
Total production Hunting & Fishing Manufacturing Other Services
Controls: FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE
YE YE YE YE YE YE YE YE
- Yi - Yi - Yi - Yi
- TP - TP - TP - TP
Wind Speed (m/s) -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0011*** -0.0014*** -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0001 0.0001
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0004] [0.0005] [0.0002] [0.0002]
t− 1 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0003 0.0001 0.0001
[0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0002] [0.0002]
t− 2 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0009** -0.0001 -0.0000
[0.0001] [0.0002] [0.0004] [0.0005] [0.0003] [0.0004] [0.0002] [0.0002]
t− 3 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0005 0.0007 0.0002 0.0006 0.0000 0.0001
[0.0002] [0.0001] [0.0004] [0.0005] [0.0004] [0.0006] [0.0002] [0.0002]
t− 4 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0003 0.0005 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000
[0.0002] [0.0001] [0.0003] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0005] [0.0002] [0.0002]
t− 5 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0000 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
[0.0001] [0.0002] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0004] [0.0002] [0.0002]
Observations 6,968 4,612 6,895 4,607 6,770 4,538 6,863 4,588
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Agriculture,
Total production Hunting & Fishing Manufacturing Other Services
N. Am. Rest N. Am. Rest N. Am. Rest N. Am. Rest
Controls FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE
YE YE YE YE YE YE YE YE
Yi Yi Yi Yi Yi Yi Yi Yi
TP TP TP TP TP TP TP TP
Wind Speed (m/s) 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0014*** -0.0012** -0.0013** 0.0012* 0.0001 0.0000
[0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0004] [0.0005] [0.0006] [0.0007] [0.0002] [0.0003]
t− 1 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0005 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0004
[0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0003] [0.0007] [0.0002] [0.0004]
t− 2 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0008 -0.0011*** 0.0003 0.0001 -0.0002
[0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0007] [0.0006] [0.0004] [0.0007] [0.0002] [0.0004]
t− 3 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0012** -0.0006 0.0004 0.0016** 0.0002 -0.0004
[0.0001] [0.0003] [0.0006] [0.0006] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0002] [0.0004]
t− 4 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0011*** -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0003
[0.0001] [0.0002] [0.0006] [0.0004] [0.0006] [0.0009] [0.0001] [0.0004]
t− 5 -0.0000 -0.0002 0.0003 -0.0006 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001
[0.0002] [0.0003] [0.0005] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0008] [0.0002] [0.0003]
Observations 792 3,820 792 3,815 790 3,748 792 3,796
Top panel displays the effect of TC wind speed on different industries. Bottom panel displays the effect on these
industries for North America only (“N. Am.”) and for the rest of the world (“Rest”). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. Heteroscedasticity, serial correlation (5 years) and spatial correlation (500 km) robust standard errors
in brackets. Abbreviations for control variables: FE - “fixed effects” (country-specific constants); YE - “year
effects” (year-specific constants); Yi - country-specific time trends; T - temperature; TP - temperature and
precipitation.
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Table 4.7: Tropical cyclone energy impact on industry growth (1970-2007)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Agriculture,
Total production Hunting & Fishing Manufacturing Other Services
Controls: FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE
YE YE YE YE YE YE YE YE
- Yi - Yi - Yi - Yi
- TP - TP - TP - TP
Energy (s.d.) -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0081*** -0.0085*** -0.0006 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001
[0.0010] [0.0012] [0.0019] [0.0018] [0.0024] [0.0029] [0.0010] [0.0011]
t− 1 0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0001 0.0026 0.0021 0.0019 0.0016
[0.0013] [0.0015] [0.0022] [0.0022] [0.0018] [0.0018] [0.0015] [0.0016]
t− 2 -0.0012 -0.0022** -0.0017 -0.0047 -0.0061*** -0.0093*** -0.0001 -0.0010
[0.0009] [0.0010] [0.0032] [0.0034] [0.0019] [0.0027] [0.0014] [0.0013]
t− 3 -0.0011 -0.0006 0.0037 0.0043 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0003 0.0004
[0.0012] [0.0011] [0.0029] [0.0035] [0.0048] [0.0058] [0.0012] [0.0011]
t− 4 -0.0009 -0.0013 -0.0012 0.0001 0.0014 -0.0004 0.0002 -0.0000
[0.0015] [0.0013] [0.0021] [0.0020] [0.0027] [0.0034] [0.0016] [0.0013]
t− 5 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0022 -0.0007 -0.0020 -0.0023 0.0005 0.0012
[0.0011] [0.0011] [0.0017] [0.0016] [0.0025] [0.0028] [0.0012] [0.0010]
Observations 6,962 4,606 6,889 4,601 6,764 4,532 6,857 4,582
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Agriculture,
Total production Hunting & Fishing Manufacturing Other Services
VARIABLES N. Am. Rest N. Am. Rest N. Am. Rest N. Am. Rest
Controls: FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE
YE YE YE YE YE YE YE YE
Yi Yi Yi Yi Yi Yi Yi Yi
TP TP TP TP TP TP TP TP
Energy (s.d.) 0.0001 -0.0023 -0.0090*** -0.0097** -0.0026 0.0024 0.0005 -0.0012
[0.0014] [0.0015] [0.0017] [0.0041] [0.0032] [0.0040] [0.0013] [0.0020]
t− 1 -0.0003 -0.0011 -0.0032 0.0032 0.0016 0.0053 0.0001 0.0046
[0.0015] [0.0017] [0.0024] [0.0030] [0.0022] [0.0050] [0.0015] [0.0033]
t− 2 -0.0015 -0.0035** -0.0037 -0.0067 -0.0091*** -0.0016 0.0003 -0.0027
[0.0010] [0.0017] [0.0033] [0.0052] [0.0028] [0.0044] [0.0013] [0.0026]
t− 3 -0.0005 -0.0024 0.0078** -0.0079 -0.0030 0.0076* 0.0003 -0.0016
[0.0008] [0.0025] [0.0033] [0.0062] [0.0058] [0.0045] [0.0011] [0.0025]
t− 4 -0.0009 -0.0034** 0.0013 -0.0048* 0.0027 -0.0057 0.0004 -0.0019
[0.0013] [0.0016] [0.0023] [0.0027] [0.0036] [0.0049] [0.0013] [0.0029]
t− 5 0.0006 -0.0010 0.0013 -0.0042 -0.0039 0.0026 0.0025** 0.0004
[0.0014] [0.0016] [0.0017] [0.0028] [0.0034] [0.0050] [0.0012] [0.0016]
Observations 792 3,814 792 3,809 790 3,742 792 3,790
Top panel displays the effect of TC energy on different industries. Bottom panel displays the effect on these
industries for North America only (“N. Am.”) and for the rest of the world (“Rest”). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. Heteroscedasticity, serial correlation (5 years) and spatial correlation (500 km) robust standard errors
in brackets. Abbreviations for control variables: FE - “fixed effects” (country-specific constants); YE - “year
effects” (year-specific constants); Yi - country-specific time trends; T - temperature; TP - temperature and
precipitation.
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Figure 4.9: Comparing energy and wind speed measures. Country-by-year observations of
annual TC energy and wind speed measures. Energy differs from the simple cube of wind speed
because (1) the wind speed measure is only the maximum wind speed achieved over a storm’s lifetime,
while the energy measure integrates power dissipation over the storm’s entire lifetime; (2) energy rises
if storms move more slowly, doing greater work at the surface; (3) wind speed measures are aggregated
by taking the maximum value at each location within each year, while energy is summed across storms.
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Figure 4.13: The distributions of country-by-year TC observations for Oceanian (top) and South
American (bottom) countries. Boxes mark 25th-75th centile ranges and white bands mark medians.
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Figure 4.15: Trends in EM-DAT deaths data. The raw EM-DAT data on deaths from TCs show a
strong trend (black line). However, without using data on physical measures of TCs, it is impossible to
know whether this is due to adaptation to TCs, trends in TC exposure due to climatological changes
or trends in reporting practices. The absence of a trend in the annual maximum (orange line) suggests
that reporting biases may be important or that adaptation to extreme TCs is not effective (we find
evidence for both in the main analysis).








































































































































Figure 4.16: Reporting biases in EM-DAT. The reporting bias in EM-DAT (see Fig. 4.1D-E) is
driven by trends in all continents (top). This is driven both by (1) trends in the number of countries
reporting TCs (middle) and (2) trends in the number of TCs reported per reporting country (bottom).
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Figure 4.20: Country-level correlations between TC exposure and normalized deaths for small countries
with at least 5 observations.
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Figure 4.21: Country-level correlations between TC exposure and normalized deaths for large countries
with at least 5 observations.
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Figure 4.22: Country-level correlations between TC exposure and normalized damages for small coun-
tries with at least 5 observations.
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Figure 4.23: Country-level correlations between TC exposure and normalized damages for large coun-
tries with at least 5 observations.

















































Student Version of MATLAB
Figure 4.24: Average precipitation and temperature fields for the datasets that are used to generate
control variables. Temperature and rainfall are spatially averaged over countries for each year.
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Figure 4.26: Suggestive evidence that populations “adapt” to TCs. We estimate the response of
countries when they are stratified according to their average annual TC exposure. “High risk” countries
are the third of countries reporting in EM-DAT with highest average TC exposure, “Low risk” countries
are the third with lowest avarage TC exposure. Linear regressions are fit for only the range of TC
exposures that are observed across all three groups. For countries with higher average exposure, the
slope of the response functions are generally lower. We take this as suggestive evidence that populations
facing more intense TC climates take steps to lower their risk through adaptation [Deschenes and
Greenstone, 2007]. Note that we do not feel this plot provides conclusive evidence of this idea because
high and low risk countries may differ in many other important ways that we may be unable to observe
or measure.
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Figure 4.27: Comparing the normalized damages of the USA with India and China. In
contrast to other wealthy nations (see Fig. 4.3F) The USA has a large response to TC exposure that
more closely resembles the response of China and India.
Chapter 5
Global Economic Exposure to
Future Temperature Changes
Solomon M. Hsiang1





In global-scale analyses of future climate change, “global average temperature change” is a commonly
used summary statistic. Unfortunately, this statistic may not be useful for many types of economic
analyses because it is an average over the planet’s entire surface and is therefore dominated by changes
over oceans and other uninhabited regions. Here, we attempt to summarize projected temperature
changes in a manner that is more useful for economic analyses: we construct the distributions of
future temperature exposure for a randomly selected person, a random hectare of cropland, and a
random dollar of value-added. Our results streamline global cost analyses, enabling future studies to
estimate global losses by combining their locally derived loss-functions with our estimates of global
exposure. We demonstrate this application by estimating that low and middle income populations may
suffer income losses of 9% annually due only to the effects of thermal stress on workers, a mechanism
previously omitted from global cost estimates. In ancillary findings, we also document that (1) when
exposure distributions are substituted for global average temperature change in standard models of
economic costs, projected annual losses increase by trillions of dollars; (2) low and middle income
populations will be twice as exposed to harmful temperatures as high income populations, based only
on their locations; and (3) it is unlikely the direct effects of warming can have a positive net impact
on the global economy.
5.1 Introduction
“Change in global average surface temperature” is a summary statistic that emerges naturally from
simple and elegant theoretical models of the Earth’s climate. Following these theoretical models, the
more complex and less elegant computational models of the climate are made to produce the same
summary statistic in an an effort to inform global climate policies. While this statistic may be a useful
summary for climate modelers, it is less useful for economic and policy analysts. The objective of this
analysis is to repackage the temperature changes predicted by 20 modern climate models in a simple
way that can be immediately applied to policy analysis.
At the core of all climate policy analysis is the idea the climate changes may incur costs (or
benefits) to society. However the global impacts of climate changes are still poorly understood. While
many recent empirical studies have begun to estimate the direct impact that temperatures have on
particular social outcomes, it has remained difficult to conceptualize the magnitude of these impacts
at the planetary scale. For example, though recent studies indicate that workers exposed to high
temperatures are less productive [Graff Zivin and Neidell, 2010,Hsiang, 2010], it is not clear whether
this impact should be large or trivial on a global scale [Tol, 2009], in part because we lack global
estimates for the future exposure of workers to high temperatures. It is difficult to estimate the
magnitude of this and other effects because the climate change statistics that climate modelers “hand
off” to economic analysts are not structured to describe economic exposure.
Climate models report average temperature changes over space: temperature changes are estimated
for every square kilometer of the planet and the global average is taken. If workers, croplands and
capital were uniformly distributed over the planet, then this global average would correspond well with
the average exposure of the global economy. However, most of the planet is covered by oceans, ice
caps, mountains and deserts; regions that strongly influence climate change statistics but contain few
or no inhabitants. Thus, to construct global summary statistics more useful for economic analysis, we
use detailed data on the spatial distribution of people, croplands and output to estimate the direct
exposure of economic activity to temperature changes.
Estimating economic exposure to climate changes is only one step in a long sequence that is needed
to understand how these global changes will impact societies around the world. A massive number
of climate scientists have constructed detailed and complex models that predict future temperature
changes [IPCC, 2007, Meehl et al., 2007] and a growing number of econometricians have analyzed
how local temperature changes have impacted economic outcomes at a national or subnational scale
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[Deschenes and Moretti, 2009, Schlenker and Roberts, 2009, Deschenes et al., 2009, Dell et al., 2009a,
Albouy et al., 2010,Schlenker and Lobell, 2010,Welch et al., 2010,Hsiang, 2010,Graff Zivin and Neidell,
2010,Deschenes et al., 2011]. This study links these two research groups by transforming output from
the climate projections into useful input for econometric estimates. By enabling economists to project
their local estimates onto the global scale we hope to streamline much needed research on the global
costs of climate change.
For planetary-scale estimates, our understanding of the cost of climate change is dominated by
“integrated assessments” [Tol, 2009]. Yet, these studies continue to have difficulty describing how
climate changes translate into economic losses. In their seminal book, [Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000]
described the challenge:
It must be emphasized that attempts to estimate the impacts of climate change continue to
be highly speculative. Outside of agriculture and sea-level rise for a small number of coun-
tries, the number of scholarly studies on the economic impacts of climate change remains
small. Estimates of the regional climatic impacts of global warming are still inconsistent
across different climate models, and economic studies have made little progress in estimat-
ing impacts, particularly in low-income countries. Much more work is needed to improve
understanding of the impacts of climate change. (p. 98)
Despite these challenges, the desire to produce a precise number forced the authors to postulate a
relationship between the climate and warming:
For the purpose of this book, it is assumed that there is a relationship between the damage
from greenhouse warming and the extent of warming. More specifically, the relationship
between global-temperature increase [∆T ] and income loss [D] is given by:
D = θ1∆T + θ2∆T
2
(p. 23)
After almost another decade of research, [Nordhaus, 2008] revisited this issue, expressing little confi-
dence in research advances made since his earlier evaluation
It is clear that this [damage function] is extremely conjectural, given the thin base of
empirical studies on which it rests. (p. 42)
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In an attempt to address these concerns, we have designed a characterization of economic exposure that
is easy and practical for other researchers to use. It is our hope that when econometricians discover new
mechanisms through which temperature affects economic activity (eg. labor productivity, [Graff Zivin
and Neidell, 2010, Hsiang, 2010]), they can use our characterization to quickly update these highly
uncertain global damage functions.
We feel that a practical summary of future temperature changes (that is designed for global eco-
nomic analysis) should satisfy the following criteria.
1. It should be global in scale.
2. It should be as simple as possible.
3. It should summarize output from all of our climate simulations.
4. It should respect our understanding that temperature impacts economies through multiple mech-
anisms (eg. health, agriculture or labor).
5. It should respect our understanding that different populations may be better able to adapt to
temperature changes (eg. use air conditioning or irrigate crops).
6. It should respect the notion that changes in temperature and the level of temperature exposure
may both impact economic outcomes.
7. It should describe changes that we expect to observe before 2100, rather than focusing on the
extremely distant future.
This study attempts to meet all these criteria when summarizing future temperature changes. Though
it is clearly limited in scope and simplified, we only attempt to estimate direct exposure to tempera-
ture changes and omit indirect impacts. For example, temperature changes will influence ecosystems in
ways that will affect economic outcomes; however these pathways are not accounted for in this analysis.
Furthermore, there are many environmental variables other than temperature whose distributions will
change with the global climate (eg. precipitation, humidity, clouds, winds, etc.) and none of these
variables are accounted for in this study. Rather than a comprehensive analysis of all climate changes,
this study is a first attempt to translate a single output from the physical sciences into a useful input
for the social sciences2.
2Of course, if this analysis proves useful, we hope that additional analyses will follow and improve on this simple
methodology.
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In the remainder of this paper, we describe our method and data and then present changes in
exposure based on temperature changes and absolute temperature levels. We conclude with an ex-
ample of how these results can be used to extend local analyses to the planetary scale (we estimate
global economic losses resulting from reduced worker productivity [Hsiang, 2010]) and some important
caveats.
5.2 Approach
The approach of this analysis is to estimate how future temperature changes project onto the distri-
bution of three types of “economic units”: people, croplands and economic output (dollars of value
added). To do this, we first fix the locations of these economic units in the year 2000. We then imagine
that we randomly select an economic unit at random (eg. a random person our of the 6-billion alive
in 2000). Holding the location of that economic unit fixed, we then record the temperature changes
that would occur at that location. By repeating this for all economic units (eg. all 6-billion people),
this procedure generates a distribution of exposure for all economic units of a certain type. We then
normalize this distribution by the total number of economic units in 2000 so that it integrates to unity.
The resulting distribution is a probability density function (PDF) that describes the distribution of
exposure one would expect to observe if a random person, a random hectare of cropland or a random
dollar of output was drawn randomly from the universe of units in 2000. We elect not to use projections
of future economic units because this would introduce another dimension of unquantifiable uncertainty,
because projections of croplands and economic activity are not readily available, and because our PDF
is a reasonable approximation for future exposure if growth in these economic units is not spatially
correlated with changes in temperature3.
3 In a formal sense, if one thinks of human exposure (H) to temperature (T ) as H × T (for a specific location), then
changes in this quantity can be approximated by a Taylor series
∆[HT ] = H∆T + T∆H + ∆T∆H + ...
We choose to focus only on this first term, the change in temperature holding the distribution of humans (or other
economic units) fixed. The second term is the change in population projected on the modern temperature distribution
and the third term is the change in temperature projected on changes in population. Because the second term does
not relate directly to climate changes and the third term is “second order”, the first term is the focus of our analysis.














where the second equality holds if ∆H
H
is small. This approximation (for climate-driven changes) behaves poorly only
when locations’ temperature changes are correlated with their population growth rates, causing the term ∆T∆H
H
to be
large. However, if population growth is relatively uniform over regions with different temperature changes, than our
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We consider the A1B climate change scenario that has been simulated by many modeling groups
and describes climate changes when greenhouse gas emissions are only mitigated slightly. We focus
on changes in temperature experienced during the transition between stable climate states, taking the
difference between average climates in the distant future (2080-2099) and the immediate future (2011-
2030). We do not use historical climatologies as our baseline because we wish to focus on patterns
associated with tansitions in the global climate where mean temperature is increasing approximately
linearly, since our results may then be easier to generalize across different scenarios.
We evaluate annual and monthly climatologies for the two averaging periods, using data from 20
general circulation models (GCMs). We treat the models as each having an equal probability that
it is “correct” because this approach has been shown to outperform any individual model [Reichler
and Kim, 2008, Auffhammer et al., 2010]. Predictions from each model are overlaid onto the global
distribution of economic units and the distribution of temperature changes are separately computed
for people (∆Tp), croplands (∆Tc) and output (∆Ty). These distributions are then averaged across
models.
The A1B scenario leads to a 2.0◦C increase in average surface temperature (∆Ta) between 2011-2030
and 2080-2099. Because we focus only on transient climate states, it might be reasonable to interpolate
or extrapolate our results to slightly smaller or larger changes in global average temperature, however
this should be done with caution and with the recognition that it is an approximation.
5.3 Data
Temperature Twenty temperature projections for the A1B scenario are obtained from the Fourth
Assessment Report of the International Panel on Climate Change [IPCC, 2007, Meehl et al., 2007].
Each projection is the mean reconstruction using multiple ensemble members and model outputs vary
in spatial resolution (see [Meehl et al., 2007] for details). The annual mean temperature change
averaged across all models is shown in Fig. 5.1A.
summary statistics will be a fair approximation for climate-driven changes in temperature exposure.
Note that if there are large migrations induced by climate, this may also cause our approximation to behave poorly.
We discuss this issue in Section 5.6.
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Figure 5.1: The global distributions of temperature changes and economic units. (A)
Changes in annual mean surface temperature [◦C] between 2011-2030 and 2080-2099 averaged across
20 GCMS in the A1B scenario. (B) The distribution of the global population in 2000. (C) Same, for
croplands. (D) Same, for economic output (value added).
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Population We obtain the distribution of the global population in 2000 from the Gridded Popu-
lation of the World (GPW) files (version 3) produced by the Center for International Earth Science
Information Network at Columbia University [CIESIN, 2009]. Subnational census data are georefer-
enced and adjusted to match United Nations estimates. The distribution of the global population is
plotted in Fig. 5.1B.
Croplands The global distribution of croplands in 2000 are obtained from the high resolution global
land use files produced by the Center for Sustainability and the Global Environment at University of
Wisconsin-Madison [Ramankutty et al., 2008]. This dataset integrates satellite observations from two
satellite missions and subnational agricultural census data. The fraction of land dedicated to croplands
are displayed in Fig. 5.1C.
Production The distribution of economic output in 2000 is obtained from the G-Econ (version 3.4)
files produced by William Nordhaus’s research group at Yale University [Nordhaus, 2006b]. Subna-
tional production statistics are georeferenced and converted to purchasing power parity (PPP). In
some cases, the GPW files are used to scale production within countries, so the construction of this
dataset is not entirely independent from the data described above. The distribution of total economic
output is shown in Fig. 5.1D.
Income distribution Because low income populations may have greater difficulty adapting to tem-
perature changes, it is important to consider whether populations with lower income are differentially
exposed to larger or smaller changes. We know of no global dataset that disaggregates the global
population by income and location at the subnational level, so we construct one by combining the
GPW files with the income distributions of each country in 2000, as estimated by Sala-i-Martin [Sala-i
Martin, 2006] (see Fig. 5.10 for the global distribution of income). For a population at a given location
within a country, the distribution of incomes are assumed to mirror the country’s income distribution.
The global population is then stratified into thirds according to income4. The resulting distribution
of high, middle and low income individuals are shown in Figs. 5.2A-C respectively.
4We only separate the global population at two income cutoffs (low-middle and middle-top). Therefore, if we generate
errors in our assignment of individuals to income groups, it should only affect the few individuals in the vicinity of those
cutoffs.
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Figure 5.2: The global distribution of income terciles and infant survival terciles. (A)
Distribution of the wealthiest third of the world by personal income in 2000. (B) Same, but middle
third by personal income. (C) Same, but poorest third by personal income. (D) Distribution of
population thirds according to infant survival rates.
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Infant survival Because the extent of public infrastructure and governance capacity may also affect
the ability of populations to adapt to temperature changes, we use infant survival rates5 as a proxy
measure for these variables. We obtain infant survival rates from the World Development Indicators
files [World Bank, 2008], which integrate subnational health surveys and census data. We partition
the population distribution from the GPW files into thirds according to their district’s infant survival
rate6. The distribution of infant survival rates are displayed in Fig. 5.2D.
5.4 Results
Economic damages from climate change (D) are often modeled as independent of the initial temper-
ature at a location and scaling only with the magnitude of changes in mean temperature (T¯ ) [Stern,
2006,Tol, 2009,Dell et al., 2009b]:
D = g(∆T¯ ). (5.1)
The simplicity of this approach is appealing, however, recent studies suggest that some impacts may
depend strongly on the initial temperature of a location, with output increasing or constant up to
some optimal temperature and then declining [Schlenker and Roberts, 2009, Schlenker and Lobell,
2010,Welch et al., 2010,Deschenes et al., 2011,Hsiang, 2010,Albouy et al., 2010]. Total value generated





Under this approach, damages are the difference between output under a climate change temperature






f(T ct )− f(T 0t )dt (5.2)
Thus, in order to support both of these modeling approaches, we first construct simple summaries
of economic exposure using both changes in annual mean temperature (∆T¯ for use in Eq. 5.1) and
5Infant survival rates are one minus infant mortality rates. Survival rates are used so that the top tercile in infant
survival corresponds roughly with the top tercile in income.
6 Different regions within the same country can have different infant survival rates. This contrasts with the con-
struction of income terciles, which assumes that the income distribution is uniform across all locations within a country.
However, it is assumed that infant survival rates are uniform across all individuals within a district. Clearly neither of
these assumptions is correct, however we will show that they produce results that are very similar to one another.
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Table 5.1: Global distribution of ∆T
Population Croplands Production
◦C ◦F ◦C ◦F ◦C ◦F
Mean: 2.4 4.3 2.6 4.6 2.4 4.3
Centiles
1 1.0 1.8 1.1 1.9 0.7 1.3
20 1.7 3.1 1.9 3.3 1.7 3.0
25 1.9 3.3 1.9 3.5 1.8 3.2
33 2.0 3.6 2.1 3.8 1.9 3.5
50 2.3 4.1 2.4 4.3 2.3 4.1
66 2.7 4.8 2.8 5.0 2.7 4.8
75 2.9 5.2 3.1 5.5 2.9 5.3
90 3.5 6.2 3.7 6.6 3.4 6.2
99 4.3 7.7 4.7 8.5 4.4 7.9




1[T ct = T ]− 1[T 0t = T ]dt for use in approximations of Eq. 5.2).
5.4.1 Changes in annual mean temperature
There are two reasons to summarize changes in average temperature: (1) as mentioned, economic
impacts may be a function only of changes in temperature and (2) average changes are probably the
most widely cited statistics in policy discussions [IPCC, 2007, Stern, 2006, Nordhaus, 2008], perhaps
because it is so simple to articulate a shift in a mean.
Unfortunately the common use of “global average changes” in policy is misleading because climate
scientists use an area-weighted average and most of the planet’s surface is covered by oceans that
warm more slowly than land (see Fig. 5.1A). Since the oceans dominate global area-weighted changes,
globally averaged temperature changes are substantially smaller than predicted changes over the con-
tinents, where most economic activity is located. When the oceans and Antarctica are dropped from
the area-weighted average, the global average temperature change (∆Tl) increases 35% from 2.0
◦C to
2.7◦C in the A1B scenario.
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Figure 5.3: The distribution of temperature changes experienced by randomly selected
economic units. (A) The change in temperature experienced by a randomly selected person. The
thick solid line is the average distribution across 20 climate models. The dashed lines are the outer
envelopes for the set of 20 distributions and the hatched region is the interquartile range computed for
each temperature value. (B) Same, but croplands. (C) Same, but economic output.
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While illustrative of the oceans’ influence on global temperature statistics, the land-only annual
average temperature increase of 2.7◦C is an overestimate of economic exposure. Populations and eco-
nomic activity cluster near temperate and tropical coastlines while temperature gains are largest in
the mountains and Arctic regions (see Fig. 5.1A). The change in annual mean temperature experi-
enced by an average person is 2.4◦C (4.3◦F). Somewhat coincidentally, this is also the average change
experienced by an average dollar in economic output. An average hectare of cropland warms slightly
more, 2.6◦C (4.6◦F), close to the land-only average change. While these means are useful, they may
oversimplify exposure levels. For people, croplands and output, the inter-quartile ranges7 in exposure
are all about 1◦C (1.8◦F, or 40% of the person-weighted average change of 2.4◦C), indicating that the
variation in exposure around the world is substantial compared to the global average shifts. The thick
lines in Figs. 5.3A-C plot the distributions of annual mean temperature changes for people, croplands
and economic output (Table 5.1 tabulates the centiles of these distributions so other researchers may
use them). All three of these distributions look qualitatively similar, but the distribution for croplands
has a slightly thicker right tail which increases its mean. These distributions are all positively skewed,
so their medians (∼2.3◦C) are all slightly below their means. In general, about 70-75% of their mass
is above 2◦C, the global area-weighted average change of 2◦C (3.6◦F), and at least 25% of their mass
is above 2.9◦C (5.2◦F). Virtually no mass falls below 1◦C (1.8◦F) and about 10% of their mass lies
above 3.5◦C (6.2◦F), a massive shift in annual mean temperature.
The distributions of annual mean temperature changes across climate models exhibits substantial
variation. Figs. 5.3A-C display the point-wise distribution of PDF values across all 20 GCMs. For
any given temperature, the inter-quartile range of densities is about as large as the average value
itself. Further, maximum density values are extremely high for temperature changes in the range of
1.5-3.5◦C. If policy-makers or economic agents are only concerned with average outcomes (i.e. they
wish to maximize “expected utility”) then this inter-model uncertainty is unimportant. However, if
these agents are “ambiguity averse” with respect to climate changes [Millner et al., 2010], then this
inter-model uncertainty over the distribution of future outcomes is itself costly.
The solid curve in Fig. 5.3A seems to be a simple, general and robust description of economic
exposure to future mean temperature changes in a scenario where area-average global temperature
increases by 2◦C. Not only do the distributions of cropland and output exposure closely mirror this
distribution of human exposure, but it also describes exposure across months, income terciles and
7The difference between the 25th and 75th percentiles in exposure.
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Figure 5.4: The generality of Fig. 5.3A. The distribution in Fig. 5.3A. is estimated for each
income tercile and each infant survival tercile for every month. Squares mark the mean, ‘x’ marks
the median, triangles mark the interquartile range and crosses mark the 5th and 95th centiles. The
grey line marks the unconditional mean of 2.4◦C. Across all subsamples, the overall structure of the
distribution is relatively unchanged.
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Table 5.2: Global damages from global temperature changes using different temperature statistics
Global change summary statistic ∆T Global economic losses
(◦C) Percent of Relative Scaled to
Global GDP to ∆Ta GGDP
?
2009
DICE damage function‡ [Nordhaus (2008)]
∆Ta (Global area weighted average) 2.0 1.14 100% $657 billion
∆Tl (Exclude oceans & Antarctica) 2.7 2.07 182% $1197 billion
∆Tp (Person weighted average) 2.4 1.64 144% $946 billion
Distribution of ∆Tp See Table 5.1 1.80 159% $1043 billion
∆Tc (Crop weighted average) 2.6 1.92 169% $1110 billion
Distribution of ∆Tc See Table 5.1 2.05 181% $1187 billion
PAGE damage function† [Stern Report (2006)]
∆Ta (Global area weighted average) 2.0 0.67 100% $390 billion
∆Tl (Exclude oceans & Antarctica) 2.7 1.15 170% $663 billion
∆Tp (Person weighted average) 2.4 0.93 138% $538 billion
Distribution of ∆Tp See Table 5.1 1.00 148% $577 billion
∆Tc (Crop weighted average) 2.6 1.07 159% $620 billion
Distribution of ∆Tc See Table 5.1 1.12 166% $646 billion
? At 3% (5%) growth GGDP increases by a factor of 14 (81) between 2009 and 2099.
‡Percent damages(∆T ) = 0.28388×∆T 2





infant survival terciles. Fig. 5.4 displays this distribution for each income group and infant survival
group, across all twelve months. While there are some small variations, the overall structure of the
distribution is persistent across all subcategories.
How much does it matter if global economic exposure is summarized by Fig. 5.3A rather than
by the global area-average of 2◦C? Consider how they map onto simple global models of economic
impacts. For this comparison, we apply different measures of exposure to the “damage functions”
described in two well know global assessments of climate change, the Dynamic Integrated Climate-
Economy (DICE) model [Nordhaus, 2008] and the Policy Analysis for the Greenhouse Effect (PAGE)
model used in the Stern Review [Stern, 2006]. Both models are variations on Eq. 5.1 and transform
an average global temperature statistic into an estimate for global economic losses. A benefit of using
these models is that they monetize measures of global exposure, converting global average temperature
changes into dollars, a unit that is familiar. However, these models are not designed for this particular
exercise8, so the following comparisons should be viewed as suggestive and should not be interpreted
8 The damage function in DICE is
D(∆T )DICE = 0.283888×∆T 2
where D is a percentage change in global economic output (global gross domestic output) [Nordhaus, 2008]. The damage
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literally. The purpose of this comparison is get a general sense of how significant or innocuous it is
to approximate global economic exposure with the traditionally reported area-weighted averages; it is
not a re-estimation of the true global cost of climate changes.
When the economic exposure to temperature changes are loosely translated in economic losses, the
traditionally reported area-weighted averages produce loss estimates that are much lower than those
derived using the summary statistics we have constructed (see Table 5.2). The area-weighted average
change of 2◦C generates losses in DICE (PAGE) of 1.14% (0.67%) of global output. When oceans
and Antarctica are dropped from this average, losses rise to 2.07% (1.15%) and when person-weighted
averages are used then losses are 1.64% (0.93%). (Recall that the crop-weighted average is very near
the land-only average and the output-weighted average is the same as the person-weighed average.)
These adjustments are large, amounting to changes that are 38-82% of the original estimate. If the
total distribution of exposure (shown in Fig. 5.3 and in Table 5.1) is used to compute the average loss
per person or per hectare of cropland, then economic losses rise a further 5-10% due to the convexity
of these damage functions (see Fig. 5.5).





where γ is a stochastic variable. For this exercise, we use the average value γ¯ = 1.77 taken from the stochastic distribution
used in the Stern Review [Stern, 2006].
Several points are worth noting about these two functions.
First, DDICE < DPAGE for ∆T < 2.5
◦C, but DDICE > DPAGE for ∆T > 2.5◦C since DDICE is more convex. This
point is not always appreciated because Stern (PAGE) argues that the costs of climate change are higher than Nordhaus
(DICE) claims. This difference comes from the ways in which they discount future earnings, not from the differences in
their damage functions. If everything in a model was held fixed, except the two damage functions were interchanged,
than DDICE would likely generate larger overall losses.
Second, the interpretation of these functions is very different. DDICE is constructed by mapping global average
temperature onto regional average temperatures, computing regional damages using region specific damages functions
and then combining those averages to produce a global estimate. In contrast, DPAGE is a general “law” for how output
scales with temperature changes and is applied to each region, given regional average temperature changes. Recognizing
this, the use of DPAGE in this exercise is at least partially valid, although it is clearly not a correct interpretation of
DDICE .
Third, the damages included in the estimation of these damage functions includes non-market damages (eg. biodiversity
loss) and theoretical welfare losses (eg. catastrophe risk) that may scale with environmental variables other than
temperature (eg. precipitation or hurricane intensity). Thus, global temperature is used in these damage functions as
a summary statistic for many environmental variables that may affect economic impacts both directly and indirectly.
This contrasts with the purpose of this study, which is to characterize the magnitude of economies’ direct exposure to
temperature changes themselves. For this reason, it is unclear exactly how this exercise should be interpreted, but it is
clear that it should not be interpreted literally.
Finally, it is worth noting that neither author who uses these functions takes them extremely seriously themselves.
Both authors have been open to criticisms that the damage functions they use are incomplete. As will be demonstrated
at the end of this paper, direct economic losses due to labor productivity [Graff Zivin and Neidell, 2010, Hsiang, 2010]
are on the scale of the total losses described by these functions, however losses to labor productivity have never been
included in the construction of these damage functions. Thus, there remains dramatic uncertainties in the “true” form
of these functions.
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economic loss = 0.28388 × ΔT²
Figure 5.5: The costs of average temperature change vs. the average costs of temperature
change. The damage function used in DICE (black) [Nordhaus, 2008]. Global economic losses com-
puted with global area-weighted mean temperature change (2◦C, blue) and population-weighted mean
temperature change (2.4◦C, orange). The distribution of human exposure is plotted along the bottom
as a gray distribution, and the distribution of economic losses (if each individual’s damage function
is identical to the global damage function) is in the right panel. The economic loss to an average
individual is then displayed as the red line (both panels). The average losses (red) are greater than
losses at the average temperture change (orange) because the damage function is convex.
Even if one takes the above exercise only moderately seriously, the error introduced to by approxi-
mating economic exposure with global average temperature is large. Using the DICE damage function,
changing from the area-average temperature to the distribution of human exposure raises economic
losses by 0.66% of global output. Scaled to production values in 2009, this amounts to a difference of
$386 billion9. If one then considers that future output in 2099 will be larger, growing by 3-5% annu-
ally between now and 2099, then the annual error introduced by this single approximation amounts to
10-54% of modern global output! Of course, there are many other “thought experiments” that, if ex-
trapolated exponentially, can produce similarly dramatic errors. However this particular adjustment is
notable for the fact that it results solely from how global temperature changes are measured. Nothing
about our understanding of climate change physics or global economics is changed.
9This is approximately the outputs of Austria, Norway, Taiwan or Saudi Arabia.
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5.4.2 Changes in the quantity of time economic units are exposed to spe-
cific temperatures
Several recent econometric analyses suggest that temperature exposure generates nonlinear impacts on
economic variables [Schlenker and Roberts, 2009,Albouy et al., 2010,Schlenker and Lobell, 2010,Welch
et al., 2010, Hsiang, 2010, Deschenes et al., 2011] and thus it is important to consider the actual
temperature that a productive unit is exposed to, not just changes in its local temperature. For
these types of impacts, we must know for how much time economic units are exposed to a particular
temperature. We can then compute how this distribution of time × temperature × economic units
changes in the future (recall Eq. 5.2).
We begin by estimating the distribution of temperatures one would observe if we randomly selected
a random person (or hectare of cropland or dollar of output) during a random month over 2011-2030.
We then estimate the same distribution for 2080-2099 and take the difference between these two
distributions. The result is shown in Figs. 5.6. These plots show changes in the quantity of time in
months that a randomly selected unit would spend at each temperature. Positive values indicate that
more time is spent at a given temperature, negative values indicate that less time is spent at a given
temperature, and each curve must integrate to zero.
The most striking feature of Figs. 5.6A-B are the spikes around 30◦C (86◦F). These spikes show
that all types of economic units will spend substantially more time at temperatures above 27◦C (81◦F),
balanced by reductions in the amount of time spent below 27◦C.
The second important feature of these figures is the difference in exposure between high income
individuals and the lower income groups. Conditional on individuals being middle or low income, the
quantity of additional time they spend at any temperature above 27◦C is approximately double the
additional time spent by a high income individual at the same temperature. If high temperatures
are economically costly, as the literature indicates, this suggests that the economic exposure to costly
temperatures will be greatest for middle and low income populations. When we stratify the global
population by infant survival, then the result is similar except low survival populations spend more
time at extremely high temperatures (> 32◦C) and middle survival populations spend more time near
30◦C.
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Figure 5.6: Change in the quantity of time economic units are exposed to different temper-
atures. (A) Change [2080-2099 less 2011-2030] in the number of months a randomly selected person
is exposed to each temperature. Positive values indicate that more time is spent at the corresponding
temperature. These curves are integrated in Table 5.3. (B) Same, but for croplands and economic
output.
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Table 5.3: Additional months exceeding each cutoff temperature per unit
Exposure to: Population Croplands Production
(unit) (capita) (area) ($PPP)
Cutoff temp. Global income tercile
(◦C) All Bottom Middle Top All All
40 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.02
39 0.08 0.12 0.11 0.03 0.07 0.03
38 0.11 0.16 0.15 0.04 0.09 0.04
37 0.15 0.21 0.20 0.05 0.13 0.06
36 0.19 0.26 0.25 0.07 0.18 0.08
35 0.24 0.34 0.31 0.10 0.24 0.10
34 0.30 0.40 0.37 0.13 0.31 0.14
33 0.37 0.49 0.44 0.18 0.40 0.20
32 0.49 0.63 0.57 0.26 0.52 0.26
31 0.70 0.89 0.82 0.39 0.69 0.37
30 1.08 1.30 1.28 0.63 0.95 0.55
29 1.50 1.75 1.77 0.90 1.24 0.78
28 1.68 1.98 1.88 1.06 1.44 0.94
27 1.63 1.99 1.72 1.08 1.50 1.00
26 1.51 1.88 1.53 1.07 1.49 1.02
25 1.36 1.65 1.33 1.07 1.37 1.07
20 0.93 0.96 0.88 0.99 0.91 1.01
15 0.64 0.47 0.59 0.86 0.64 0.89
10 0.47 0.31 0.41 0.70 0.49 0.73
5 0.41 0.25 0.34 0.64 0.46 0.65
0 0.27 0.17 0.25 0.39 0.39 0.35
-5 0.14 0.09 0.14 0.19 0.29 0.17
T (◦C) Heating “degree-months” above T
> 30 3.88 5.04 4.74 1.93 3.69 1.89
> 27 8.69 10.76 10.11 4.97 7.87 4.61
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Figure 5.6 displays differences between pairs of continuous PDFs, so the units are a density of time
that is hard to interpret. To ease interpretation, we integrate these curves from a cutoff temperature
to positive infinity. These integrals describe the amount of additional time (in the future) that a unit is
expected to spend above a certain temperature cutoff. Integrals for integer-valued temperature cutoffs
between 25-40◦C (and by 5◦C steps below 25◦C) are shown in Table 5.3. These values are tabulated,
instead of graphed, because they are the results we expect other researchers will find useful in their
own work.
We find that a randomly selected person will experience 1.6 more months above 27◦C (81◦F), a
randomly selected hectare of cropland will spend 1.5 more months above that cutoff and a randomly
selected dollar of value will be produced at a location spending 1 additional month above that cutoff.
We note that low, middle and high income groups will respectively spend 2.0, 1.9 and 1.1 additional
months above that cutoff, indicating that the burden of high temperature exposure is almost twice
as large for low and middle income populations. This differential exposure of the middle and low
income groups is even stronger for more extreme temperatures. For example, low and middle income
populations will spend an additional 0.25 months above 36◦C (97◦F), 3.5 times the additional 0.07
months that high income populations will spend above that cutoff.
This increased quantity of time that individuals will be exposed to high temperatures is accounted
for by reductions in their exposure to lower temperatures. Because exposure to low temperatures may
also have adverse economic impacts, it is sometimes suggested that this reduction in exposure to low
temperatures may substantially (or completely) offset the increased exposure to high temperatures [Tol,
2009]. This idea is somewhat supported by recent econometric studies which indicate that economic
production increases with respect to temperature up to some critical point, beyond which it declines
[Nordhaus, 2006b, Deschenes et al., 2009, Schlenker and Roberts, 2009, Albouy et al., 2010, Schlenker
and Lobell, 2010,Welch et al., 2010].
By using our measure of global exposure to the entire range of temperatures, we can ask how
large the gains from warming must be in order to offset the losses it generates. For this exercise,
we consider the aggregate losses that would be incurred if the distribution of human exposure (Fig.
5.7A) were projected onto different response functions (Fig. 5.7B). In our view, a “true” response
function that describes all economic impacts is still unknown, however we build caricature response
functions that share some properties of those derived in the previous analyses mentioned. First, we
define the temperature band of 20-27◦C (68-81◦F) as “economically optimal.” While these cutoff
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Figure 5.7: Examples of nonlinear response functions. (A) The distribution of months spent
at each temperature for a randomly selected person [same as 5.6A except the curve represents all
income groups and is not smoothed]. (B) Five example response functions that are qualitatively
similar to those derived empirically in the econometrics literature. Temperatures in the range 20-27◦C
are assumed to be “optimal”. Temperatures above 27◦C generate marginal losses of one unit in value
per 1◦C. Temperatures below 20◦C have marginal gains of 1, 0.5, 0.25, 0.1 and 0 units of value per
1◦C. When the distribution in (A) is projected on each of these response functions, the total change
in value is tabulated in Table 5.4.
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Table 5.4: Value lost for example response functions
Slope Lost value








temperatures are uncertain, they are sufficiently close to those observed in several studies that this is a
good approximation. Second, we constrain the response function to decline linearly above 27◦C , and
scale the decline to 1 unit of value per 1◦C. We also constrain the slope of the response function below
20◦C to be constant, but to vary between 0 and +1 unit of value per 1◦C. (These units are unimportant
and can be arbitrarily rescaled; the only thing that matters to our analysis is the ratio of the slopes
in the regions above and below the optimal temperature band.) We allow this slope to vary because
there remains uncertainty in the gains from warming cold locations. Some studies suggest that certain
types of economic output do not vary substantially below the optimal temperature band [Schlenker
and Roberts, 2009,Albouy et al., 2010,Graff Zivin and Neidell, 2010] while some studies suggest that
it it increases with temperature [Deschenes et al., 2009, Welch et al., 2010]. In either case, the rate
of increase generally appears to be substantially lower than the rate of decline at high temperatures,
which is why the slope is constrained to remain weakly below 1. Fig. 5.7B illustrates the range of
response functions considered.
We find that in order for the gains in warming to offset its costs, we must postulate relatively
strong gains from warming. The middle column of Table 5.4 tabulates the global economic impact of
warming when the distribution in Fig. 5.7A is projected onto the response functions in Fig. 5.7B. The
third column tabulates analogous values when the distribution in Fig. 5.7A is truncated at −10◦C
(dotted line) because the very small number of individuals at very cold temperatures strongly affects
the global aggregate when gains from warming become large. For functions with no or little slope
below the optimal temperature, global aggregate losses are large. When we use a slope of 0.5, half the
slope at high temperatures, we find that the global impact remains negative and a large fraction of the
gains we observe are generated by an extremely small number of individuals at very low temperatures.
The gains from warming exactly offset the losses if a slope of 0.64 is used for the whole distribution of
exposure. The same occurs at a slope of 0.80 for the exposure distribution that is truncated at −10◦C.
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When a slope of 1 is used, i.e. the marginal gains from warming cold locations is exactly equal to the
marginal losses from warming hot locations, then global output increases but is strongly driven by the
few individuals at very low temperatures.
To see why gains are limited and strongly affected by the few individuals at very low temperatures,
consider Fig. 5.8 which displays the joint distribution of population’s initial temperatures and the
temperature changes they experience in the future. For initial temperatures between 10-30◦C, the
distribution of temperature changes are similar and near the population-weighted mean of 2.4◦C.
This means that with climate change, the distribution of experienced temperatures simply shifts by
an approximately fixed value for all individuals. Individuals who had been just below the optimal
temperature range shift into this temperature band, but individuals who had previously been in the
optimal temperature range shift out of it to the higher sub-optimal temperatures. In aggregate, there
is no accumulation of individuals within this optimal range because more individuals shift out of
the optimal range than shift into it10. However, individuals at very low temperatures exhibit very
large temperature gains (recall Fig. 5.1A), exerting strong influence on the global outcome when we
considered response functions with large slopes11.
While we lack definitive estimates for the economic benefits of warming, it seems unlikely that
direct warming will benefit the global economy. In order to achieve global gains from warming, we
must postulate a response function where the gains from warming cold locations generate benefits
larger than most empirical studies would imply. Moreover, when we do this, the global gains from
warming are strongly driven by a very small number of individuals in Arctic environments.
10This discussion only considers the current location of economic units, however it is possible that currently uninhabited
regions become relatively more optimal and that populations can “win” by migrating into those regions. However this
migration may be costly and it is unclear that voluntary migration can offset what are otherwise large global losses.
11These populations come almost entirely from the Arctic and it seems ambiguous to us whether dramatic temperature
changes in these regions are economically beneficial.






































Figure 5.8: The joint distribution of temperature changes and initial temperatures. Top:
the joint distribution of log population by ∆T¯ (abscissa) and average temperatures over 2011-2030
(ordinate). Bottom: marginal distribution of ∆T¯ (compare to Fig.5.3A).
5.5 An example application: workers exposed to thermal stress
Figure 5.6 and Table 5.3 are sufficient to estimate global economic losses from a non-linear response
function if we believe that the mechanism underlying the response is sufficiently general that it can be
extrapolated globally. For many mechanisms, such as the physiological responses of crops or workers
to extreme temperatures, this might be a reasonable assumption. However, even if mechanisms around
the world are the same, the ability of populations to adapt to them may not be. Thus, we can use our
breakdown of the global income distribution to separately consider impacts for sub-populations that
may have different capacities for adaptation.
To illustrate how these estimates can be applied, we consider the impact of high temperatures on
the productivity of workers around the world [Hsiang, 2010], a mechanism that is omitted from all
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previous analyses of global economic costs [Tol, 2009]. The following calculations are simple “back
of the envelope” estimates. Yet, there is value in illustrating how the results of this analysis can be
used to quickly estimate global cost estimates from smaller scale analyses. Moreover, our example also
illustrates why such a streamlined approach to global estimates may be important: in this case we
demonstrate that a physiological mechanism previously ignored may have first-order significance.
The impact of high temperatures on worker productivity has never been seriously considered in
economic models of global warming, despite extensive literatures in ergonomics and engineering that
document large reductions in worker productivity at high temperatures [Ramsey and Morrissey, 1978,
NIOSH, 1986,Wyon, 2001,Pilcher et al., 2002,Hancock and Vasmatzidis, 2003,Seppa¨nen et al., 2003,
Hancock et al., 2007]. Recent work indicates the effect of high temperatures on workers is apparent
in macro-economic fluctuations of some low and middle income countries [Hsiang, 2010]. Though high
income populations appear to be less affected by temperature when working environments can be
controlled [Graff Zivin and Neidell, 2010]. It is possible that this dichotomy explains why output in
poor populations around the world is strongly correlated with temperature while output in wealthier
countries is not [Dell et al., 2009a].
To estimate future loses from reduction in worker performance, we begin with the estimated rate at
which output is lost when temperatures rise above 27◦C. Hsiang (2010) estimates that annual output
falls 2.65% for a 1◦C increase in temperature over a three month period. This suggests that exposure
to one additional month at a temperature 1◦C higher (1 additional “heating degree-month”) reduces
annual output by 2.65%3 = 0.88%. This estimate, derived exclusively from macro-economic data, is very
close to (albeit slightly smaller) than laboratory-based estimates for reductions in worker productivity
(see Fig. 5B in [Hsiang, 2010]).
Initially ignoring the potential for high income individuals to adapt, we can use this study’s pooled
estimate that an average person will be exposed to an additional 8.69 heating degree-months above
27◦C (see the bottom panel of Table 5.3). Thus, if no workers are able to adapt, then we estimate that
an average worker’s output will fall 0.88%× 8.69 = 7.65% annually due only to reduced productivity
(for scale, 7.65% of the global economy in 2009 is $4.4 trillion; at 3-5% annual growth the corresponding
value will be $63-355 trillion in 2099). However, if we imagine that the third of workers with highest
income can invest in adaptive measures (eg. air conditioning) then we should focus only on the impacts
for medium and low income workers. The output of medium and low income workers is probably
below that of high income workers in absolute value, but medium and low income populations are
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exposed to twice the heating degree days of high income workers. Low income workers are exposed
to 10.76 heating degree-months above 27◦C, suggesting that the average worker’s output will decline
0.88% × 10.76 = 9.47% due only to productivity impacts of high temperatures. Meanwhile medium
income workers are exposed to 10.11 heating degree-months, suggesting their output would decline by
almost as much: 8.9%.
These estimated impacts via worker productivity are large. Global economic losses for the same
scenario estimated by damage functions in the DICE [Nordhaus, 2008] and PAGE [Stern, 2006] models
suggested that global output would fall 1.14% and 0.67% respectively (recall Table 5.2). Even if the
above estimates for productivity losses are too large by a factor of five, the damage functions currently
used would still be dramatically underestimating the costs of warming by omitting impacts on worker
productivity12.
5.6 Discussion
We have combined six global and spatially explicit datasets13 to describe the exposure of the global
economy to future temperature changes if the spatial distribution of economic units remains relatively
fixed14. Since it is difficult to know how the spatial distribution of economic activity will shift over
the coming century, this description should be interpreted carefully. In our view, there is no credible
way to characterize uncertainty in the spatial distribution of future economic activity, so we encour-
age moderate and level-handed skepticism of our findings. It is possible that over the next century
economic growth in the tropics will be rapid as historically poor countries “catch up” by importing
technologies, increasing public investments, progressing through demographic transitions and improv-
ing their governing institutions [Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2003, Sachs, 2005, Acemoglu, 2008]. In this
scenario, global economic exposure to climate change might be higher since more activity would be
concentrated in the low and middle income regions where future heating degree months are greatest.
12 In this simple example, we do not consider increases in worker productivity associated with rising temperatures for
workers at initially cold temperatures [Wyon, 2001, Pilcher et al., 2002]. We avoid constructing this estimate because
we know of no studies that have estimated the economic impact of workers warming from low temperatures. However,
we do not think it would be nearly enough to offset the effects of warming from high temperatures for three reasons.
(1) Cross-sectional analysis [Nordhaus, 2006b] and panel analysis [Dell et al., 2009a] fail to find that output per capita
increases for warming from initially low temperatures. (2) The exposure to warming from initially low temperatures is
small compared to the exposure to warming from initially high temperatures (recall Fig. 5.6) since most of the additional
exposure to high temperatures is compensated for by reductions in exposure to optimal temperatures (20-25◦C). (3) The
technology needed to keep working environments warm (when climates are cold) is dramatically simpler and cheaper
than the technology needed to keep working environments cool (when climates are hot). This technological asymmetry
is a general result from the second law of thermodynamics and is unlikely to change with future innovations.
13We actually combine twenty five datasets if one counts all 20 GCMs as separate datasets.
14We defended this assumption in Section 5.2.
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On the other hand, it is possible that gains in wealth may enable these populations to adapt to climate
changes more effectively, thereby reducing the economic impact of their higher exposure. Alternatively,
these economies might fail to converge to the output of high income regions, perhaps as a result of
climate changes. This would probably keep the global distribution of economic activity closer to the
one observed presently and described in this paper.
Climate induced migration is another mechanism through which the spatial distribution of the
modern economy might adjust to future temperature changes. Given the wide range of temperatures
in which current populations reside, it seems unreasonable to assume that entire societies will relocate
sufficiently far that our estimates here be wildly erroneous. It seems more likely that marginal indi-
viduals will find it privately advantageous to migrate [Deschenes and Moretti, 2009,Feng et al., 2010],
leading to small but limited displacements of economic activity. However, using the data we have
collected we can conduct the simple thought-experiment of asking how much displacement would have
to occur in order to maintain the current annual temperatures experienced by all economic units. This
thought experiment represents an extreme assumption that is opposite to the “no migration” assump-
tion maintained throughout this paper. Fig. 5.9 displays the distribution of distances that individuals
would have to migrate in order to ensure that their annual mean temperature in 2080-2099 was equal
to the temperature over 2011-2030 at their original location15. The distances migrated range from a
few kilometers (for individuals living near mountains that they can ascend) to 2,000 km (1,240 mi)
and the distance traveled by a randomly selected individual is approximately 470 km (290 mi). The
cost of relocating all durable infrastructure (eg. cities) to support this kind of global movement would
be fantastic, heuristically supporting the notion that climate-compensating migrations will likely only
be undertaken by marginal populations
15This thought experiment constrains individuals to remain living on land and to settle in the location nearest to their
original location that has a temperature equal or cooler than the temperature at their original location.
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Distance migrated to keep annual mean temperature constant (km)
Figure 5.9: Migration distances required to keep average temperatures constant. For each
individual, we compute the minimum distance they would need to migrate in order for their annual
mean temperature to remain unchanged. The probability density function is the distribution of dis-
tances for a randomly selected individual.
It is certain that populations will adapt to future temperature changes, so one must be cautious
when projecting global measures of exposure onto response functions estimated with time series or panel
data (as we did in Section 5.5). However, it is generally not known how fast or effectively populations
are able to adapt to environmental changes [Patt et al., 2010], a fact that underscores the importance
of research efforts that focus on this problem [Graff Zivin and Neidell, 2010,Dell et al., 2009b,Hsiang
and Narita, 2011, Meng et al., 2011]. Moreover, while adaptation is often assumed to minimize costs
[Deschenes and Greenstone, 2007, Patt et al., 2010] some social responses to environmental changes,
such as civil unrest [Burke et al., 2009,Hsiang et al., 2011], may exacerbate small environmental changes
by introducing economic inefficiencies.
Finally, we reiterate that only the direct exposure of economic units to future temperature changes
was analyzed here. There are many climatological variables other than temperature (eg. rainfall) that
will exhibit shifting climatologies in the future. Furthermore, there may exist many indirect mecha-
nisms (eg. ecosystem responses) through which temperature changes will themselves affect economic
output for which direct exposure to temperature changes is an inappropriate measure. Nonetheless,
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our estimates for the direct exposure of the global economy to temperature changes are simple, general
and robust; so we are hopeful that they will prove useful as a step towards simplifying what is otherwise
an overwhelmingly complex and conceptually challenging problem of unprecedented global scale.
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Figure 5.10: The global distribution of income in 2000 based on [Sala-i Martin, 2006] in linear units
(top) and logarithmic units (bottom). Global mean income is showed with a ‘+’.
Chapter 6
Implications and future work
In general, these studies have shown that relatively broad social outcomes, such as national income or
political stability, are sometimes strongly coupled to climatological variations. These results suggest
that in modern development or climate policy, we must be wary not to underestimate the social impact
of the climate. However, these results also show that we should not be fatalistic about social conditions
that we attribute to the climate because many populations have successfully decoupled their lives from
their climate, suggesting that the costs described in these studies are not unsurmountable. It seems
that the first step towards managing these climate impacts is to acknowledge that they exist and
identify where they persist. This has been the central contribution of this dissertation.
6.1 Climate policy
Ceteris paribus, all the chapters in this dissertations suggest that previous cost estimates for the social
cost of future climate change are too low. This, in turn, implies that efficient greenhouse gas emissions
will be lower than previous recommendations. Previous estimates for the cost of climate changes did
not include the costs of thermal stress on workers, civil conflicts or lost income to tropical cyclones.
These findings suggest that we should generally exhibit humility with respect to the completeness of
our cost estimates. In his recent review of the subject, [Tol, 2009] stated:
Research in this area has reached the point that we can now identify our areas of ignorance;
I believe that there are no more unknown unknowns, or at least no sizeable ones. But my
belief here may suffer from overconfidence. In a survey article I co-authored more than
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a decade ago on the social costs of climate change, we suggested that all aspects of the
problem were roughly known, and that research would be complete within a few years.
This view turned out to be so overoptimistic as to be entirely mistaken.
It seems unfortunate that he should once again be mistaken that there were not sizable and uncharac-
terized mechanisms. Perhaps, rather than ever assuming that all costs are known (recall Equation 1.1
and its discussion), we should simply recognize that costs will be systematically underestimated, ac-
cept that the remaining distribution of undiscovered costs is unknowable and design our policy-making
institutions accordingly. Future work is required to examine how this can be done. Perhaps all we
can do is to mimic civil engineers and include a “margin of safety” in the design of our policies. An
alternative might be to employ a “precautionary principle” in decision-making, placing the legal onus
of demonstrating costs are low (on those who benefit from altering the climate) rather than requiring
a demonstration that costs are high (from those who prefer the status quo).
The fact that global “damage functions” are systematically too low suggests that a more transparent
and less ad-hoc approach to their construction may have large benefits. Maybe the best we can do is
to “make it easy” to identify our own errors by making tools to streamline the research process. In
Chapter 5, I developed a single tool that may help to systematize the process, however a complete
procedure remains undeveloped should be pursued in future work.
All chapters, but particularly Chapter 4, suggest that the vulnerability of populations can decline
and that a simplistic view of climate changes with zero adaptation is inappropriate. However, these
results suggest that the process through which this occurs may not be obvious and that generalizations,
at this stage, are also inappropriate. From this work, we know the following facts about vulnerability
reduction or adaptation: (1) vulnerability to some events can decline rapidly but may not decline for
all sectors; (2) while declines in vulnerability may be correlated with higher income, it is not at all
clear that the decline is caused by higher income; (3) our results are consistent with (but do not prove)
a hypothesis that costs must be observable for them to be intentionally mitigated, suggesting that
simply identifying costs may itself spur adaptation; and (4) there may exist forms of adaptation, for
example predation or expropriation, that amplify the costs of climate changes rather than minimizing
them as is often assumed. Collectively, these facts provide mixed support for the belief that future
vulnerability reductions will limit the costs of climate change. Although, in net, they suggest that
effective adaptation is possible but that its structure remains unknown. Further research into each of
the above points is required to limit future social losses, however the second point deserves further
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discussion.
It is frequently suggested that money provides the strongest defense against climate change and
that instead of focusing on mitigation, policy should instead focus on economic growth or monetary
transfers to countries that are exposed to large changes. In Chapters 2, 3 and 4, we found that higher
income countries exhibited lower vulnerability to climatological fluctuations, a fact that might support
these policy proposals. However, as mentioned, it might not be the case that high income per se causes
the bulk of reductions in vulnerability, as we found in Chapter 4. As discussed in Chapter 3, it might
be the case that reductions in vulnerability cause incomes to rise, or that some other unobserved social
or technological changes that are correlated with income cause vulnerability to fall. If the latter case
is true, this is extremely important for the design of climate policy. If fungible income is itself not
the key ingredient for reducing vulnerability, than transfers of income between countries or growth in
income might have zero impact on global vulnerability.
For example, it could be the case that extensive road networks and high levels of market integration
are the key traits of economies that are resilient to ENSO and do not lapse into civil conflicts with
El Nin˜o, perhaps because food shortages are less severe. Road networks and market integration are
probably beneficial for economic growth, so we would observe that high income countries do not
respond to El Nin˜o with conflict (as we found). If this is the case, transfers of incomes or growth
in incomes that do not translate into the development of road networks and improvements in market
integration will not reduce a country’s vulnerability to ENSO. Road networks and market integration
are not goods that can be directly transferred from rich countries to poor countries; and there are
many ways in which economic growth can be encouraged but that allow roads and market integration
to stagnate. Thus, income transfers or growth policies are not themselves sufficient to guarantee that
climate vulnerabilities decline.
Even if income is less relevant for climate vulnerability than its correlates, it may be the case that
enough different growth policies will eventually reduce climate vulnerability by chance because we may
eventually address the important source of climate resilience. However, without more research into the
keys variables that are the proximate cause of climate resilience, such a policy seems both inefficient
and risky. For example, if emissions reductions are weak explicitly because we are relying on transfers
or growth to “save” future generations from otherwise heavy losses and, upon arriving in the year
2100, we discover that tacit social infrastructure is far more important for adaptation than tradable
income, we will be in trouble.
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For the above reasons, this dissertation provides strong support to the notion that rapid adaptation
to climate can occur, but we do not yet know how such an objective should be efficiently pursued.
Addressing this issue is central to future work because without such knowledge in hand, adaptation as
an operational policy cannot be relied on as a substitute for mitigation policies.
6.2 Economic Development
Because low income countries are strongly affected by the climate phenomena explored in this disserta-
tion, it also generates implications for development policy in the current (rather than future) world. In
some cases, identifying causal pathways helps to identify informational or market failures that can be
addressed directly, for example the benefits of temperature control systems in working environments
could be publicized to firm owners. In other cases the mechanisms are less clear (eg. Chapter 3) and
policy prescriptions may be somewhat weaker.
It may be that the largest contribution for some of these chapters, in terms of development policy,
may be their techniques for measuring the economic losses to climate. Measurement is itself valuable
because it is a requirement of efficient contracting and, in some of these cases, properly designed
contracts may be all that are needed to help mitigate social losses. For example, the design of tropical
cyclone index insurance could effectively manage the annual cyclone risk of $30-40 billion in losses, if
a correct index can be specified. This and other applications are topics for future work.
In the study of economic development, there has been a perennial debate about the relative im-
portance of culture, geography and institutions. This dissertation cannot settle this debate, however
its results suggest two comments that may inform it.
First, the effect of climate is sizable. In Chapter 2 it was found that a one standard-deviation
increase in September-October-November temperature altered average overall growth by approximately
one percentage point, with the effect being as large as two percentage points in some industries.
In Chapter 3 we found that a one standard-deviation increase in NINO3 increased the risk of civil
conflict in the topics by approximately 23%. Finally, in Chapter 4 we found that a one standard-
deviation in tropical cyclone wind exposure reduced total agricultural growth by approximately one
percentage point, a loss that persists unmitigated for at least three years. It is not immediately clear
if these climatological effects are “larger” or “smaller” than the effects of most cultural or institutional
variables. But they are clearly not small in absolute terms, suggesting that environmental influences
on development are not ignorable. Although, in the case of ENSO and conflict, we can say that
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climatological variables were at least as good, if not better, than any social or economic variables for
explaining the timing of conflicts.
Second, the fact that a single doctoral dissertation can uncover three large impacts of climate on
development suggests that the problem is under-studied. There are a large number of studies finding
large correlations between economic performance and institutional or cultural variables, however there
are very few that carefully examine the influence of environmental or geographic variables. Perhaps one
reason environmental variables are infrequently studied may be the difficulty that social scientists have
had measuring them. In each chapter of this dissertation, new techniques for measuring environmental
variables was developed at high cost to the researcher[s]; however, in each case, large economic impacts
were detected. If the difficulty of these studies explains why there are so few of them, and the small
number of studies explains why environmental variables are considered less important than institutional
or cultural variables, then the relative dominance of cultural and institutional explanations for economic
underperformance might simply be an epistemological artifact.
Another classical challenge in development economics is to explain cross-country differences in
performance. Yet, it is unclear if any results in this dissertation should contribute to that discussion.
In each chapter, the relationships that were identified always compared a country to itself in different
states of its environment. While the internal validity of this approach is strong, its external validity
is less obvious. Countries differ in many important and unobservable ways, so relationships that hold
within two countries may not hold between them. Based on these results, one could hypothesize that
the environmental mechanisms identified also explain cross-country patterns; however these results
alone are insufficient to prove such a claim.
Finally, it is worth noting the above discussion regarding vulnerability and adaptation to climate
does not only apply to the future. Many resources are currently dedicated to understanding and
improving adaptive capacity for future climate changes, however this dissertation suggests that many
low income populations currently suffer large losses that are attributable to climatological variations.
Therefore, when future work elucidates why some populations are less vulnerable to climatological
variations, those results should be immediately applied in current development policies.
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